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Abstract 
 
Nigeria is constitutionally a secular country but its citizens are rated among the 
most religious in the world by several surveys. Religious symbolism is 
conspicuous in Nigeria, littered from educational institutions to work 
environments and market places. Semiotics and semantics have a rich history 
of the study of symbols, however, symbols are also utilized as primes in 
psychology. Research in social and cognitive psychology suggest that symbols, 
particularly when embedded with emotive meaning, serve to reinforce particular 
associated and learnt constructs. The present thesis assesses how religious vs. 
secular symbols interact with specific cognitive processes and mechanisms 
(Type I and Type II cognitive processes, agency detection, need for cognitive 
closure, and immortality bias). Five studies were carried out in Nigeria. Study 
One showed a high rate of God references in two non-religious Nigerian 
national newspapers (broadsheet and tabloid). The hypotheses of Studies Two 
to Five were tested across religious vs. secular situational influences. Studies 
Two and Three tested hypotheses related to the rationality vs. religion debate 
through the default interventionist dual process theory. Study Four assessed 
how Nigerian children (aged 5 to 11 years old) conceive of retrograde 
immortality through reasoning by analogy about future immortality. Study Five A 
replicated the previously-reported correlation between need for cognitive 
closure and religious fundamentalism. Study Five B showed that when 
uncertainty is primed in individuals the detection of supernatural agency 
positively mediates, and the detection of human agency negatively mediates, 
the relationship between need for cognitive closure and religious 
fundamentalism. Aspects of dual processes theories and the Cognitive Science 
of Religion (CSR) that are concerned with implicit cognitive functions directly 
informed this series of experiments, however conformity and self-theories offer 
complementary explicit/social perspectives. Two sets of recommendations are 
offered; the first addresses future research in psychology, such as the 
separation of content from process in the rationality vs. religion debate. The 
second addresses policy recommendations at three interconnected levels 
(macro, institutional, and individual). 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Religious symbolism is conspicuous in all spheres of Nigerian society, from 
print, audio and video media outlets to all levels of institutions of learning. What 
effects do these religious symbols have on the cognition of individuals in 
Nigerian society? Are these religious symbols merely decorative expressions of 
allegiance (e.g., the crucifix for Catholics and the crescent moon for Muslims)? 
Do these symbols serve to reinforce religious ideas learnt repetitively from 
childhood and dominant within society? Or do these symbols serve the two 
questions posed earlier, as well as interact with default cognitive mechanisms 
that predispose us to religiosity?  
 
Anthropologists, particularly material social anthropologists, emphasise the 
importance of cultural artefacts in understanding the collective consciousness of 
societies (e.g., Henare, Holbraad, & Wastell, 2007). The study of symbols, 
through semiology (Saussure, 1916; 1986) and semiotics (Peirce, 1955; 1978) 
has a rich relationship with psychoanalysis (e.g., Freud, 1899; Jung, 1959, 
1963; Lacan, 1978, 1988) but fails to integrate the insights offered by other 
more contemporary fields of psychology, gained through the use of symbols as 
experimental primes1. Theorists (e.g., Bouissac, 2007) argue that for the study 
of signs to advance further, it will need to transcend its present linguistic and 
philosophical approach and move towards psychological frameworks. 
 
The present thesis offers a multidisciplinary approach to the study of the 
situational effects of religious vs. secular symbols, with a particular emphasis on 
cognitive psychology and the cognitive science of religion (CSR).  All the 
experiments in the present thesis were carried out in Nigeria; Studies One, Two 
Four and Five were carried out in the former capital (Lagos), while Study Three 
was carried out in the present capital (Abuja).  
 
 
1
For an exception see biosemiotics which advances a nature-culture coevolution (e.g., 
Hoffmeyer, 1997, 2007, 2008; Kampis, 1998; Kull, 2000; Maran & Kleisner, 2010). 
2 
 
 
 
 
Study One was carried out as an unobtrusive and inexpensive introduction into 
research in Nigeria, where all later studies were also carried out. This study 
quantified the number of God references in two non-religious Nigerian national 
newspapers. In Study Two and Three, dual-process theories in cognitive 
psychology were utilized to assess the diametric effects of supraliminal 
exposure to religious vs. secular symbols. These studies engaged with the 
rationality vs. religion debate, and contrary to popular secular opinion, argues 
that religious belief can be rational, albeit only specific facets of rationality are 
considered (e.g., epistemological rationality and not inferential rationality). Study 
Four was carried out with children aged between five and eleven years old and 
analysed the effect of exposure to religious vs. secular symbolism on 
immortality bias. Study Five engaged with the Cognitive Science of Religion 
(CSR) to analyse how agency detection explains (i.e., mediates) the 
relationship between the need for cognitive closure and religious 
fundamentalism, under religious and secular situational influences. See Chapter 
3.8 for a more comprehensive description of all the experiments carried out. 
 
1.1  Research Setting and Epistemological Relevance 
 
Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) point out the need for research in 
psychology outside the Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and 
Democratic (WEIRD) societies to diversify our sources of knowledge and 
broaden our understanding of human variation. Henrich et al. criticise the 
formulation and empirical validation of psychological theories based on studies 
carried out with WEIRD participants, suggesting that WEIRD participants are 
particularly unusual in comparison to the rest of the world‘s population. The first 
point has been widely welcomed (e.g., Ceci, Kahan, & Braman, 2010; Lancy 
2010), the second point however, has received much criticism, that instead 
WEIRD participants are closer to human nature (e.g., Bennis & Medin, 2010; 
Maryanski, 2010). Nonetheless, the cognitive constructs assessed in the 
present thesis are theorized to be ubiquitous across culturesas a result of our 
common evolutionary past (Atran, 2002; Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 2001) but subject 
to situational influences (e.g., highly religious cultures, threatening, ambiguous, 
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and uncertain situations).  
 
Religion permeates Nigerian society (Adeboye, 2012; Marquette, 2012), it is 
estimated that about 93% of all Nigerians practice either of the two world 
dominant doctrinal religions, Christianity and Islam (Chiluwa, 2012; Mandryk & 
Johnstone, 2001). A 2010 Gallup Global Report showed that 96% of Nigerians 
rated religion as being an important part of their life. A more direct measure, the 
Global Index of Religion and Atheism (WIN-Gallup, 2012) rated Nigeria as the 
second most religious country (93%) out of 57 countries.Some research has 
been carried out on religion in Nigeria including research on Christian miracles 
obtained through cyberspace (Chiluwa, 2012), a call to view religion as a 
―crucial‖ component of education (Olademo, 2011), an argument in favour of 
training in Christian political leadership (Omenka, 2009), a religious approach 
toward health care (2011), the humanitarian efforts of religion (Orji 2011), and 
on the peaceful coexistence among religions (Fatokun, 2009). The studies in 
the present thesis however were principally concerned with the specific 
cognitive mechanisms and processes responsible for the acquisition of religion 
in the first place, and the situational influences of religious vs secular symbols 
on cognition. 
 
Islam and Christianity share many facets in common, such as belief in the same 
monotheistic  Abrahamic God, repentance, forgiveness of sins, and damnation 
(Peters, 2004), the present thesis however utilized only Christian symbols for 
the religious category. Therefore, the fieldwork was carried out in parts of 
Nigeria where Christianity is dominant or is as dominant as Islam. No data were 
collected from parts of Nigeria where Islam is the only dominant religion. 
Muslims however that lived in the regions where the studies were carried out 
were not excluded, because they live in a culture where Christian doctrine and 
symbols are dominant (e.g., through the presence of Christian billboards, TV 
adverts and programmes, radio programmes, music, car stickers, films, and in 
conversation with peers).   
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1.2  The Multifaceted and Paradoxical Nature of Religion    
 
Religion exerts a paradoxical and tremendous influence over human affairs 
(Hogan 2004). Religion unifies individuals across cultures through shared 
values (Johnson & Bering 2006; Johnson & Kruger, 2004), where fellow 
believers are considered as fictive kin, and God is considered as an attachment 
figure (Kirkpatrick 2004), but religion also divides individuals by constructing 
out-group members (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Religion encourages 
altruistic behaviour, particularly towards ingroup members (Batson 1983), and 
appeals to an innate intuitive regard for morality and decency (Ebstyne & 
Furrow, 2008) but religion has also been the justification for inhumane violence 
(Juergensmeyer, 1993; 2002, Kimball, 2002). Religion promotes pro-social 
behaviour (Ali, 2011; Johnson et al., 2003), but also encourages anti-social 
behaviour such as egotism (Pichon, Boccato & Saroglou, 2007). The complexity 
of religion hinders a comprehensive definition, therefore, studies investigating 
the influence of religion on behaviour must be specific about the particular 
facet/s being investigated, and about what religion in particular is being 
investigated. 
 
The present study assessed Christianity and utilized Christian icons. Christianity 
in the present thesis is not conceptualised as synonymous with religion but as 
merely a historically-recent expression of religion, which has borrowed from 
previous religions, and is confined to a specific set of cultures, albeit the biggest 
set in comparison with other contemporary religions (Robert 2009). All the 
paradoxes mentioned above can be found in Christianity to varying extents; for 
instance, Christianity unites individuals across races and countries (Emerson & 
Kim, 2003), yet within particular countries and periods, Christianity has caused 
division and hostility among its denominations (e.g., Catholics vs. Protestants in 
Ireland during the late 20th century). Despite the paradoxes within Christianity, 
there are however some certainties within mainstream Christianity across all 
denominations, two of which are of specific interest to the present thesis; 
reward for belief/faith in the Christ and punishment for disbelief. 
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1.2.1   Reward and Punishment in Christianity 
 
The Bible is the definitive text of Christianity; all consequential teachings in the 
latter are derived from the former (Migliorebs, 2004). Every Christian is 
expected to read the Bible, save those prevented by a biological or social 
handicap (e.g., blindness or illiteracy). The Bible contains strict instructions such 
as the rewards for believing in God, and the consequences for not believing in 
God. For instance, John 6:47 (KJV) states ―Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that 
believeth on me hath everlasting life‖.  Act 16:31 (KJV) reads ―…believe on the 
Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved, and thy house‖. Hebrews 11:6 
(KJV) reads ―But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that cometh 
to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently 
seek him‖. See Appendix G (I) for a non-comprehensive list of the rewards 
noted in the Bible for belief in the Christian God. 
 
The sharp line between Heaven and Hell, as reward and punishment is a legacy 
left by the protestant reformation, which challenged the five states of afterlife 
(Heaven, Limbo for the righteous who came before Christ, Limbo for infants, 
Purgatory, and Hell) offered by the medieval church (Marshall, 2010). The ideal 
Ockham‘s razor utilized by Reformed, Protestant reformers, and Lutherans alike 
was to reference the Bible, which made no provision for a middle ground 
between reward and punishment. Just like the rewards outlined above, 
numerous verses in the Bible also warn against the consequences of not 
believing in the Abrahamic God. For instance, John 3:18 (KJV) states ―… he 
that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed‖. John 
3:36 (KJV) also states that ―… he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; 
but the wrath of God abideth on him‖. Revelation (20:10, KJV) describes Hell as 
a lake of fire and sulphur, Matthew (13:50, KJV) reasserts that it is a fiery 
furnace ―where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth‖, and Mark (9:48, 
KJV) informs that the fire never quenches. Mark (9:47, KJV) further advises that 
it is better to pluck out an eye if it offends one than to be cast into Hell with both 
eyes. Appendix G (II) for a non-comprehensive list of the negative attributes of 
scepticism/disbelief in the Abrahamic God in the Bible.   
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1.3  Types of Signs Utilized  
 
It is necessary to distinguish between three types of signs as proposed by 
Peirce (1955, 1978).According to Peirce, there are three kinds of signs: Symbol, 
which does not bear resemblance to that which it signifies (e.g., swastika for 
Nazi ideology), Icon, which bears resemblance to that which it signifies (portrait 
of Christ for Christianity), and Index, which bears a causal/consequential 
relationship to that which it signifies (e.g., smoke for fire). Peirce‘s classification 
has been further extended by Sebeok (1994) to include Signals, which elicit a 
mechanical response, Symptoms, whichelicit a natural, automatic and non-
arbitrary response to that which it signifies, and Names, which classify 
extensions. The present study utilised icons and symbols, however as Peirce 
recognised, and as Chandler (2002) emphasises, these distinctions are not 
mutually exclusive: an index can be an icon, an icon can be symbol, and a 
symbol can be an index. Chandler illustrates this using a map as an example; a 
(two dimensional) map can be indexical in the sense that it marks locations, 
therefore a consequence of the presence of the marked position being in that 
particular place. A (two-dimensional) map can be iconic in the sense that it 
maps exact scaled distances between locations, and symbolic in the sense that 
it does not bear a natural resemblance to the place it signifies. Therefore, in the 
present thesis, which is principally concerned with psychology, symbols, icons, 
and signs will be used interchangeably, according to the context in which it is 
being used.  
 
Classic semiotic theory can be assessed through two different frameworks: 
Saussure‘s dyadic approach (1916;1986) and Peirce‘s (1955) triadic approach. 
Saussure postulates that signs are comprised of two components, the signifier 
and the signified. Taking an example from one of the icons utilized in the 
present study; punitive religious iconography (depiction of Hell), the signifier is 
the image that depicts Hell, while the signified is the place called Hell. Crucially, 
according to Saussure, the signified is a concept conceived in the perceiver‘s 
mind and not a physical entity (i.e., an idea of Hell not the actual place called 
Hell). Langer (1951) expands the point that signs are not generally viewed as 
proxies for the objects they represent, but as conveyors for the conception of 
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the objects they are meant to represent (Langer, 1951; also see Aristotle, cited 
in Richards, 1932). Saussure further posits that the relationship between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary, defined by one‘s community. Building on 
our example, the conceptualisation of Hell can differ across communities, for 
instance one community can conceptualise Hell as a place of eternal damnation 
for all sinners, while another community might conceptualise Hell as a fictional 
tale of a distant culture. Consequently, Saussure emphasises that a sign has no 
meaning independent of context and of other signs. According to Saussure, the 
negative relationship between signs is particularly important in defining the 
signs themselves. For instance, in the present chapter, the punitive religious 
icon utilized gains its particular iconic context in light of the other religious icon 
utilized (i.e., benign religious iconography), and both religious icons gain their 
particular iconic context in light of another opposite icon utilized (i.e., secular 
iconography). The extent to which these symbols are conceived of as opposites 
will depend on the perceiver, as outlined above; this is why the link between the 
signifier and the signified is arbitrary.  
 
Peirce (1955, 1978) offers a triadic semiotic theory, which postulates that signs 
are comprised of three components, the representamen, the object, and an 
interpretant. Taking an example from one of the icons utilized in the present 
study, i.e., punitive religious iconography, the representamen is the form of the 
icon (e.g., depiction of Hell), this is conceptually similar to Saussure‘s signifier. 
The object will be Hell, i.e., that which the form refers to. Peirce‘s object differs 
from Saussure‘s signified in that Saussure conceives of the signified in the 
Aristotelian sense, i.e., a general concept of the signified that the signifier 
stands for, while Peirce conceives of the object as a physical reality which the 
representamen stands for. Peirce‘s third facet of the sign, the interpretant, will 
be the interpretation of the link between the representamen and the object, i.e., 
the interpretation of the link between the depiction of Hell and the place referred 
to as Hell. This subjective interpretation, which is also present in Saussure‘s 
signifier-signified link, but more elaborately detailed as a third facet, i.e., 
interpretant, in Peirce‘s model, is of particular importance in the approach of the 
present chapter, which focuses on the conditions (internal cognitive conditions, 
and to a lesser extent external sociocultural conditions) which direct the 
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influence of religious signs.     
 
Cousins (2012), in his semiotic treatment of mind and culture, and in reaction to 
Saussure‘s signifier and signified dyad, suggests that the dyad model (as well 
as Peirce‘s triad model) offers insufficient explanatory power when signs are 
intended to have a goal. Peirce‘s triadic modelis problematic because it 
deviates from the consensus that signs ought to represent the concept of a 
thing, not the thing itself. Peirce‘s model also lacks the clarity of a primary 
reference (i.e., signifier - signified). Cousins departs from Peirce‘s triadic model 
by building on Saussure‘s dyad model and adding a third facet (to Saussure‘s) 
to propose a Telic Triad model which offers an even more appropriate and 
contemporary framework for the present chapter. Cousinshas named this third 
facet the intendant, which encompasses both an intended outcome and a 
perceiver who anticipates that outcome. For instance, in the punitive religious 
icon used in the present chapter (i.e., depiction of Hell), both the intended 
outcome (the goal of the sign) and the interpretation will be that the perceiver is 
reminded of the consequence of sin (e.g., eternal punishment). The 
interpretation of the intendant, however, will only hold for the interpreter within 
the same cultural/religious worldview as the creator of the sign. Within a 
different cultural/(anti-) religious worldview, for instance, the same sign might 
have an intended goal to mock the belief in Hell, which an atheist might 
correctly interpret and be amused by (as intended). A believer, however, might 
also correctly interpret the sign but not find it funny (which in itself might or 
might not have been the goal of the creator of the sign). Cousins‘s triad model 
therefore offers a more appropriate theoretical framework to situate the present 
chapter because it offers an avenue for the arbitrary interpretation of the 
signifier-signified link, through the intendant.  
 
For a recent religiosity-related example of the intricacy of sign semiotics, Ling 
(2010) documents how the fast-food chain McDonald‘s in Singapore suffered an 
embarrassment when its intendant in a Chinese zodiac souvenir promotion was 
misconstrued by a particular cultural group (the Chinese), as a result of 
McDonald‘s attempt to avoid upsetting a different cultural group (Muslims). 
Singapore has a huge Chinese population, and the Chinese zodiac calendar is 
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made up of twelve animals including a pig. Islam is also one of the major 
religions in Singapore, and Muslims do not interact with pigs.Therefore, 
McDonald‘s anticipating a negative interpretation of their interndant, replaced 
the pig souvenir with a souvenir of Cupid. Quek and Ling (2013) analysed 97 
documents, including online newspapers and news station forums, to show that 
a significant percentage of the Chinese population were offended. They (the 
Chinese) were offended because the Chinese Zodiac is an important part of 
their cultural heritage, and they felt it ought not to be tampered with.  
 
The present thesis is interested in how our cognitive architecture biases the way 
we react to religious vs. secular signs, and to a lesser extent how sociocultural 
conditioning aids this process. The psychological approach to semiosis 
therefore is decidedly implicit, i.e., focused on why the interpretant interprets the 
way she does, which can be easily situated within Saussure‘s or Peirce‘s model. 
However, because the icons utilised serve specific goals (i.e., punitive religious 
reminders of supernatural punishment, benign religious reminders of God‘s 
love, and secular reminders to think logically and rationally), Cousins‘s triad 
model offers the most appropriate framework. 
 
1.4 The Self and Religion 
The recorded history of the self in the West can be traced at least as far back to 
the gnothi seauton (know thyself) of the Delphic Oracle. The ‗self‘ has remained 
relevant through Shakespeare‘s ―this above all, to thine own self be true‖ 
(Shakespeare, trans. 1934, 1.3.79) to William James‘s self-theory (1890), down 
to the contemporary notions of disembodied minds (Blose, 1981) and a 
sanitized account of Freud‘s (1915) unconscious (i.e., as greatly influential but 
without the Freudian conflicts such as sexuality and Oedipal libido).Locke 
(1690), in his polemical work An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
philosophized that the self was completely a product of experience and 
education, which fitted in with his thesis of the mind as a tabula rasa (i.e., blank 
slate). This view of the mind as a blank slate—which was later championed by 
stimulus-response behaviourism (Skinner, 1938), and shortly thereafter largely 
discredited by the cognitive revolution (e.g., Chomsky, 1959)--was quite 
influential in the long line of ideological shifts that has led to the present 
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noncontroversial view of the self as entirely corporeal.  
Locke (1690) likened the self to the consciousness of being (e.g., 
consciousness of pain, pleasure, happiness, and misery). That is, one‘s self is 
not one‘s physical attributes such as one‘s face or limbs, but self-awareness. 
This view, particularly when seen through Hobbes‘ (1950) assertion that man is 
entirely corporeal and no metaphysical entities exist either in the form of 
Christian angels or Descartes‘ rational soul, was in direct confrontation with the 
medieval church (Porter, 2003). Medieval theology envisioned the body as a 
dungeon for the soul, therefore self-denial (e.g., monastic asceticism and 
celibacy) and general self-distrust were considered virtuous. The mechanistic 
philosophies of the 17th century increasingly freed up individuals to engage in 
self-discovery and self-expression, for instance through self-portraits and 
autobiographies (Porter, 2003). Consciousness however is not all there is, and 
Freud‘s (1915) influential work in fleshing out a theory of the conscious and 
unconscious, with the latter having a greater influence than the former on one‘s 
self, set the stage for contemporary dual-process theories (of the conscious and 
the unconscious). The present thesis will utilize these dual-process theories as 
an explanatory framework for the series of experiments carried out. 
James (1890), in his Principles of Psychology, offered a more holistic concept of 
self than Locke‘s (1690) likening of the self to the contents of consciousness. 
James extended the concept of self to include the different aspects of one‘s self, 
as well as the entirety of one‘s possessions, including one‘s material assets 
(e.g., house and car) and one‘s relationships (e.g., family and friends). The self, 
as conceived by James, is divided into two classes: the ―me‖ (i.e., the material 
self, the social self, and the spiritual self) and ―I‖ (i.e., the pure ego). The 
material self, as the name implies, refers to everything corporeal intimately 
associated with one‘s self (i.e., one‘s body, family, house, cars, etc.).The social 
self refers to one‘s interaction within society and the recognition one receives 
therein.The spiritual self refers to one‘s psychic dispositions.And the pure ego, 
finally, is very similar to Locke‘s stream of consciousness (i.e., a subjective 
sense of a personal present identity that is consistent with the past and 
imagined future). Following James‘s self theory, the study of the self has been 
widely explored within psychology. Sirgy (1982) lists the various ways in which 
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self-concept has been construed across different branches of psychology, 
presented below in tabular form. 
Table 1 
Interpretation of Self-Theory Across Various Psychological Theories, 
Tabularized Based onText in Sirgy (1982) 
 
Psychological Theory                              Interpretation of Self-Concept 
 
Psychoanalytic theory  
Behavioral theory  
Organismic theory 
Phenomenology 
Cognitive theory  
Symbolic interactionism  
 
A conflicted self system 
A system of conditioned responses 
Functional/developmental approach 
A holistic approach  
Conceptual system processing approach  
A system of interpersonal interactions 
 
1.4.1 William James’s Social Self, Erving’s Dramaturgical Analysis, and 
Conformity 
James‘s (1890) social self hypothesis foreshadowed the rise in conformity 
studies in psychology which began in earnest in the 1930s, albeit with the view 
that one can alter one‘s behaviour multiple times across multiple contexts as an 
expression of their different social selves. According to James, this seamless 
transition of the self to match the character of valued others (e.g., family, 
friends, authority figures) arises due to need for recognition. To equate James‘s 
social self as a conforming self, however, may be a misreading of the social 
self, because rather than transforming behaviour to match those of valued 
others, James posits that different aspects of one‘s self are revealed in different 
contexts (e.g., in a religious gathering vs. secular party setting). James, 
however, was not clear on how the individual would react if the particular 
character of a valued other were not in his repertoire of social selves, that is, 
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whether or not that individual would assume a new social self. 
 
To gain more insight into how individuals display multiple sides of themselves in 
different contexts, it will be worth considering Erving‘s (1959) dramaturgical 
analysis. Erving (1959), using the theatre as an analogy, likened individuals to 
actors who put up different acts to please their present audience (i.e., the 
person or group of people the individual is communicating with). This acted-out 
presentation of self occurs in the front region (i.e., like a theatre stage), while 
the back region (i.e., like a theatre‘s backstage) is the individuals personal 
mental space where he/she plans the actions to be executed in the front region. 
Within this framework, emphasis is placed on the present situational context in 
understanding human interaction. Unlike James‘s social self, Erving‘s various 
acted-out selves do not necessarily have to be part of the individual‘s (multiple) 
identity, but an identity merely put on for acceptance, as an actor would expect 
from his audience. However, what happens when an individual is confronted 
with an audience with an obviously incorrect or unexpected answer/attitude? 
What happens when an individual, or actor, is in an ambiguous situation?       
 
Individuals conform when they alter their beliefs and behaviours to be 
consistent with social norms (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Deutsch & Gerald, 
1955; Effersona et al., 2008; Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000; Renkema et al., 
2008; Sherif, 1935). Sherif (1935) was one of the first researchers to explore 
conformity in an experiment that utilized the autokenetic effect. The autokenetic 
effect occurs because during the perception of a jittery stimulus, the brain 
corrects the jittery movement by making reference points with other stimuli in 
close proximity, to make the jittery stimulus appear steady. However, in the 
absence of reference points such a stimulus will appear unsteady. Sherif (1935) 
asked participants to make notes measuring the movement of a stationary light 
with no other object in proximity (a light source in a dark room).The results of 
the study demonstrated that individual participants altered their answers to 
match those of the collective group. Asch (1951) also showed that participants 
adhered to an obviously wrong answer when that answer was collectively 
agreed-upon by the group (group members, unbeknownst to the participant, 
were confederates of the experimenter). 
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Classic conformity studies distinguish between normative and informational 
conformity (Deutsch & Gerald, 1955). Normative conformity is theorized to 
occur when individuals alter their behaviour to obtain and/or maintain group 
desirability (Lonnqvist et al., 2009; Navarrete, Hall, & Fessler, 2005), and 
avoidance of social disproval (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Informational 
conformity is theorized to occur when individuals alter their behaviour due to a 
desire for accuracy; it is more internalised than normative conformity and its 
effect is more pronounced when the individual lacks competent information 
(Lonnqvist et al., 2009). Researchers interested in the automaticity paradigm 
have carried out experiments to investigate if individuals can indeed be primed 
to conform beyond their awareness, automatically and non-consciously. For 
instance, Epley and Gilovich (1999) demonstrated that participants primed with 
conformity through a scrambled sentence task conformed more with 
experimental confederates than participants who were not primed. 
 
Numerous studies have shown that religion increases conformity.For instance, 
Van Cappellen et al. (2011) showed that religious priming increases 
informational conformity, independent of self-reported religiousness. 
Participants were primed through a lexical decision task (i.e., by categorizing 
combinations of letters as words or non-words); in the religious prime condition, 
religious words like ‗salvation‘ or ‗prayer‘ appeared for 15 ms followed by a 
mask between the presentation of the words and non-words. Conformity was 
measured by assigning participants a numeric task and presenting each 
participant three alternative answers to the numeric task that were given by 
other participants (informational influence). Results showed that participants 
primed with religion significantly conformed more than the other participants in 
choosing the correct answer to the numerical task (Van Cappellen et al., 2011). 
 
The results of Van Cappellen et al. (2011) demonstrated that participants in the 
religious priming condition conformed, regardless of their religiousness, 
because of their knowledge of the religious primes utilized. The effect found in 
Van Cappellen et al. is in accord with Stark‘s (1984) suggestion that studies 
investigating religious conformity would only be successful if the sample 
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population is religious. In cultures with a dominant religious worldview, religious 
ideas are heightened and become a valid aspect of normal interaction. This 
makes Nigeria an ideal location to carry out the experiments in the present 
thesis, as all popular forms of media are awash with religious doctrine; religion 
is reflected in conversations and symbolism (e.g., company logos, billboards, 
car stickers, etc.), and it is perpetuated in society by leaders, political and 
otherwise. This creates an ideal environment for informational conformity, given 
that the existential questions addressed by religion are ones that the average 
individual lacks competent information on. Most Christians in Nigeria attend 
places of worship most Sundays, in which expressions of religious emotions, 
intentions, and actions are readily and overtly displayed. Such expressions of 
religiosity saturate Nigerian society, in not only traditional church spaces but 
also other appropriated spaces such as hotels (Adeboye, 2012). Further, 
deviancy from religious norms is ridiculed and stigmatized (Bujra & Igwe, 2006), 
creating an ideal climate for normative conformity. The role of informational 
conformity in Nigeria will be considered in the first study carried out in the 
present thesis.  
 
1.4.2 William James’s Spiritual Self, Type I Cognitive Processes, and the 
Cognitive Science of Religion 
William James‘s (1890) spiritual self is the most abstractly defined of all his 
classes of selves. James refers to the spiritual self as ―… a man‘s inner or 
subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions…‖ (pp. 296). Despite the 
name ‗spiritual self‘, this conceptualization of self is devoid of 
spirits/ghosts/religion per se, but rather stems from an intuitive inner core, or 
what James refers to as the ―central nucleus of the Self‖ (pp. 298). A ―rather 
mysterious operation‖ that we can only get a sense of where the sensory input 
facilitated by our psychic disposition ends and motor input begins.  
These ―psychic dispositions‖ of the spiritual self articulated by James (1890) 
may be what we now refer to as Type I cognitive processes, which are not open 
to conscious introspection but are autonomous, and go on to affect conscious 
Type II cognitive processes (Evans 1989, 2006, 2008; Wason & Evans, 1975; 
Stanovich, 2004). These dispositions that James referred to play a major role in 
15 
 
 
 
the contemporary Cognitive Science of Religion‘s (CSR) approach to the study 
of religion. According to CSR, a number of these dispositions, which are 
automatic and not necessarily open to conscious introspection, encourage and 
maintain the acquisition of religion (Barrett, 2000; Bering, 2000, 2004; Boyer, 
1994, 1996, 2000; Guthrie, 1980, 1993; McCauley, 2000; Sperber, 1996). These 
dispositions are theorized to be enabled by specific cognitive mechanisms (e.g., 
the hyperactive agency detection device [HADD] Barrett, 2004). CSR will be 
explored extensively in the present thesis, under both the conceptual chapters 
and the last two empirical chapters. 
In his treatment of the spiritual self, James (1890) also conceives of this 
―obscure‖ aspect of the self as the origin of ―conclusions‖. Interestingly this 
foreshadows Mercier and Sperber‘s (2011a, 2011b) argumentation theory, 
which generally posits that reasoning (a conscious process) evolved to support 
conclusions generated by obscure unconscious processes. Mercier and 
Speber‘s argumentation theory will be expanded on in the conceptual chapters, 
particularly with regard to how it relates to the dual process theories and the 
weak massive modularity framework. 
1.5 The Big Picture: Non-Conscious Effects of Religious Primes 
 
Studies show that relevant symbols in one's immediate environment can prime 
individuals to act in predictable ways (Alter & Kwan, 2009; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 
2003; Bargh, 2006; Critcher & Gilovich, 2008; Gueguen, Bougeard-Delfosse, & 
Jacob, 2015). This priming influence often occurs beyond the conscious 
awareness of the individual through an autonomous association of already-
connected constructs in memory (Bargh, 2006; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg, 
1998). For instance, Bushman et al. (2007) showed that both religious US 
students (Study One) and non-religious Dutch students (Study Two) 
demonstrated increased aggression when primed with a punitive God. Gervais 
and Norenzayan (2012) showed that exposing Canadian participants to Rodin‘s 
sculpture The Thinker (a western secular symbol) increased religious disbelief. 
Most religiosity priming research, however, is undertaken outside Sub-Saharan 
Africa, creating a gap in the data from which we draw pan-human theories 
regarding the nature of religious and secular primes. In view of this gap, the 
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experiments in the present thesis were carried out in Nigeria, one of the most 
religious countries in Africa (WIN-Gallup, 2012), and assessed the situational 
influence of secular symbols and religious (benign and punitive) symbols on 
religiosity.    
 
Abrahamic religions (i.e., Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) are doctrinal; they 
are characterized by high levels of repetition which leads to what Whitehouse 
(2005) terms the ―tedium effect‖. The tedium effect occurs when over-familiarity 
with particular units of information leads to a deficiency in active conscious 
processing of those units, as a consequence of the high level of repetition. 
Stanovich (2004) terms these conscious-cum-nonconscious processes as the 
set of autonomous subsystems (TASS), while Smith and DeCoster (1999, 2000) 
terms them ―functionally parallel neural networks‖. For instance, if narratives in 
Christianity and Islam about Hell as a place of punishment for sinners are 
repeated enough times, individuals would no longer need to consciously make 
the connection between sinners and Hell, but would do so effortlessly and 
nonconsciously. In priming studies, the prime (e.g., a symbol) only acts as a 
medium that is associated with already-learnt constructs stored in the memory 
of the individual. For instance, a symbol of Hell will have no effect on an 
individual who has never heard of narratives about Hell. Therefore, although the 
religious priming symbols are important in the experiments carried out in the 
present thesis, the highly religious nature of the culture in which the studies 
were carried out is even more important in guiding the predictions made.  
 
Various studies on priming show that one does not necessarily need to hold a 
particular belief to be significantly influenced, rather what is necessary is an 
already-established knowledge of the construct to be primed (Bushman et al., 
2007; Clobert & Saroglou, 2013; Labouff et al., 2012). For instance, Bushman et 
al. (2007) showed that priming a non-religious sample with a punitive God 
resulted in increased levels of aggression (Study Two), as it did with a religious 
sample (Study One). Clobert and Saroglou (2013) also showed that Belgian 
participants who were more familiar with Christianity were significantly more 
influenced by Buddhist symbolism to show increased prosociality, when 
compared to the control condition. A meta-analysis of the effects of religious 
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priming on prosociality (Shariff, Willard, Anderson, & Norenzayan, 2015) 
showed that in cultures where religious beliefs are prevalent, religious priming 
can significantly influence non-religious individuals. 
  
The studies in the present thesis were carried out in two Nigerian states: the 
former capital Lagos, and the present capital Abuja.Although both states have 
large Christian and Muslim populations,their environmentsare filled with more 
Christian than Muslim symbols, especially symbols associated with media 
outlets (including billboards, TV, radio, and newspapers). The present thesis, as 
the title suggests, is particularly interested in the situational influences of these 
religious (vs. secular) symbols on religiosity in Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The Automaticity of Higher Mental States  
 
Long before psychology became an independent discipline, Descartes (1637) 
proclaimed that humans are ―merely automata‖ (i.e., res extensa) like all other 
animals; machine-like in functionality (e.g., use of nerves, veins, muscles, 
bones), distinguished from other animals only by the possession of a rational 
soul (i.e., res cognitans). A century later, this substance dualism distinction was 
diminished to a singularity view by more materially orientated philosophers, for 
instance La Mettrie's (1748) ―automaton-theory‖ posited that man was merely a 
conscious automaton. The automaton theory informed the epiphenomenalism 
hypothesis which posits that physical events elicit mental states but mental 
states do not elicit physical events (Blackmore, 2010); this view reduces the 
soul/consciousness in Cartesian dualism to a minor epiphenomenal overflow of 
neural processes determined by the physical world (Capek, 1954). 
 
The overbearing emphasis on the influence of situational/environmental cues on 
mental states was later championed by behaviourist theorists, such as Watson‘s 
(1921) conditioned reflexes and Skinner‘s (1938) proposition of stimulus control. 
These ideas were revealing but incomplete. The precedence of environmental 
influences over mental states soon lost its explanatory power in the wake of the 
cognitive revolution with propositions such as Chomsky‘s (1971) argument for 
inherent cognitive mechanisms that directly support and influence physical 
events, such as the ability to acquire language. The cognitive revolution saw the 
re-emergence of the importance of the subjective qualities of conscious 
experience (Sperry, 1993). Contemporarily, unlike the unidirectional 
epiphenomenalism and behaviourist approach, determinants of mental states 
and subsequent behaviour are best viewed as bi-directional and interactive, 
between the physical environment and mental states (Popper, 1972). The 
present thesis conceives of automaticity as such, albeit with a greater emphasis 
on mental states as providing the vehicle through which social/cultural 
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constructs such as religion can operate (Barrett, 2004). 
 
According to Bargh (2006), two studies were influential in establishing the 
contemporary study of the automaticity of higher mental states. The first was 
Cherry's (1953) exploration of the 'cocktail party effect'; this effect occurs when 
one is in a crowded and noisy environment, with all the different conversations 
blending into an incomprehensible dissonance, until one hears her name and 
her attention is automatically grabbed, with the once-incomprehensible words 
now becoming sensible. The second influential study was LaBerge and 
Samuel's (1974) proposition, which argued that when text is read, the words 
automatically activate corresponding semantic and lexical nodes in memory, 
and that this process is uncontrollable and effortless. More recent 
methodological approaches have been influenced by Bargh‘s (1982) and 
Devine's (1989) work on the automaticity of self-schema and stereotype 
representations, respectively.  
 
Within cognitive psychology, the brain is generally conceived of as consisting of 
complex and interacting distributed networks (Barrett, Ochsner, & Gross, 2005). 
These networks are theorised to be composed of distributed neurons, called 
nodes, which hold units of information. In early frameworks, nodes were 
conceived of as singular ―solutions‖ or outputs created to solve problems (e.g., 
Fogel et al., 1992). An improvement on this approach suggested that ―solutions‖ 
or outputs are stored as connections between associated nodes. This 
connection is proposed to be flexible, i.e., able to accommodate changes in the 
pattern of the network, as well as able to be strengthened by experience or 
repetition (Ellenbogenn & Meiran, 2011; Hoffman & McGlashan, 1993).  
 
Some frameworks propose that during cognition, nodes that are distinct but 
related to the subject of interest are integrated into a coherent entity and 
encoded in memory. With the different nodes thus connected, an activation of 
one node perhaps through perception, conversation, or reminiscence, facilitates 
the activation of the entire coherent entity with which that particular node is 
associated (e.g., Graf & Schacter, 1989; Mayes, Montaldi, & Migo 2007; 
Quamme, Yonelinas, & Norman 2007). This process is generally termed 
20 
 
 
 
‗spreading activation‘ whereby the orthographical, lexical, and phonemically 
similar nodes are activated due to activation of an associated node (e.g., 
Ferguson et al., 2004; Posner & Snyder, 1975).  
 
Spreading activation was first introduced by Quillian (1962, 1967) as a theory to 
understand semantic processing, and was modelled on computer simulations of 
comprehension and memory search. Quillian proposed that upon activation, 
during memory search, nodes in a semantic network would spread until a 
connection was formed. This idea was extended by Collins and Loftus (1975), 
with the proposition that units of information are represented as nodes within 
conceptual networks, and these nodes (within the conceptual network) are 
interconnected by means of parallel bidirectional links greater than links 
between those nodes and nodes in other semantic networks. Spreading 
activation has been explored to a large extent through the Lexical Decision Task 
(LDT), which measures the speed of classification of words (and non-words) 
after the presentation of a prime, where associated words are classified faster 
than non-associated words in the semantic network of the primed concept 
(Durgunoğlu & Neely, 1987; Fazio 2001; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977). For 
instance, if a participant is primed with 'blood' either in its real or symbolic form, 
it is assumed that once the concept of 'blood' is activated it will spread to other 
nodes associated with blood in the memory of the participant (such as 'red' or 
'pain'), therefore, if the participant is presented with the words 'red' or 'pain' 
he/she would respond to it quicker than responding to the non-word 'ced' or the 
word 'rain'. It is important to note however that although these associations are 
general they are also subjective; for instance, an individual recently injured (and 
bloodied) as a result of falling in the rain might associate 'blood' with 'rain' faster 
than the average individual would.  
 
Not all researchers agree with the theory of spreading activation.As an 
alternative it has been argued that the activation of a node might invoke 
preparedness in the individual to facilitate response and/or competition (e.g., 
Klauer et al., 1997; Wentura, 1999). For instance, if a participant is primed with 
the word 'blood', it would facilitate response to the colour or word 'red' because 
the response pathway needed to respond to red has already been activated. 
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However, if the subsequent word (or non-word) is incongruent, such as 'ced', 
then activated associations with the word 'blood' must be inhibited before the 
individual can respond accurately. This effect is best illustrated with the stroop 
task. Despite these differences, however, it is clear that both frameworks agree 
that networks of nodes in memory can be influenced by the activation of one 
associated node. 
 
A somewhat similar model of automaticity to the memory retrieval view is the 
algorithm-strengthening view; both views posit that conscious processes involve 
complex algorithmic computations.However unlike the memory retrieval model, 
which skips the computation stage to the output when the process is automatic, 
the algorithm-strengthening view posits that the complex algorithmic 
computation still takes place in automatic processing, albeit the process 
becomes much faster and seamless through repetition (Anderson 1992). 
Chartrand and Bargh (1999) use the analogy of playing a musical instrument to 
explain how (at least one kind of) automaticity might function. Musicians 
practice consciously, and upon getting better with practice, certain conscious 
and controlled cognitive processes (e.g., the spatial knowledge of the white and 
black keys on a piano) gradually become automated, freeing up conscious 
capacity to coordinate other creative processes. In sum, Chartrand and Bargh 
(1999) concluded that frequency and consistency were necessary and sufficient 
for automaticity, albeit under the same circumstances. Similarly, a review by 
Moors and Houwer (2006) on automaticity concluded that despite the 
conceptual and theoretical differences that distinguish the different studies they 
considered, all share the view that repetition fosters learning, which is 
evidenced by changes in accuracy, awareness, attention and speed, which are 
all features of automaticity. Bargh (1989, 1992, 1994) proposes that for any 
process to be termed ―automatic‖ it ought to meet four criteria: (1) spontaneity, 
i.e., the ability to be triggered without conscious input; (2) uncontrollability, i.e., 
when triggered the ability to run to completion in the absence of conscious 
moderation; (3) minimal cognitive expense, i.e., use of minimal cognitive 
resources, and (4) unconsciousness, i.e., occurring beyond the awareness of 
the individual. 
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2.1.1 Type I and Type IIInformation Processing  
 
There are a number of dual-process theories of information processing which 
vary according to underlying frameworks within different disciplines. For 
instance, dual-process theories can be found on reasoning (e.g., Evans 1989, 
2006; Wason & Evans, 1975; Stanovich 2004), decision making (Wu et al., 
2002), probability (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Fredrick, 2002, 2005), 
processing of stereotypes (Bargh 1999; Devine 1989), self-knowledge (Nisbett 
& Wilson, 1977; Wilson, 2002), behavioural economics (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002), and decision making and management (Dhami & 
Thomson, 2012). Given the wide application of dual-process theories, theorists 
have utilised different terms for and attributed different levels of functionality to 
the two processes, making it difficult to coherently define either (Evans, 2008).  
 
Automaticity is characteristically conceptualized as synonymous with 
automatic/non-conscious processes or Type I information processing and 
contrasted with controlled/conscious processes or Type II information 
processing (Evans, 2008; Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2002; Posner, 1980; Smith & Collins, 2009; Wason & Evans, 1975).  
Conscious or Type II information processing is considered as wilfully initiated, 
effortful, and controllable, whereas non-conscious or Type I information 
processing is considered as initiated beyond awareness, effortless, and 
autonomous (Evans, 2008). From an evolutionary perspective, the ability for 
Type I information processing has been theorised to be an early important 
evolutionary adaptation (Evans & Over 1996; Epstein & Pacini 1999; Reber 
1993; Stanovich 1999). Type I processing would enable an immediate response 
to a recurring threat, for instance the innate and immediate aversion to snakes, 
where contemplation of alternate responses (Type II processing) might be 
prohibitively costly (Haslerud, 1938).   
 
Recent research from social cognitive neuroscience has further identified 
specific systems in the brain that reflect the dual process framework. For 
instance, Liberman (2003) and Liberman et al. (2004), who describe these 
processes as ‗X‘ (i.e., Type I) and ‗C‘ (i.e., Type II), have shown that 
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implicit/automatic processes typical of Type I information processing are linked 
with the lateral temporal cortex, the basal ganglia, and the amygdala (X-
system), while explicit/controlled learning, executive control, and inhibition 
typical of Type II information processing are linked with the medial-temporal 
lobe, prefrontal cortex, and the anterior hippocampus (C-system).   
 
 
 
Figure 1.Properties and Functional Characteristics of Type I and Type II 
Processes  
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2.1.2 Type I and Type IIas Two Distinct Processes  
 
Theoretical assumptions underlying cognitive psychology converge on the idea 
that information processing accounts for the response to stimuli in humans 
(Moors & De Houwer, 2006). It is further theorized that humans possess a 
limited cognitive capacity for information processing, insufficient to process the 
diverse range of sensory information that the brain receives (Wheeler & 
Treisman, 2002). For instance, Miller (1956) reported an observation from his 
study and several other studies carried out in the 1950s that humans can only 
hold about seven (±2) units of information within short-term memory at any 
given time (more recent research reports a smaller figure of four units [Cowan, 
2001]). Consequently researchers highlighted the need for a mechanism that 
would select what aspects of information should be consciously processed at 
any given time (e.g., Allport, 1989; 1993). Early models of dual process theories 
considered ‗attention‘ as the mechanism responsible for selecting the aspects of 
information to be processed, and consequently two types of information 
processing were conceived:  one that is directed by attention or requires 
substantial attention (i.e., Type II), and another that functions independent of 
attention or requires minimal attention (i.e., Type I). Attentional networks 
according to these models orient sensory stimuli, activate information in 
memory, and maintain alertness (e.g., attention as an organ system [Posner, 
1980, 2004], and attention as a triangular circuit (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; 
LaBerge, 2004).     
 
2.1.3 Type I and Type II as a Continuum   
 
Similar to Broadbent (1958), who viewed the mechanism for attention as being 
active before perceptual analysis (as opposed to after semantic processing 
[e.g., Deutsch & Deutsch, 1963; see Moors & De Houwer, 2006]), Kahneman‘s 
(1973) capacity model of attention proposed that information processing does 
not depend on attention during the early stages (i.e., sensory processing). 
Kahnemen, however, further proposed that there is an increase in dependence 
on attention as information processing reaches the late stages (i.e., the 
response end). Building on Kahneman‘s proposition, Hasher and Zacks (1979) 
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proposed that attentional resources lie along a continuum for memory encoding, 
with automatic processes (i.e., Type I) at one end and effortful processes (i.e., 
Type II) at the other end. According to Hasher and Zacks, who were principally 
interested in how the encoding of information is processed, not how encoded 
information is processed, proposed that by virtue of the effortlessness of Type I, 
information is encoded in memory seamlessly because the cognitive system is 
not strained.However, because Type II information processing is effortful and 
strains the cognitive system, information is encoded in memory selectively.     
 
Another example that viewsType I and Type II information processing along a 
continuum is Hammond's (1980, 1986, 1996) 'cognitive continuum theory', 
which asserts that intuitive reasoning (Type I) and analytical reasoning (Type II) 
have been presented as a false dichotomy, and argues instead that both 
processes should be viewed along a continuum. Hammond proposes that: (1) 
cognition can be viewed as a continuum with intuitive cognition at one end and 
analytic cognition at the other end, (2) common sense or ‗quasirationality‘ 
includes instances of both intuitive cognition and analytic cognition, (3) cognition 
alternates between both ends of the continuum, where the stimulation of one 
end inhibits the other, and (4) the order in which cognitive tasks fall along the 
continuum is determined by their capacity to induce intuitive cognition, 
quasirational intuition, or analytical intuition. 
 
2.1.4. Type I and Type II as Parallel-Competitive Interacting Processes 
 
Evans (2008) has distinguished two broad categories of the conceptualisation of 
dual process theories according to how they function in interaction: ‗parallel-
competitive‘ and ‗default-interventionist‘. Within the parallel-competitive 
framework, Sloman (1996) proposes that Type I and Type II can simultaneously 
process different outputs for the same problem, Type I through an algorithm of 
association, similarity, and general knowledge (e.g., use of stereotypes), and 
Type II through an algorithm of hierarchy, logic and causal-mechanics. Sloman 
further proposes that the two processes provide different outputs because they 
have different goals, but that they overlap and the output is dependent on the 
individual (e.g., individual knowledge and experience).  Another example of the 
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parallel-competitive framework is the cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST; 
Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, & Huh, 1992), which differentiates a preconscious 
nonverbal experiential process (Type I) from a verbal reasoning rational process 
(Type II). An underlying assumption of CEST is that people automatically create 
an emotionally driven cognitive personal theory of reality, comprised of a self-
theory, a world theory, and connecting prepositions; and this automatic 
personaltheory of reality is carried out by the Type I experiential system. Like 
Sloman, CEST proposes that the experiential system and the rational system 
function in parallel and can interact with each other. However, unlike Sloman, 
CEST proposes that because Type I cognitive processing (i.e., here the 
experiential system) is evolutionarily older and laden with emotion, i t can 
overrideType II cognitive processing (i.e., the rational system) even when 
people are aware that their actions might be perceived as irrational (Denes-Raj 
& Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1992; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).   
 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and Heier (1996) showed that belief in unusual and 
superstitious thinking is correlated with the experiential system through the use 
of the constructive thinking inventory (Study One). Pacini and Epstein (1999) 
used factor analysis to show that religious orthodoxy (measured as 
conservative ideology) was inversely associated with rationality and not with the 
experiential system (Study One). Epstein (1994) emphasises that religion in 
general is ubiquitous among humans because religion communicates better 
with the experiential system than the analytical system, and because the 
experiential system is the default mode of cognition. More recently, Norris and 
Epstein (2011) showed that the experiential system is divided into three factors: 
intuition, imagination, and emotionality, while the rational system is comprised of 
a single factor.  
 
2.1.5 Type I and as Default-InterventionistInteractingProcesses 
 
The default-interventionist framework, unlike the parallel-competitive framework, 
generally proposes that initial outputs generated by Type I processes influence 
and constrain Type II processes, which act upon the outputs generated byType I 
processing (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002, 2005; Stanovich 1999, 2004, 
27 
 
 
 
Stanovich & West, 2008). Within this framework, strategies, procedures, and 
rules acquired by Type II termed ‗mindware‘ (Pekins, 1995) are used to replace 
heuristic outputs provided by Type I (Stanovich & West, 2008). It then follows 
that acquisition of the necessary mindware for the particular context is a 
prerequisite for the proposed intervention by Type II. For instance, attributing 
rainfall to a supernatural agent might be the final output, initially processed 
intuitively by an individual‘sType I, and rationalized by her Type II‘s cognizance 
of the cultural/religious narrative (e.g., supernatural agent X is responsible and 
not supernatural agent Y). If the individual‘sType II, however, has the necessary 
mindware to know that rainfall is water from the clouds, condensing after it has 
cooled to its dew point or as a result of increased water-to-air ratio,then her 
response will be different. 
 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 2005) propose that after Type I has rapidly 
produced intuitive outputs to a particular problem, Type II may or may not 
override, correct, or endorse it. Stanovich (2009, 2011) in the heuristic-analytic 
theory of reasoning, further proposes that the intervention on Type   
I by Type II and the production of alternative output/s are two different 
processes, therefore Type II operates on two different levels termed ‗algorithmic 
level‘ and ‗reflective level‘. Stanovich, West, and Toplak (2011) propose that the 
algorithmic level accesses strategies utilized for cognitive processes and the 
production of rules for sequencing thought and behaviour. Hence, when Type II 
overrides Type I through the algorithm level it does so through altering the 
particular cognitive strategy and rules in question. They further propose that the 
reflective level accesses acquired beliefs, goals, and opinions to produce 
alternate outputs when Type II overrides Type I through the reflective level. 
 
2.2 Religiosity, Rationality, and Cognitive Dual Processing    
 
―A great deal of intelligence can be invested in 
ignorance when the need for illusion is deep.‖ 
Saul Bellow [1976, p.127] 
 
The quote above by the Nobel Laureate Saul Bellow echoes the argument in 
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the present section regarding the relationshipbetween rationality and religion. 
Psychological studies as early as Howels (1928) and Sinclair (1930) reported 
negative correlations between religiosity and intelligence. These negative 
correlations characterized most religiosity vs. intelligence studies of the period, 
for a review see Argyle (1958). This generalization however was challenged by 
Kosa et al. (1961), with the hypothesis that the social environment of the 
individual (religious or secular) will determine the relationship between mental 
abilities such as intelligence and religiosity. Recently, owing to the proliferation 
of dual-process theories of cognition, there has been renewed interest in the 
relationship between cognitive ability and religion (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; 
Buzdar, Ali, & Tariq, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 
2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013; Shenhav, Rand, 
& Greene, 2012; Siddiqa, 2010).    
 
As discussed in the previous section, dual-process theories of cognition 
generally distinguish heuristic/reflexive/experiential/intuitive (hence fast and 
automatic) Type I cognitive processes from analytical/reflecti ve/rule-based 
(hence slow and controlled) Type II cognitive processes (Evans, 1989; 2006; 
Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Stanovich & West, 2000; Stanovich, West, 
& Toplak, 2011). Based on this distinction, studies have re-emerged linking 
religious belief with irrationality and/or lack of an analytic cognitive style 
(Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2012). The present 
thesis, however, proposes that religious belief need not be viewed as 
synonymous with Type I cognitive processing, and hence as irrational, but that 
religious belief can also entail rational thought (i.e., through Type II cognitive 
processing) used to justify the initial inferences and conclusions generated by 
Type I cognitive processing. This approach to the rationality vs. religion debate 
is grounded within the default-interventionist dual-process framework (Evans, 
2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a), which advances that Type II cognitive 
processes are influenced and can be constrained by inferences and 
conclusions generated by default Type I cognitive processes. This approach is 
consistent with the argumentative theory (Mercier & Sperber, 2011a, 2011b; 
Mercier, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d), which proposes that reason (Type II 
cognitive processing) evolved for supporting conclusions generated by Type I 
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cognitive processes. It is also consistent with Baumard and Boyer‘s (2013) 
modified dual-process model, which proposes that religious beliefs are reflective 
elaborations on initial intuitions. 
 
Reflective/analytical/rational thought has been identified as a distinct thinking 
style associated with low religious belief (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Pennycook 
et al., 2012, 2013; Shenhav et al., 2012; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). Aarnio and 
Lindeman (2007) distinguish between an intuitive thinking style (typical of Type I 
processing) and an analytical thinking style (typical of Type II processing), 
suggesting that the former supports religious belief because of its dependence 
on self-evidently valid subjective experiences. Pennycook et al. (2012) similarly 
showed a negative relationship between religious belief and an analytic 
cognitive style, and a positive relationship between religious belief and an 
intuitive thinking style. Pennycook et al. (2012) offer an asymmetric model of 
belief and unbelief that proposes the emergence of religious scepticism after 
initial acceptance (of religious belief) in rational individuals. This line of 
reasoning is further advanced in the proposal of a conflict detection mechanism 
that detects conflicts in reasoning about belief and reasoning about the material 
world (Pennycook et al., 2013). Shenhav, Rand, and Green, utilizing the 
Cognitive Response Test (CRT), which generally assesses the tendency for a 
reflective or intuitive response in individuals, showed that an intuitive cognitive 
style predicts religious belief (Study Two A), and this relationship holds even 
when personality and cognitive ability are controlled for (Study Two B). 
 
The cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST; Epstein, 1985) though originally 
conceived as a triadic model, has been utilized as a parallel functioning but 
interactive dual-system framework to explain the relationship between rational 
thought and religious belief. According to CEST, individuals automatically create 
and connect propositions of a self-theory and a world-theory, which combine to 
form an emotionally driven cognitive personal theory of reality (Epstein, 1985; 
2003; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Norris & Epstein, 2011). Two 
conceptual systems within CEST include the experiential system and the 
rational system; the former is typical of Type I processing (i.e., intuitive and 
automatic), while the latter is typical of Type II processing (i.e., reflective and 
30 
 
 
 
controlled). Within CEST, emphasis is placed on the experiential system, 
theorised to be evolutionarily older than the rational system, and responsible for 
encoding, organizing and interpreting experience, as well as directing behaviour 
(Epstein et al., 1996).    
 
The experiential cognitive system is theorized to be dependent on associative 
and observational learning and aided by reinforcement, to employ crude broad 
generalizations, and to be affective, and it is claimed to be ―self-evidently valid‖ 
(Norris & Epstein, 2011). The experiential system is also theorised to be 
associated with naïve optimism and superstitious belief (Epstein et al., 1996; 
Watson, Morris, Hood, Miller, & Waddell, 1999). Although several studies have 
reported positive relationships between religiosity and the experiential cognitive 
system, most of these studies consist of population samples from nations that 
Henrich, Heine, and Norenzayan (2010) have termed Western, Educated, 
Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic (WEIRD). The conclusions drawn from 
studies on religious belief and rational thought carried out in WEIRD nations 
might not apply to non-WEIRD nations, particularly those without a conspicuous 
secular worldview. For instance, recently, Buzdar, Ali, and Tariq (2015) showed 
that in Pakistani secondary school students, Muslim, Hindu, and Christian 
participants scored higher on rational cognitive processing than experiential 
cognitive processing, with Muslims showing the highest signs of rational 
processing, and Christians showing the highest signs of experiential processing. 
The positive relationship between high rational thought and Islam in the Buzdar 
et al. study, however, is in contrast to Siddiqa (2010) which found an inverse 
relationship between Islam and rationality among Pakistani university students.  
 
The default-interventionist dual-process framework employs the general 
distinctions between Type I and Type II cognitive processing. However, Type I 
cognitive processes are theorized to be the default mode of cognition that 
generates inferences and conclusions which influence and can constrain Type II 
cognitive processes (Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). This implies that 
in instances where Type I cognitive processes generate religious inferences and 
conclusions, Type II cognitive processes can rationalize these inferences and 
conclusions to generate a coherent output. Hence the process (i.e., 
31 
 
 
 
rationalization) is differentiated from the content (i.e., religious inferences and 
conclusions). The extent to which Type II cognitive processes might wholly rely 
on, partially rely on, or completely override Type I generated references and 
conclusions is based on individual differences and situational contexts (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013b).  
 
Baumard and Boyer‘s (2013) example, presented below, is characteristic of the 
default-interventionist dual-process approach to rationality and religion. It is 
theorised that synchronised movement simulates endorphin production (Cohen, 
Ejsmond-Frey, Knight, & Dunbar, 2010), which would be an automatic Type I 
cognitive process. When the synchronised event is religious (e.g., prayer), Type 
II cognitive processes might rationalize the feeling caused by the Type I 
cognitive processes (i.e., endorphin surge) with available knowledge (e.g., as a 
consequence of supernatural agency). The argumentation as a function of 
reasoning hypothesis (Mercier & Sperber, 2011a) equally sheds more light on 
Baumard and Boyer‘s example. According to Mercier and Sperber, reason (i.e., 
Type II cognitive processing) evolved for supporting conclusions generated by 
Type I cognitive processes, and serves an adaptive goal of social persuasion. 
Building on Evans (2007), Evans and Stanovich (2013a), Mercier and Sperber, 
as well as Baumard and Boyer, it can be argued that religious belief does not 
necessarily imply the absence of rational thought. Rational religious individuals 
in societies with a dominant religious worldview and no conspicuous secular 
worldview might utilize Type II cognitive processes toward rationalizing and 
justifying religious inferences and conclusions generated by default Type I 
cognitive processes. This specific hypothesis was tested in the present thesis, 
across Study Two (laboratory setting) and Study Three (real-life setting). 
 
2.3 Religiosity, Rationality, and Conformity 
 
The previous section provided a signpost to the conceptual approach to Studies 
Two and Three in the present thesis. However, the dual process approach to 
the rationality vs. religion debate does not exhaust all the explanatory variables. 
The present section offers a philosophical and social approach as opposed to 
the cognitive approach of the previous section.  
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Religious thinking has been described as irrational (Culver & Gert, 1982; 
Gervais, Shariff & Norenzayan, 2011; Laythe et al. 2002; Alarcón, Moreno-
Jiménez, & Moral-Toranzo, 2011). Some researchers, Dein and Littlewwod 
(2011) for instance, have even suggested that religion and psychosis have a 
common evolutionary trajectory, referring to their commonalities (as well as 
differences) in the perception of supernatural agencies, delusions, withdrawal, 
broadcasting, and thought insertion. Rationality, however, is multifaceted, and a 
more critical assessment of the rationality or irrationality of religion will have to 
specify exactly what kind of irrationality is being referred to. For the purpose of 
the present thesis, epistemological rationality, as well as Scherer‘s (1985, 2011) 
categorical distinction of rationality into functional, consensual, and inferential 
rationality will be briefly considered, in relation to conformity.  
 
2.3.1 Epistemological Rationality and Conformity 
 
Epistemic rationality generally refers to a subjective mode of reasoning, 
fostered by one‘s beliefs as supported by one‘s evidence of those beliefs (Ke lly 
2003). For instance, in response to the question ―Are natural disasters an act of 
God to punish sinful nations?‖ a Christian believer might gather ‗evidence‘ for 
this, such as the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 19:24, KJV) or 
the flooding of the world when Noah was six hundred years old (Genesis 6 – 7, 
KJV). The believer might have also gathered evidence through personal events, 
such as loss or death of a ‗sinful‘ loved one or acquaintance. One might 
therefore argue that a Christian who asserts that natural disasters are an act of 
God to punish sinful nations has come to that conclusion rationally, albeit 
epistemologically. The evidence supplied in the example above, however, is 
illogical. For instance, Noah lived in the Middle East and it is improbable that he 
could have gathered species found only in the Australian outback or Amazon 
forest. Further, even if his genius had allowed him to gather both predator and 
prey in an ark for 40 nights, it would have been physically impossible to fit all 
species in the world into an ark sized 300 x 50 x 30 cubits (Genesis 6:15).  
 
From the above paragraph, we can philosophize how one might conceive of an 
illogical and improbable conclusion as epistemologically rational. However, how 
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does one‘s social environment affect subjective epistemology, particularly in the 
research setting of the present thesis? Luyaluka (2016) argues that contrary to 
Western epistemology, African epistemology attributes the source of all things to 
God. Luyaluka, in this particular work, fails to appreciate the complexity of the 
history of Western epistemology, particularly of the religiosity-influenced pre-
enlightenment era. Nonetheless, his thesis on the epistemology of the (present) 
African mind is adept; the assumption that everything emanates from God is the 
norm. Therefore, in this particular case the subjective epistemology of the 
religious African individual is in accord with the social epistemology of his 
environment, creating the ideal context for both normative and informational 
conformity.  
 
2.3.2 Functional Rationality and Conformity 
 
Functional rationality serves a Machiavellian end. It is similar to Weber‘s (1964) 
Zweckrationalität, and is more generally known as instrumental rationality; it is 
reasoning fostered by one‘s anticipation of an intended outcome, and can be 
thought of as ―self-interested calculation‖ (Meglino & Korsgaard, 2006). If one 
does indeed believe in God and Satan, and in Heaven and Hell, then adopting 
mental states and behaviour that serve to meet the ultimate goal of attaining 
Heaven (or avoiding Hell) is functionally/instrumentally rational.  
 
Functional rationality is relevant to both normative conformity and informational 
conformity. As discussed in Chapter 1.4.1, normative conformity occurs when 
individuals alter their behaviour to obtain and/or maintain group desirability 
(Lonnqvist et al., 2009; Navarrete, Hall, & Fessler, 2005), and to avoid social 
disproval (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Pretending to be religious (or according 
to James‘s [1890] social self, showing one‘s religious self) within a society that 
places a high value on religiosity is rational, when viewed through the lens of 
functional rationality. Informational conformity occurs when individuals alter their 
behaviour due to a desire for accuracy (Lonnqvist et al., 2009). Therefore, in a 
highly religious society, such as the one in which the empirical studies of the 
present thesis were carried out, an individual who lacks information on religion 
(no one is born with knowledge of any religion) can be viewed as functionally 
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rational, if he becomes religious due to the pro-religious information available.  
 
2.3.3 Consensual Rationality and Conformity 
 
Consensual rationality generally refers to the appeal to common sense in 
relation to social desirability, where going against the group norm would appear 
undesirable (Scherer, 1985; 2011). Consensual rationality is similar to what 
Weber (1964) termed value-based rationality or Wertrationalität, and has all the 
hallmarks of normative conformity;it is, however, reasoned out or rationalized 
conformity. Therefore in a non-secular culture such as Nigeria, it is easy to see 
how a believer might rationalize an illogical belief or behaviour when it is 
religiosity-related. For instance, the statement ―Accepting the events in your life 
by religious faith is better than reasoning out the causes of the events‖ can be 
very dangerous, if one is persuaded by it. One infected with malaria could, 
instead of seeking a doctor, depend on his/her religious faith which asserts that 
God is the author of all things, and that therefore He alone can heal. That 
individual would engage in prayer and fasting rather than seek medication, and 
would not dare doubt the efficacy of prayer to God, nor the morality of God for 
infecting her and many others in the first place. The religious consensus would 
regard such doubt as a sure path to Hell, as Christian indoctrination asserts that 
scepticism is sinful (Matthew, 5:28, KJV). 
 
2.3.4 Inferential Rationality and Conformity 
 
Inferential rationality is analytical and lays emphasis on logical conclusive 
arguments (Scherer, 1985, 2011). Inferential rationality meets the three criteria 
of the modernist conceptualization of rationality, i.e. it must (1) be universally 
valid, (2) have clear associations among different components of relevant 
arguments, and (3) be determined by specific logical rules (van Huyssteen, 
1999). Scharp (2013) adds that inferential rationality also encompasses the 
motivation to re-evaluate pre-existing beliefs based on new evidence. Although 
inferential rationality is more valuable for objective intellectual pursuit than the 
other forms of rationality considered above, it is not without its flaws. An 
inferential rational argument necessarily requires an initial premise from which 
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rational points are inferred, and this chain of inferences is not infinite but 
regresses to the point at which the premise is conceded (Rescher, 1998). 
 
When sceptics write that religiosity is irrational they mostly refer to inferential 
rationality, and when religious-apologetics reply that religion is rational they 
mostly refer to the other facets of rationality discussed earlier, or to related 
facets. One must also ask the question, what is the relationship between 
inferential rationality and conformity? To respond to this question, one must ask 
an even greater question, i.e., what is the social context? It might be stated that 
in as much as one conforms, the process cannot be said to be inferentially 
rational even if the end result might coincidentally be (e.g., in a gathering of 
sceptic professors). This argument, however intuitive, is not robust, for it can 
also be argued that an individual, for instance, due to informational conformity 
pressure, can also alter his/her behaviour by thinking through the problem 
inferentially and arriving at the same conclusion. In response to the greater 
question asked earlier (i.e., what is the social context), the society where the 
empirical studies were carried out is not composed of sceptic professors, but 
predominantly made up of very religious individuals. All religions based on 
metaphysical and mystic claims (such as resurrections [John, 11: 44, KJV; 
Matthew, 28:6, KJV] and a man living inside a fish for three days [Jonah, 1:17, 
KJV] in Christianity) cannot be considered to be based on inferential rationality.    
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CHAPTER 3 
 
3. The Cognitive Science of Religion’s Approach to Religion 
 
Contrary to the now-confusing terms ‗system one‘ and ‗system two‘, originally 
conceived by Stanovich (1999) to generalise the different dual process/system 
frameworks and offer some clarity, cognitive processing is not limited to two 
systems but better viewed as a collection of systems, subsystems, and specific 
mechanisms which function through Type I and/or Type II cognitive processing 
(Baumard & Boyer, 2013; Eraña, 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). To regard 
system one processes as responsible for religiosity, and system two processes 
as responsible for scepticism toward religiosity, seems insufficient, particularly in 
individuals who have rational motives (e.g., epistemologically) to be religious. 
The default-interventionist framework offers more explanatory power for the 
relationship between religiosity and Type I and Type II cognitive processing. 
According to the default-interventionist framework, Type I processing generates 
a set of inferences which Type II processing might or might not rationalize, 
depending on the individual processing the information and the context in which 
the information is processed. The series of experiments carried out in the 
present thesis addresses the latter (i.e., situational context). This approach, 
however, will be insufficient without a critical examination of the former (i.e., the 
individual) and a critical look beyond the vague terms Type I and Type II, to 
identify specific cognitive mechanismsthat function through these processes.   
 
The modularity of the mind framework generally advances that the mind is 
comprised of specialized modules that perform domain-specific functions, as 
shaped by natural selection (Bechtel, 2002; Carruthers, 2005; Cosmides & 
Tooby, 1992; Fodor, 1983; 2000). This appears in contradiction to the dual 
theories of cognition, for either the mind is made up of two systems (the dual 
framework) or many modules (the plurality framework). However, in line with 
Eraña‘s (2011) argument, this conflict only arises in two instances. The first 
instance is when the dual process approach is conceived of as architectonic 
(i.e., two different cognitive systems), as opposed to when it is conceived of as 
descriptive (i.e., of cognitive processes, not systems). The second instance is 
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when modularity is conceived of in the strong encapsulated view of Fodor 
(1983), which posits that modular cognitive systems are impenetrable, domain 
specific, innate, and informationally encapsulated. Modular systems according 
to Fodor should satisfy the following nine criteria: they should be localized, 
subject to characteristic breakdowns, autonomous, fast, productive of simplistic 
outputs, ontogenetically determined, domain specific, impenetrable, and 
informationally encapsulated. 
 
Conceiving the mind as composed of modules has been particularly favoured 
within evolutionary psychology. For instance, Cosmides and Tooby (1992) 
articulate that general-purpose, content-free systems will be unlikely to evolve 
because the reproduction of these systems will be problematic and easily 
outcompeted. The strong view of massive modularity has come under much 
criticism, even from Fodor (2000), because of its restrictive nature in explaining 
high level cognition. Carruthers (2006, 2008) argues that modules need not 
necessarily be encapsulated but frugal. Carruthers advances that impenetrable 
and informational encapsulation will lead to duplication which might result in 
bigger, costlier brains. Barrett and Kurzban (2006) offer a less restrictive view of 
modules, arguing that they should be viewed according to their functional 
specialization, i.e., modules will differ and be constrained according to the 
particular action they have evolved to execute on the particular information they 
are programmed to receive. 
 
Carruthers (2006, 2008) offers a weak massive modular framework compatible 
with the cognitive dual-processing hypothesis. Carruthers proposes that Type I 
cognitive processes will include the set of central modules that generate 
inferences for goal-formation, belief-formation, and decision making, while Type 
II cognitive processes will include cycles of rehearsed and serially processed 
inferences from Type I. Examples of Type II cycles of rehearsed inferences 
include religious doctrine and rationalized faith. Carruthers (2006) emphasizes 
the relevance of a central language module which receives information from 
different domain specific modules that it translates into natural sentences and 
integrates through an inference generator. Also central to Carruther‘s (2006) 
hypothesis is the role of mental rehearsal of these inferences, generated either 
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through inner speech or visual imagery. Carruthers posits that these set of 
inferences are ‗globally broadcast‘ as theorized by Baars (1988, 1997), directed 
by normative beliefs and influenced by verbal instruction. Further, this 
integration extends beyond similar semantic content, for instance, metaphors 
can forge an integration through language between weakly associated 
concepts, that otherwise would have never been integrated, and when thus 
integrated can generate further inferences, which are strengthened through 
rehearsal.     
 
Carruthers‘s proposition has been welcomed by some dual process theorists, 
for instance, Evans (2003) and Evans and Over (2008). Prominent dual-process 
theorists agree that because Type I processes are autonomous and numerous, 
there is good reason to conceive of them as modular. Evans and Over, 
however, have criticised Carruthers‘ emphasis on the role of language for the 
integration of Type I processes, or modules, suggesting that language need not 
be the only integrating system. Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 2011b) and Mercier 
(2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d) advance a similar hypothesis, which highlights 
some similarities between the weak massive modularity framework and the dual 
process framework, albeit through a different theoretical approach. Mercier and 
Sperber hypothesize that argumentation is the function of reasoning (a Type II 
process), and has evolved to justify conclusions generated intuitively (by Type I 
processes). Mercier and Sperber reference empirical research which shows that 
reasoning can often lead to epistemic distortions that are at odds with what is 
factual, given that individuals tend to reason backwards by seeking reasons to 
justify their conclusion. Mercier and Sperber cite confirmation bias (i.e., the 
search for/interpretation of evidence to endorse pre-existing 
beliefs/expectations) as a quintessential example, which is ubiquitous, 
regardless of open mindedness or general intelligence (Stanovich and West, 
2007, 2008).    
 
Although not explicitly stated by Mercier and Sperber (2011a, 2011b; Mercier, 
2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d), their approach falls within the default-
interventionist framework of dual process theories, i.e., Type I processes 
generate a set of inferences that Type II processes act upon and are 
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constrained by. Within Mercier and Sperber‘s approach toward reasoning in 
particular, Type I processes generate a set of inferences and consequently a 
conclusion, or set of conclusions, which Type II processes seek to justify; Type 
II processes are thereby constrained by the conclusion/s generated by Type I 
processes. As pointed out by Frankish (2011), Mercier and Sperber‘s 
hypothesis also throws light on an error that seems implicit within dual 
process/systems theories, particularly when non-experts utilize it. This error 
occurs when non-experts synonymise Type II processes with factual, objective, 
and error-free conclusions, and Type I processes with error-prone conclusions. 
As Mercier and Sperber‘s hypothesis informs, thought-out justifications for pre-
existing beliefs need not necessarily be objective and factual, and the default-
interventionist framework offers much more explanatory power than frameworks 
which conclude that religion is supported by Type I and not Type II (e.g., 
Pennycook et al., 2012).  
 
In addition to Frankish (1998, 2004), Carruthers‘s (2006) work on articulating 
how the weak massive modularity approach might gain better explanatory 
power by engaging with dual process theories has been accepted as well as 
criticized. Consequently, Curruthers (2008) has sought to clarify the most 
criticized aspect of his hypothesis (i.e., his emphasis on language as an 
integrator of inferences from domain specific modules [e.g., Evans & Over, 
2008]). Curruthers (2008) addresses this criticism by suggesting that language 
is not the only means through which content is integrated from different 
modules, and that when language is absent the integration of modules will 
depend upon and be constrained by ―contingent patterns of module 
connectivity‖ (pp. 296). Given the lack of theoretical clarity in the conception of a 
singular Type II cognitive process (i.e., language), it is argued that Type II, just 
like Type I, may be composed of multiple mechanisms (Evans & Over, 2008; 
Mercier & Sperber, 2011a), e.g., different mechanisms required for strategic 
planning, probabilistic reasoning and creative imagination.  
 
The subchapters presented below address Type I and Type II processes and 
mechanisms specifically related to religion. In line with the cognitive science of 
religion (CSR), the tertiary impact of signs on cognition will depend on primary 
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ubiquitous cognitive mechanisms/processes and secondary socio-cultural 
acquired links between the signifier (e.g., the crucifix) and the signified (e.g., 
resurrection in Christianity). 
 
3.1 Agency Detection  
 
Before considering the mechanism theorised to be responsible for the cognitive 
process of agency detection, it will be necessary to briefly discuss Error 
Management Theory (EMT; Haselton, Buss, & DeKay, 1998; Haselton & Buss, 
2000). Expanding on Green and Swet‘s (1966) work on signal detection, and 
heuristic based systematic errors in judgement and reasoning (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), Haselton and colleagues propose that cognitive errors 
present in human reasoning today arise from adaptive biases formed in the 
Environments of Evolutionary Adaptedness (EEA) because they offered 
reproductive and survival advantages (emphasis in original). EMT, like signal 
detection, advances that two general types of errors (Type I errors and Type II 
errors) are possible when judgements are made under uncertainty. Crucially, a 
decision maker cannot optimize the decrease of both errors simultaneously 
because the decrease in tendency of either increases the tendency of the other. 
For instance, one cannot decide on a dark night that a string-like object on the 
floor is a snake and a rope to the same degree; the tendency to decide the 
string-like object is a snake will decrease the tendency to decide the string-like 
object is a rope, and vice versa. Further, if deciding between a snake and a 
rope was a recurrent problem in the EEA then, selection would have fashioned 
adaptations to make predictable errors, such as a bias to assume that the 
string-like object is a snake (i.e., to err on the less costly side, where mistaking 
a rope for a snake would be less costly than mistaking a snake for a rope). EMT 
accounts for this type of reasoning by positing a trade-off in costs. For instance, 
making a Type II error by wrongly perceiving a rope to be a snake will cost the 
individual cognitive resources in terms of heightened emotion and caution, due 
to the false alarm. This however would be less costly than a Type I error where 
the individual wrongly perceives a snake to be a rope; this error would save 
cognitive resources but would cost the individual more, possibly her life.  
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The CSR pioneer Guthrie (1993), in his work Faces in the Clouds, proposed the 
existence of a cognitive agency detection device (ADD) that serves a general 
perceptual function which leads to the acquisition of religion (as a by-product), 
particularly when perceptual hypersensitivity results in anthropomorphic 
tendencies. Bering (2000, 2004) further proposed that ADD is a hyperactive, 
non-reflective specific cognitive mechanism that is prone to identifying agency 
even when none exists, particularly in uncertain, ambiguous, and threatening 
situations. Barrett‘s hyperactive agency detection device (HADD) has gained 
more popular appeal than Guthrie‘s original ADD but both Guthrie and Barrett 
agree that an ability to infer agency even when it does not exist would have 
offered a survival advantage, for instance aiding in the detection of camouflaged 
or otherwise hidden predators (e.g., snakes, big cats).  
 
As outlined earlier, EMT (like signal detection) advances that in uncertain 
situations two types of errors are possible (Type I error and Type II error), and 
that the decrease in one type of error will necessarily lead to the increase in the 
other type. Further, if the cost of the errors were asymmetrical in the EEA then 
cognitive biases that make the less costly error will be selected for. HADD is an 
oversensitivity bias that makes a less costly error (Barrett 2002, 2004; van Elk, 
2013). For instance, in an uncertain situation, possibly in the dark, when the 
bushes beside one rustle, there might be two possible explanations: either an 
agent or the wind caused the rustle. As EMT informs us, in such an uncertain 
situation, one will be biased towards assuming that a potentially dangerous 
agent, rather than the wind, caused the rustle. According to the theory behind 
Type I processes, this process will be autonomous (i.e., one doesn‘t decide to 
decide it is an agent). The assumption that the rustle was caused by an agent 
will be less costly in the long run than the assumption that the rustle was 
caused by the wind; if the former turns out to be correct, one will be prepared 
for appropriate action (e.g. to run away from a potential predator).  
 
Barrett (2004) proposed that state anxiety produced by the presence of threat 
(e.g., a predator in the ancestral environment) and the ambiguity of sensory 
input (e.g., hearing sounds in the dark) will heighten the sensitivity of the 
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threshold for the detection of agency. Barnes and Gibson (2013) evaluated the 
effect of these environmental factors by asking participants to rate the presence 
of four environmental variables (nonthreatening-threatening, busy-secluded, 
light-dark, noisy-secluded) at the time of their most memorable spiritual, 
religious, supernatural or paranormal (SRSP) experience on a seven point 
scale. The results showed that (only when) the four environmental variables 
were factored together was there a significant difference between rating an 
SRSP experience as involving a religious supernatural agency as opposed to a 
nonreligious supernatural agency, with nonreligious supernatural agency more 
likely to occur when it is dark, quiet, secluded, and threatening. Additionally, 
participants who recalled supernatural agency that was nonreligious had higher 
scores on magical ideation (a schizotypy measure). 
 
In a more direct measure of agency detection, van Elk (2013) utilized a 
biological motion perception task to estimate group differences in agency 
detection between paranormal believers (who were recruited from the Paraview 
paranormal fair in Amsterdam) and sceptics (who were recruited from the 
University of Amsterdam). In the biological motion detection task, participants 
viewed a series of point-light displays and had to decide if they detected the 
presence of a human agent or not. The results showed that only paranormal 
belief (e.g., superstition and precognition), and not belief in witchcraft or 
traditional religion, was related to illusory agency detection. The results further 
showed that participants who believed in the paranormal showed a significantly 
greater bias toward illusory agency detection than sceptics, but only when there 
was low to intermediate ambiguity in the biological motion detection task, and 
not when there was high ambiguity. Van Elk discussed his results in terms of 
paranormal believers showing a greater tendency for confirmation bias and 
rushing to conclusions based on insufficient evidence. Agency detection will be 
revisited, after a look at other cognitive processes that function in conjunction 
with it in the acquisition and maintenance of religion. 
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3.2  Theory of Mind     
 
Premack and Woodruff (1978) are often credited with the first use of the term 
Theory of Mind (ToM) in psychology (e.g., Schlinger, 2009), in a study that 
investigated if chimpanzees possess this feature that is universal in all normally-
developing humans.  The use of the term ‗Theory of Mind‘, however, dates 
further back, for instance Patrick (1922) used it within philosophy to describe 
the mind as an emergent property of the body. Premack and Woodruff proposed 
that ToM is the mental state an individual imputes to himself about himself, 
conspecifics, and other species. Premack and Woodruff considered it 
appropriate to call this phenomenon a theory because the process and the set 
of inferences generated are not directly observable, and because predictions 
can be made based on the set of inferences generated. Since then, ToM has 
generated considerable interest; Salzinger (2006) reported 2,176 entries for 
ToM in PsycINFO, and presently (2015) PsycINFO contains 18,471 entries. 
Recent papers have expanded on the conceptualisation of ToM, however the 
basic idea put forward by Premack and Woodruff still applies. For instance, 
Malle (2002) considers ToM as the ability for mental states to be represented, 
conceptualized, and reasoned about, while Baron-Cohen (2001) emphasizes 
that these mental states include the full range of beliefs, emotions, imagination, 
intention, and desires. 
 
ToM amalgamates Simulation Theory (ST), Theory Theory (TT), and their 
derivatives (Bohl & van den Bos, 2012). TT has many variants, most however 
generally agree that intuitive conceptual hierarchical structures involving causal 
representations of the world that enable predictions of future events are similar 
to mundane theories that get updated in light of new evidence (Carey, 1985; 
Gopnik, 1988; Wellman & Gelman, 1992). Of the variants of TT, one prominent 
point of departure is between theorists who argue that intuitive conceptual 
hierarchical structures are learned (e.g., Gopnik and Meltzoff, 1997), and 
theorists who argue that these intuitive conceptual hierarchical structures are 
innate (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Contrary to TT, ST asserts that 
individuals utilize their own minds as models to simulate what other minds might 
be like; this might be done through imagination (Goldman, 1989) or through 
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implicit or explicit reasoning (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). Recently, Goldman 
(2006) has argued in favour of combining explicit and implicit ST frameworks as 
well as the TT framework, to gain more explanatory power and overcome 
criticisms levelled against each which are addressed by the other.  
 
Bohl and van den Bos (2012) suggest that there is a coarse-grained mapping 
between ToM and Type II processes, particularly when ToM is explici t, because 
ToM inferences and conclusions will involve conscious and controlled retrieval 
of data from higher cognitive mechanisms (e.g., meta-representation). Bohl and 
van den Bos, in the same vein, associate Type I processes with the 
interactionist framework, suggesting that both types of processes work in 
parallel and may or may not interact. A more similar approach, however, to the 
default-interventionist dual-process framework is offered by Leslie and Thalis 
(1992), Leslie and Polizzi (1998), Leslie, Friedman, and German (2004), and 
Leslie, German and Polizzi (2005). Leslie and colleagues advance that ToM 
involves the generation of a set of inferences/belief candidates from specific 
representational cognitive mechanisms (i.e., Type I cognitive processing), and 
that these beliefs are further processed by an executive selection processor 
(i.e., Type II cognitive processing). Leslie and colleagues further argue that the 
ability for humans to make inferences about other minds is introduced to the 
cognitive system through a theory of mind mechanism (ToMM), because the 
particular inferences that come to form ToM are not innate, even though the 
capacity to form these inferences is innate. Leslie and colleagues adeptly 
illustrate this point by providing an analogy about the conceptualisation of colour 
by very young children. Children are not born with a theory of colours (e.g., the 
extent to which crimson differs from burgundy), even though children possess 
the ability to comprehend all colours within their visual colour spectrum. 
Children instead learn from the experience of seeing colour and assigning 
different observed colours to appropriate referents in the real world.     
 
ToM has traditionally been investigated through the false-belief task, and 
although this task has many variants, one of the most replicated versions is the 
Wimmer and Perner (1983) Maxi task. Wimmer and Perner presented children 
aged between three to nine years old with a character named Maxi who puts an 
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object (a piece of chocolate) in box A. Maxi‘s mother then moves the object 
from box A to box B in Maxi‘s absence. Following this, participants were asked 
in which box Maxi will look for the object upon his return. Across a series of 
experiments, Wimmer and Perner showed that children become adept at 
inferring the false-beliefs of others only from four to six years old. The same 
experimental paradigm was utilized by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) to explore the 
hypothesis that children with autism lack ToM in comparison with typically 
developing children. To achieve this, Baron-Cohen et al. compared responses 
from autistic children with those of typically developing children and children 
with Down‘s syndrome about a doll (Sally) who placed an object into a basket A, 
which was moved to basket B by another doll (Anne) in Sally‘s absence. When 
the participants were asked where Sally will look for the object upon her return, 
only autistic children failed the task, and this was interpreted as a result of their 
inability for ToM (i.e., their inability to represent Sally‘s current belief as opposed 
to what they themselves know to be true). These false-belief tasks and their 
variants have been repeatedly utilised to assess ToM and associated constructs 
(e.g., false-belief understanding and language ability: Milligan, Astington, & 
Dack, 2007; false-belief and morality: Killen et al., 2011; false-belief and 
maltreatment: Cicchetti et al., 2003; false-belief and assertion: Jary, 2010; false-
belief and desire: Ziv & Frye, 2003; false-belief and executive control: Mutter, 
Alcorn, & Welsh, 2006; false-belief and bilingualism: Nguyen & Astington, 
2014).      
 
Leslie, German, and Polizzi (2004), likewise utilized a modification of the false-
belief task to support their hypothesis that ToMM generates a set of initial 
beliefs from which a second process selects an appropriate belief. For a correct 
belief to be obtained, a crucial aspect of this second process involves the 
inhibition of other beliefs included in the response set from the first process. In 
Leslie and colleagues‘ modification of the false-belief task, rather than the 
participant responding to where the person (person X) who placed the object in 
location A will look for the object (when the object has been moved to location 
B), the participant has to respond to where person X who (now) desires to avoid 
the object will look. Leslie and colleagues showed that children (even at the age 
at which the traditional false-belief task is passed) find this task much more 
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difficult. According to Leslie and colleagues, children find it harder because the 
prediction of person X‘s action also mandates an inhibition of other sets of 
responses.  
 
Leslie and colleagues discuss their findings in relation to how individuals 
assuage their desire in response to their beliefs. This general proposition is very 
similar to Mercier and Sperber‘s (2011a, 2011b; Mercier, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 
2011d)hypothesis, discussed earlier, that argumentation is the function of 
reasoning, which evolved to justify conclusions generated intuitively. The 
accounts of both Leslie and colleagues and Mercier and Sperber, although not 
explicitly stated (perhaps because they are not necessarily dual-theorists but 
seek to accommodate their theories within the dual-process approach), are 
situated within the default-interventionist approach. To be clear, ToM is not 
solely one‘s anticipation of the behavioural response of another individual; it is 
also the understanding of the knowledge and beliefs, goals and perceptions of 
another individual, as well as one‘s prediction of the individual‘s response based 
on one‘s knowledge (Call & Tomasello, 2008).  
 
3.3 Cognitive Closure, Conformity, and Motivated Cognition 
 
The need for cognitive closure (NFCC) is a motivated cognitive response to the 
desire for ―any answer‖, particularly in confusing and ambiguous situations 
(Amit & Sagiv, 2013; Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
NFCC in this regard enables a base for action, such as predictability, and the 
urgency of this need is ―assumed to be proportionate to the perceived benefits‖ 
(Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Conformity on the other hand occurs when 
anindividual alters his behaviour to avoid group disapproval (normative 
conformity) or when the individual genuinely lacks information (informational 
conformity). How does NFCC differ from conformity? Are they two different 
frameworks within two different branches of psychology that explain the same 
phenomena through different lenses? 
 
Studies have shown a positive relationship between conformity and NFCC (e.g., 
Calogero, Bardi, & Sutton, 2009). However, conformity, through the classic 
47 
 
 
 
distinctions of normative conformity and informational conformity is reasoned 
out and typical of Type II cognitive processing, while NFCC is quick and 
automatic, typical of Type I cognitive processing. Two frameworks discussed in 
detail in previous sections (CEST and argumentative theory) offer a conceptual 
bridge through which we might hypothesize a link between NFCC and 
conformity through the different cognitive processes that enable them.  
 
According to CEST, the experiential system (Type I cognitive processing) is 
evolutionarily older than the rational system (Epstein et al., 1996). This 
conceptualisation of evolutionary older Type I processes ties in with Mercier and 
Sperber‘s (2011) argumentative theory, which posits that reason (a Type II 
process) evolved to support conclusions generated by intuitive (Type I) 
cognitive processes. If this is the case, then one might hypothesize that, at least 
in ambiguous situations (which is a requirement for the activation of NFCC), 
when individuals conform, they would have already done so automatically and 
non-consciously, and only moments later tried to justify why they had altered 
their behaviour (i.e., for either normative or informational reasons).  
 
NFCC is a unitary latent variable comprised of 5 subscales: preference for 
order, discomfort with ambiguity, preference for predictability, close-mindedness, 
and decisiveness. It mediates information processing through either an 
urgency-‗seizing‘ tendency (a desire to attain closure as soon as possible) or a 
permanence-‗freezing‘ tendency (a desire to preserve past knowledge or to 
safeguard future knowledge [Webster & Kruglanski, 1998]). 
 
Much research has been carried out, particularly within socio-cognitive 
psychology, on implicit motivation, specifically on the implicit influence of goals 
(e.g., Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Glaser 
& Banaji, 1999; Moskowitz, 2002; Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2002). Studies 
on implicit motivation generally propose a hierarchical connectivity of mental 
representations between goals and behaviour, with the former at the top and the 
latter below (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Wegner & Vallacher, 1987). Based 
on this hierarchical connectivity of mental representations, it is assumed that the 
motivation for goals encoded consciously can automatically and non-
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consciously affect behaviour, particularly when these implicit goals are primed 
through exposing individuals to specific associated primes (e.g., Custers & 
Aarts, 2005; Gollwitzer, 2011; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). For instance, 
Karremans, Stroebe, and Claus (2006) gave one set of participants a salty 
sweet known to induce thirst and another set of participants no sweet (Study 
Two), and then asked the participants to perform a visual detection task on a 
computer screen. During the task, participants were primed with either the 
beverage ―Lipton Ice‖ or a control word. The results showed that when given a 
choice between Lipton Ice and an alternative drink afterwards, participants 
significantly choose Lipton Ice over the alternative, but only for participants 
induced with thirst and thus having the goal to quench their thirst. 
 
Adopting the same paradigm as Karremans et al. (2006), but with a focus 
onmental concentratation rather than to thirst-quenching, Bermeitinger et al. 
(2009) demonstrated that participants who (a) were subliminally primed with the 
sign (logo) of a concentration-enhancing pill (dextrose pill), (b) were tired, and 
(c) had the motivation for concentration, consumed more of the pill in 
comparison to the control group who were not primed with the sign of the pill. 
Studies have further shown that unfulfilled goals aroused unconsciously can go 
on to negatively affect the mental states and subsequent behaviour of 
individuals. For example, Masicampo and Baumeister (2011) showed that fluid 
intelligence (Study One) and impulse control (Study Two) are inhibited in 
participants who have been non-consciously influenced (primed) to achieve a 
goal and further manipulated to not be able to achieve that goal.    
 
The neurotransmitter dopamine has been found to play an important signalling 
role in goal dependent and motivational behaviour (Khamassi et al., 2008; 
Hitchcott, Quinn, & Taylor, 2007; O‘Doherty et al., 2004 Schultz, 1997; Shohamy 
& Adcock, 2010; Suri, 2002). It has been found that rewarding events activate 
dopamine neurons, and that signals from these neurons are reinforced by 
repetition and prediction error signals (Schultz, 1997; Suri, 2002), suggesting 
that dopamine causes a bias towards favouring memories of motivational 
significance (for a review see Shohamy & Adcock, 2010). Through the use of 
event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging, Copland et al. (2009) 
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showed that frequency-based semantic focus is enhanced by L-DOPA, and 
suggested that L-DOPA decreases the activation of competing associations, 
thereby heightening the focus of the primed semantic concept administered 
through a lexical ambiguity task. 
 
Relevant to the present thesis, in terms of the effect of religious vs. secular 
primes (signs), isastudy carried out by Butler, McNamara, and Durso (2010). 
Butler et al. investigated the difference in the religious semantic networks of 
participants with Parkinson‘s disease versusneurologically normal participants. 
Parkinson‘s disease is a neurodegenerative ailment that interrupts the 
mescocortical dopaminergic networks and is characterised by severe depletion 
of dopamine in the striatum (Dagher & Robbins, 2009; Dauer & Przedborski, 
2003; Williams-Gray et al., 2007). In the study by Butler et al. (2010), 
participants viewed one of three primes (civil, religious, or neutral) and target 
phrases matched to the preceding prime in the particular conditions. Afterwards, 
participants were required to respond accurately and immediately (by hitting a 
‗yes‘ or ‗no‘ button) if the presented task was likely to be performed by them. 
Using the response times of the participants, Butler et al. demonstrated that 
patients with Parkinson‘s disease showed significant deficiencies in the 
automatic and non-conscious activation of religious concepts in their semantic 
networks. Dopamine deficiency inhibits the activation of religious concepts in 
religious semantic networks, and goal-dependent events activate dopamine 
neurons, reinforced by repetition and prediction error signals (Schultz, 1997; 
Suri, 2002).  
 
In line with the default-interventionist framework, the default set of inferences 
generated by Type I cognitive processes such as cognitive closure and agency 
detection need not necessarily be the final output that affects behaviour. Type II 
cognitive processes, depending on the individual and the context, can intervene 
by modifying or altering the content of the set of inferences generated by Type I 
cognitive processing. For instance, in pre-enlightenment environments, in 
reaction to the sound of thunder, one‘s need for cognitive closure (NFCC) might 
motivate the detection of agency responsible for the sound as some sort of 
powerful supernatural being. With cultural learning (e.g., religious learning) a 
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specific agent in a specific culture is identified and named as the agent 
responsible (e.g., Amadioha in Igbo, Indra in India, or Thor in Norse mythology). 
After this information is embedded in memory, when the autonomous cognitive 
processes of NFCC and agency detection are activated, the conclusion arrived 
from the set of inferences generated by Type I processes is no longer an 
ambiguous ‗powerful supernatural being‘ but  Amadioha, Indra, or Thor. In the 
above example, the extra qualifying information is provided by the intervening 
function of Type II processing. Cognition, however, is intricate; the urge to 
identify (i.e., NFCC) and the act of identification itself (i.e., agency detection) are 
insufficient, and cognitive processes also autonomously make inferences about 
the mind of the agent identified (i.e., ToM).   
 
3.4 Immortality Bias  
 
Human are biased toward thinking that at least some qualities of personhood 
continue after death, and it is theorised that this bias reveals intuitive (Type I) 
patterns of reasoning that support the acquisition of religion (e.g., Bering, 2002; 
Bering & Bjorklund, 2004, Bering, Hernandez Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005). Studies 
that investigate immortality bias generally utilize children as participants to avoid 
the confounding effects of cultural/religious narratives of immortality, and to get 
a glimpse into how they intuitively conceptualize immortality. 
 
Bering and colleagues (e.g., Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bering, Hernandez Blasi, 
& Bjorklund, 2005) as well as Emmons and Kelemen (2014) have championed 
much of the research on immortality bias in children. Bering‘s (2002) rationale 
for assessing future immortality in children is informed by the simulation 
framework (e.g., Harris, 1992) which generally posits that Child A can only 
simulate the mind of Child B if Child  A imagines a ―divergent stance‖ that Child 
B assumes towards a ―discrepant reality‖ (Harris, 1991, p.292). Using the 
simulation hypothesis, Bering (2002, 2006) argues that since it is 
epistemologically impossible for a child to know what it is like to be dead, the 
knowledge base from which a child imagines a divergent stance and a 
discrepant reality is itself imagined. Further, from this imagined knowledge 
base, it is easier to conceptualise the absence of physical categories such as 
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biological, psychobiological and perceptual states that have been experienced 
subjectively than to be able to conceptualise the absence of mental states such 
as emotional, epistemic, and desire categories. Therefore, Bering argues that 
the conceptualisation of the far removed mental states of dead agents is 
inferred from an intuitive pattern of reasoning.  
 
To demonstrate children‘s intuitive pattern of reasoning about dead agents in an 
American sample, Bering and Bjorklund (2004) showed children a puppet show 
in which a mouse is eaten by an alligator. The children were then asked 
questions about the biological and psychological functioning of the dead mouse. 
Children aged between four and six years old reported more biological future 
immortality of the dead mouse than children aged between six and eight years 
old (Experiment One). Experiment Two showed that discontinuity of 
psychological future immortality increased with age, and Experiment Three 
showed that overall, adults and older children tended to report discontinuity of 
both biological and psychological future immortality more than younger children. 
These findings were generally replicated with samples of Spanish children from 
a secular and a Catholic school. Children in the Catholic school, however, 
reported more future immortality than children in the secular school (Bering et 
al., 2005). Bering and colleagues interpret these findings as evidence that 
younger children reveal more intuitive patterns of reasoning than older children. 
 
Despite the different interpretations of simulation theory (ST), it is generally 
agreed that one utilizes one‘s own mind to simulate what other minds might be 
like (Gallese & Goldman 1998; Goldman 1989, 2006). Bering (2002) also posit 
that since it is epistemologically futile to cognize what it is like to be dead, the 
mind of dead agents will be conceived of as similar to that of the living. 
According to this view, when conceiving of the minds of dead agents, physically 
unobservable states (i.e., epistemic, desire, and emotional) are presumed to 
persist while physically observable states (i.e., biological, psychobiological, and 
perceptual) are presumed to cease.   
 
Bering and Shackelford (2004) and Johnson and Bering (2006), based on 
studies on the evolution of cooperation (e.g., Johnson & Kruger, 2004), propose 
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an ―intentionality system‖ as a specific cognitive system dedicated to generating 
inferences concerning the epistemic contents as well as intentions of the minds 
of others. Johnson and Bering argue that the intentionality system evolved 
specifically for observing and regulating the movement of social information 
within groups, and attributing the events in one‘s life and one‘s broader 
community to the minds of other supernatural agents. This hypothesis, 
particularly the point about supernatural agents, feeds directly into the 
supernatural punishment hypothesis advanced by Johnson (2005, 2011), 
Johnson & Bering (2005, 2006) and Johnson and Kruger (2004).  
 
Johnson and colleagues, like the anthropologist Hartland (1924), propose that 
belief in and fear of supernatural punishment can act as a deterrent against 
breaching tribal law (in Hartland‘s case) and religious rules (in Johnson and 
colleagues‘ case). Johnson and colleagues however further assert that the fear 
of supernatural punishment is a specifically evolved cognitive mechanism for 
the acquisition of religion, that offers the following four selective advantages: 
elimination of (second-order) free rider problems, elimination of the 
responsibility of group member vigilantes, elimination of human deceit, and 
elimination of delayed/abandoned/fraudulent/discriminant/nepotistic human 
tendencies in punishing defectors. Although Johnson and colleagues suggest 
that the fear of supernatural punishment is an adaptation that was specifically 
selected for, it contradicts the more general consensus within CSR, that 
religious cognition is the by-product of mental adaptations that evolved to fulfil 
non-religious functions (e.g., Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1994, 1996, 2000; Guthrie, 
1980, 1993; McCauley, 2000; Sperber, 1996).  
 
The future immortality studies by Bering and colleagues also fail to 
disambiguate how reasoning about dead agents differs from reasoning about 
other agents. Boyer (2003) criticizes Bering‘s (2002) proposition that the ability 
to represent dead agents was specifically selected for, and instead favours an 
account which suggests that the conceptualization of dead agents is part of a 
broader representation of agents in absentia (e.g., people never encountered or 
institutional bodies like ―the government‖ [p. 237]). Hodge (2008) similarly 
proposes that the results of Bering and colleagues are best interpreted through 
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offline social reasoning (Currie, 1997; Gendler, 2006), that is, the capacity to 
consider and arrange future interactions with absent conspecifics.  
 
Bek and Lock (2011) show that the expression of belief in the emotional 
category of future immortality is influenced by biological contextual influences. 
Bek and Lock therefore argue that if simulation is a default mechanism then the 
conceptualization of future immortality should not be subject to contextual 
effects. Bek and Lock particularly criticise Bering‘s examples that differentiate 
physical states from mental states, such as; it is easier to imagine not feeling 
hungry (i.e., physical state) than to imagine not having any thoughts (mental 
states). Bek and Lock point out that ―not feeling hungry‖ is particular, while ―not 
having any thoughts‖ is general; like for like, one could argue that it is just as 
easy to imagine not having any thoughts about food as one could imagine not 
being hungry. Lastly, Bek and Lock, through factor analysis, show that the 
perceptual category did not load onto the same factor as the other categories in 
the physical state (i.e., biological and psychobiological) but loaded onto the 
same factor as the other categories in the mental state (i.e., epistemic, emotion, 
desire). Nonetheless, in accord with other personhood continuity studies (e.g., 
Bering, 2002; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Emmons & Kelemen, 2014), Bek and 
Lock also found that individuals express more belief in the continuity of mental 
states than physical states of future immortality. The above suggests that 
physical states generally differ from mental states but more research needs to 
be undertaken to disambiguate the different categories within these states, and 
how these different categories are affected by contextual and situational 
influences. Study Four in the present thesis investigates the religious vs. 
secular situational influences on children‘s conceptualization of retrograde 
immortality. 
 
3.5 Religiosity and Intuitive/Minimally Counterintuitive Prepositions 
 
Boyer (1994, 1997, 2000) proposes that religious prepositions which on the 
whole are intuitive, but comprised partly of a facet which violates ontological 
properties of intuitive assumptions, are generally more remembered and better 
communicated than prepositions which are either entirely intuitive or entirely 
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counterintuitive/nonsensical. For instance, the preposition that an invisible 
humanlike agent with no bodily mass can pull an object contradicts intuitive 
assumptions about folk mechanics, but relies on intuitive assumptions about the 
general abilities of typical human agents, and is therefore minimally 
counterintuitive in comparison with, for instance, the highly counterintuitive 
preposition that a pebble can pull an object upwards, or the highly intuitive 
preposition that a human can pull an object upwards. Minimally counterintuitive 
prepositions are memorable and easily transmitted because they bridge 
assumptions about the natural world which are easy to remember with 
conceived elements of the supernatural which captivate (Atran & Norenyazan, 
2004; Atran & Sperber, 1991). This bridge taps into an immense cognitive 
network of culturally-independent implicit beliefs (Boyer, 1994), and opens up 
the possibilities of a host of other implicit inferences (Barrett, 2004). For 
instance, if it (the invisible agent) can pull, then it can push.Atran and 
Norenyazan (2004) class intuitive knowledge into the following domains: 
folkpsychology (goal-directed behaviour), folkbiology (the biological 
configuration and relationship among species), and folkmechanic (movements 
of objects and their boundaries). 
 
Aarnio and Lindeman (2007) define paranormal beliefs, including magical 
beliefs, supernatural beliefs, and superstitious beliefs, as ―beliefs in physical, 
biological or psychological phenomena that feature fundamental or core 
ontological properties of another ontological category‖ (pp. 586-587). They 
show that paranormal belief is correlated with high intuitive thinking and low 
analytical thinking, using the Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Pacini & 
Epstein, 1999). Further, high intuitive thinking was theorised to be more integral 
in paranormal thinking than low analytical thinking, suggesting that intuitive 
thinking and analytical thinking are not on opposite ends of a continuum but 
rather dual processes. Shenhav, Rand, and Green (2011) similarly showed 
through the cognitive reflection test (CRT; Frederick, 2005) that analytical 
thinking is inversely related to belief in God, because intuitive thinking enables 
religious belief. Pennycook et al. (2012) extended this explanation, in a manner 
reminiscent of early dual theory systems, to show that depending on the 
context, analytical thinking can also enable religious belief, particularly in 
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instances in which individuals have analytically thought about how they non-
conventionally perceive God (as an abstract force, for instance). Pennycook et 
al., however, referencing insights offered by the cognitive science of religion 
(CSR), further state that analytical reasoning leads to rejection of religious 
beliefs not because religious beliefs are intuitive but because they are 
counterintuitive. Although also used by some CSR researchers, ‗counterintuitive‘ 
in this sense is misleading if used without prefixing it with ‗minimally‘ because 
within CSR, minimally counterintuitive religious beliefs are considered 
memorable and easily transmitted particularly because of their high intui tive 
content and low counterintuitive content. 
 
3.6 Doctrinal Religiosity, Automaticity, and the Intendant of Signs 
 
Whitehouse (1995, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a,2002b, 2004, 2005) classifies 
religion into two major modes: doctrinal and imagistic. According to Whitehouse, 
doctrinal religion is a centralized mode of religion, characterized by a high 
frequency of repetition, while imagistic religion is a decentralized mode of 
religion characterized by a low frequency level of repetition. The former spreads 
and maintains religious information through less emotionally-arousing but 
repetitive rituals, while the latter spreads and maintains religious information 
through highly emotionally-arousing but low/non-repetitive rituals. The former, 
through its repetitive mode and high volume of religious text utilizes semantic 
memory, while the latter, through its highly arousing mode utilizes episodic 
memory.  
 
The Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) are quintessential 
examples of the doctrinal mode of religion. Within this mode of religion, 
repetition is assumed to lead to what Whitehouse terms the ―tedium effect‖, 
where over-familiarity with particular units of information leads to a deficiency in 
active conscious processing of those units, as a consequence of the high level 
of repetition. Within the automaticity view of cognition, two types of automatic 
processes can be distinguished, i.e., processes that are unlearnt (e.g., agency 
detection) and processes that are learnt and repeated so often that they 
become automatic (e.g., the need to push a door handle downwards before 
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opening the door). It is within this second mode of automaticity that 
Whitehouse‘s tedium effect belongs. Stanovich (2004) terms these Type II-cum-
Type I processes as the set of autonomous subsystems (TASS), while Smith 
and DeCoster (1999, 2000) term them ‗functionally parallel neural networks‘.  
 
The signs utilized in the present thesis, particularly the religious signs signifying 
a benign God and a punitive God respectively, gain from all the cognitive 
processes discussed above. For instance, the subject of the Christian religious 
signs point to an agent, knowledge of the agent provides a source of cognitive 
closure for existential questions, Christian doctrine informs our ToM about the 
agent, and most of the stories associated with the agent are minimally 
counterintuitive. Further, the points above are repeated to Christians (who 
constitute the majority of the population where the experiments in the present 
thesis were carried out) to a high degree of frequency, until these associations 
become automatic and no longer require conscious processing. 
 
‗The intendant‘, Cousins‘s (2012) third facet in his telic triad model of signs 
(which includes the signifier, the intendant, and the signified), captures an 
aspect of semiotics of particular interest to the role of automaticity in the present 
thesis. The intendant is not a conscious interpretation of the link between the 
signifier and the signified, but an autonomous interpretation based on pre-
existing associations between the signifier and the signified already established 
in memory. Figure 2 illustrates the links among the signifier, the intendant, and 
the signified. 
 
Signifier   Intendant 
 
 
 
                                 Signified 
 
Figure 2.Cousins‘s (2012) telic triad model. 
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In Cousins‘s (2012) telic triad model, the link between the signifier and the 
signified is dependent on the particular intendant of the subjective individual; the 
signified changes if the intendant changes, hence the line linking the signifier to 
the signified is dotted in Cousin‘s model of his telic triad model. For an example 
of how the link between the signifier and the signified changes based on the 
intendant, see Figure 3. 
 
 
    Intendant (to communicate arithmetic manipulation) 
    Intendant (to communicate Christ‘s sacrifice) 
 Intendant (to communicate charitable organisation) 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.The changing nature of the signifier-signified link, based on 
theintendant. 
 
 
 
The Crucifix 
  
 
Addition  
  
British Red Cross 
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Figure 3illustrates a non-exhaustive example of how the cross (or plus sign) 
could have different intendants, depending on the subjectivity of individuality 
and the context in which the sign is viewed. For instance, the first intendant 
could be by a mathematician / in an arithmetic book, the second intendant could 
be by a Christian / in a church, and the third intendant could be by a fundraiser / 
at a relief operation. 
3.7 Further Considerations  
 
3.7.1 Cultural Anthropology and the Incompleteness Thesis 
 
The incompleteness thesis conceives of the mind as incomplete before its 
interaction with culture, postulates an interactive coevolution between culture 
and mind, and asserts that any explanatory rationale developed to account for 
the human mind without a consideration of this interaction will be incomplete 
(Geertz, 1973; Hoffmeyer, 1997, 2007, 2008; Kampis 1998; Kull, 2000; Maran & 
Kleisner, 2010). This preposition was proposed independently, as Cousins 
(2014) points out, by Morgan (1896), Osborn (1896), and Baldwin (1896). While 
older theorists such as Baldwin (1892) viewed the influence of culture as a tool 
for coping with evolutionary selection pressures, more contemporary theorists 
(e.g., Cousins, 2014; Kohler, 2014) view the cultural knowledge base as a niche 
(i.e., as a selection pressure itself when firmly embedded within the social 
ecology of a population). Also, where Baldwin saw an already-manipulated 
environment influencing succeeding generations, Cousins sees a dynamic 
environment influencing those who manipulate it further. 
 
In support of the incompleteness thesis, Geertz (1973) rationalises how the tool-
making/communicative signs of the cultural environment of Lower Pleistocene 
early hominins would have changed the adaptive environment they lived in and 
motivated cognitive and cortical development. Although this view suggests that 
humans were agents of their own evolution, crucially it does not imply that 
humans had a motivational goal toward a particular evolutionary ideal, and it 
denies that humans had any conscious control of the outcome (Kohler, 2014). 
Cousins (2014), arguing from a semiotic framework, uses language to further 
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his point about mind-culture coevolution through a number of criteria. Cousins‘ 
first criterion relates to the invariability of selection pressures, and posits that 
rather than seeing language as information processing with a set of rules (e.g., 
grammar) language should be seen as semiotic (i.e., meaning inferred through 
references by the interpreter), because language is understood through 
meaning-making. The second criterion relates to progress through modification 
(e.g., natural selection) and does not necessarily imply biological adaptation; 
Cousins argues that language also fits this criterion, where the early formation 
of a primitive linguistic niche would have been selected for and modified based 
on the feedback loop of mind-culture coevolution. The third criterion concerns 
the association between tools and language; Cousins argues that the former 
and latter co-evolved, with each gaining in degrees of complexity. Cousins ‘third 
criterion is similar to Deacon‘s (1997) rationale behind his argument that the 
indexical and iconic representational processes in the brain might have 
influenced the brain‘s prefrontalization.  
 
Mind-culture coevolutionary theory is often met with criticism, particularly within 
evolutionary psychology, where the mind is generally conceived of as 
composed of informationally encapsulated modules (Tooby & Cosmides, 1995). 
However, viewing the debate from the default-interventionist dual process 
perspective, one might argue that both mind evolution and mind-culture 
coevolution theorists seem fixated on different mental processes, and this 
fixation can be gleaned from the very examples they utilize. Mind evolution 
theorists seem to focus on Type I processes while mind-culture coevolution 
theorists seem to focus on Type II processes. Cousins‘ (2014) use of language 
is a case in point. Language, as Carruthers (2006) argues, could be a Type II 
process that integrates inferences from evolutionary older modules (i.e., Type I) 
within the mind. One way Cousins could further his hypothesis would be to 
critically engage with Carruthers‘ insistence on the creative meaning-making of 
literary devices and figurative language, which forms new synaptic associations 
that would have never been formed otherwise, and if rehearsed, become part of 
the cognitive architecture. 
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3.7.2 A Brief Economic Contextual Consideration 
 
Socioeconomic status (SES) has been shown, across a number of surveys and 
studies, to be inversely related to religiosity, i.e., religiosity increases as SES 
drops, and vice versa (Barber, 2011; 2012; Heaton, 2013; Norris & Inglehart, 
2004; WIN-Gallup, 2012). A Gallup Global Report (2010) spanning 114 
countries showed that, excluding the US (because it doesn‘t fit the trend), the 
poorest countries in the world (mean per-capita income ≤$2,000) were the most 
religious, while the richest countries (mean per-capita income ≥$25,000) were 
the least religious. Barber (2012) further analysed the Gallup Global Report 
data to show that religiosity is negatively related to advancement in welfare 
systems, equality of income distribution through taxation, favourable health 
care, and economic development. Barber (2011) had made a similar 
observation with data spanning 137 countries. 
 
 The correlation between SES and religiosity, although strongly negative in 
general, is also affected by other national characteristics such as the country‘s 
history of contact with religion, the provision of education by religious 
establishments, nature of the particular religion/s, and cultural valuation of 
religious tolerance playing important roles (Heaton, 2013). Some researchers 
further doubt that there is a clear relationship between SES and religiosity, 
arguing that it is only prevalent in African and Asian countries, and countries 
with poor data quality (e.g., Cristobal, 2009). Nonetheless, Nigeria is one of the 
most religious countries in the world (WIN-Gallup, 2012) and has a low SES 
(Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013). 
 
The uncertainty hypothesis presupposes an evolutionary cognitive adaptation, 
whereby the ability for religious acquisition evolved to deal with the uncertainty 
of uncontrollable forces in fitness-relevant events, such as those affecting 
survival. This view thus implies that heightened uncertainty increases religiosity 
(to address the uncertainty), and addressed uncertainty reduces religiosity. 
Variants of this framework include the uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007) 
and personal uncertainty theory (van den Bos et al., 2006). Somewhat similar to 
the uncertainty hypothesis, the existential security hypothesis posits that the 
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psychological anxiety invoked by life-threatening situations encourages 
religiosity, and the strength of the appeal of religiosity is reduced when such life-
threatening situations are addressed (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). For instance, in 
modern welfare states with high SES across Western Europe, in which basic 
amenities are provisioned to address life-threatening problems such as poverty, 
infant mortality, maternal death, and HIV, the need for religion has been 
reduced. However this need remains high in African and Asian countries where 
these problems are not being solved (Barber 2011; 2012; Gallup, 2010; WIN-
Gallup, 2012). 
 
The uncertainty hypothesis and the existential security hypothesis are not 
mutually exclusive; Barber (2011; 2012) combined both to explain the 
relationship between SES and religiosity, such that when anxiety about 
existential uncertaintyrises, religiosity also increases. These views, however, 
tend to leave out other psychological variables such as the influence of 
informational conformity.  
 
3.7.3 Religion, Childhood Indoctrination and Conformity 
 
Knowing what kind of information to spend attentional resources on is critical for 
children to learn to encode information about the world effectively; they are 
directed in this regard by parents, teachers, peers and others (Morris et al., 
2012). Children from about the age of four begin to comprehend that evidence 
(i.e., perceptual experience) predicates knowledge (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 
2001), and to appreciatethe importance of the attestation of others formaking 
inferences about the world (Koenig, Clément, & Harris, 2004). About 93% of the 
Nigerian population are religious (Chiluwa, 2012; Mandryk & Johnstone, 2001), 
which implies that most of the people whochildren look up to when forming 
inferences about the world will be religious adults. Although systematic research 
has been done on how belief systems gained in childhood are influential in 
adulthood, not much of this research has been religiosity-related, particularly 
within sub-Saharan Africa. To shed more light on the argument presented here, 
we shall consider the non-conscious activation of stereotype knowledge in 
adults, gained during childhood. 
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Duncan (1976) demonstrated in a stereotype activation study that ambiguous 
acts by individuals can be evaluated by other individuals based on their 
predetermined attitudes. Duncan showed that after an ambiguous act (light 
shove) by one confederate on another was viewed by participants, it was rated 
as violent by 75% of participants when performed by an African American, and 
by 17% of participants when carried out by a Caucasian. This study was 
criticised for using a biased sample population (Caucasian participants), which 
was thought to undermine the results obtained. However, a similar study (Sagar 
& Schofield, 1980) was carried out using both African American and Caucasian 
participants, and it replicated the results of Duncan, showing that ambiguous 
actions performed by an African American were more negatively evaluated by 
both African and Caucasian Americans. Both Duncan and Sagar and Schofield 
suggested that the cognitive accessibility of the stereotypic association between 
the person and violence was stronger when perceiving an African American 
perpetrator versusa Caucasian perpetrator. 
 
Building on Duncan‘s (1976) and Sagar and Schofield‘s (1980) research, 
Devine (1989) looked at a more complex interaction between (1) knowledge of 
stereotypes and personal beliefs acquired early in life and (2) recently modified 
beliefs. Based on studies which showed that stereotypes are established in 
childhood (e.g., Allport, 1954), Devine theorized that concepts about particular 
stereotypes can sometimes be in conflict with more recent personal beliefs, and 
if elicited non-consciously, the childhood belief might gain precedence. For 
instance, through recent association with a stereotypic character, a person 
might re-evaluate her preconception about that particular stereotype. However, 
stereotypical knowledge gained during childhood can still be elicited non-
consciously and go on to affect behaviour. Devine‘s study assumed that 
stereotypical beliefs would be more accessible upon perception of stimuli 
associated more with that particular stereotype than with personal beliefs, 
because of the amount of previously activated associations (i.e., from 
childhood, compared with a recently acquired belief). The results of Devine‘s 
study demonstrated stereotype-consistent negative evaluation of African 
Americans when the process was non-conscious and automatic (i.e., implicitly 
63 
 
 
 
assessed); however when the process was conscious and controlled (explicitly 
assessed), stereotype-consistent evaluation was inhibited. 
 
Within contemporary popular discourse, Dawkins (2006) champions the view 
that believers in religion arecasualties of childhood religious indoctrination 
(Coetsier, 2009). Dawkins (2006) and Humphrey (1998) both argue that ideas 
fed to children at a gullible and trusting age can go on to influence them for the 
rest of their lives. Dawkins particularly emphasizes the role of fear (of hell) in 
religious indoctrination. Through letters, interviews and correspondence, 
Dawkins shows that religious lessons given to children about eternal pain and 
suffering in Hell are not seen as merely metaphorical but are deeply embedded 
into their worldview. Ray (2009) has likened this religious indoctrination to a 
virus, more potent when inflicted in childhood. Dawkins (2006, p. 28) further 
asserts that this ―virus‖ can only be gotten rid of if it is ―not too insidious‖ or if the 
individual possesses a strong ―native intelligence‖.      
 
The classic distinction between normative and informational conformity 
(Deutsch & Gerald, 1955) offers a valuable tool to explore how children might 
conform to the beliefs of religious authoritative figures. It is certain that, expectin 
extraordinary cases, children are dependent at home (e.g., on parents), school 
(e.g., on teachers), and social gatherings (e.g., on guardians). From a 
normative conformity point of view, it is in children‘s best interest to alter their 
behaviour to match that of the authority figure whom they are under. This 
needn‘t necessarily be the case in cultures that promote freedom of thought in 
children, however, in the society where the empirical studies of the present 
thesis were carried out, children are expected to obeyand not question 
authority. Further, theirauthority figures are predominately religious (Luyaluka, 
2016). From an informational conformity point of view, children are relatively 
susceptible in this regard: because social knowledge is accumulated as children 
grow older, if their society provides only religious knowledge, they will 
internalise this knowledge so that it shapes their developing worldview.      
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3.8 Prelude to the Series of Experiments Carried Out 
 
Nigeria is a highly religious country (WIN-Gallup, 2012) and the two prevalent 
religions are Christianity and Islam (Chiluwa, 2012; Gallup, 2010; Mandryk & 
Johnstone, 2001; WIN-Gallup, 2012). These two Abrahamic religions are 
doctrinal (Atkinson & Whitehouse, 2011) and their adherents believe in the 
dichotomy of God/Devil, good/bad, and Heaven/Hell (O‘Sullivan, 2013). 
Doctrinal religions are characterised by a high frequency of repetition which 
leads to the tedium effect (Whitehouse, 2005). The tedium effect occurs as a 
result of overfamiliarity with associated religious concepts, which leads to 
reduced conscious Type II processing, and increased non-conscious Type I 
processing, of these concepts. Within dual processes theories of cognition this 
transfer of processing from Type II to Type I is termed TASS (Stanovich, 2004) 
and occurs through the process of over-familiarity. The first study carried out in 
the present thesis was a preliminary study to ascertain the rate of repetition of 
God references in two non-religious Nigerian national newspapers.  
 
A number of studies within the dual process framework synonymise religiosity 
with Type I cognitive processing and scepticism with Type II cognitive 
processing (e.g., Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 
2012). This proposed synonymic relationship between religion and Type I 
processing leads to the conclusion that religiosity is irrational. Studies Two 
(laboratory setting) and Three (real-life setting) in the present thesis challenged 
this assumption through utilizing the default-interventionist dual process 
framework. Implicit within the default-interventionist approach is the proposal 
that Type I cognitive processes provide the initial set of inferences which Type II 
cognitive processes act on (or override, depending on individual differences, 
e.g., level of pre-Abrahamic religious knowledge). Therefore, if an individual‘s 
Type I processing provides a set of religious inferences, that individual can go 
on to use her Type II processing to rationalize (e.g., through epistemological or 
functional rationality) and thus arrive at a rationalized conclusion. This line of 
argument also gains from Mercier and Sperber‘s (2011a, 2011) argumentative 
theory, which proposes that reason (Type II processing) evolved for supporting 
conclusions generated by Type I processes. In Studies Two and Three it was 
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hypothesised that when participants are exposed to secular symbols, no 
symbols, benign religious symbols, and punitive religious symbols, there will be 
a trend in religiosity-related inferential irrationality (RRII) scores. It was 
predicted that participants exposed to secular symbolism will have the lowest 
RRII scores followed by participants not exposed to any symbolism (control), 
followed by participants exposed to benign religious symbolism, and lastly, 
participants exposed to punitive religious symbolism will have the highest RRII 
scores. 
 
Studies Four and Five engaged with specific cognitive mechanisms theorised to 
support the acquisition of religion within CSR. Study Four assessed immortality 
bias in Nigerian children. It is theorised that immortality bias reveals intuitive 
patterns of reasoning about personhood that leads to religiosity. These studies 
are generally carried out with children, because children‘s responses are more 
free of cultural/religious learning than those of adults. These studies generally 
show that (a) as children get older, they report less belief in continuity of 
personhood (i.e., reduced belief in life before birth and after death), and (b) 
greater continuity of mental states (e.g., emotional and epistemic states) over 
physical states (e.g., biological and perceptual states).Younger children‘s 
increased belief in continuing personhood is seen as reflective of their intuitive 
reasoning, while older children‘s decreased belief in continuing personhood is 
seen as reflective of their use of non-intuitive reasoning (e.g., deductive 
reasoning) acquired through cognitive maturity. Emmons and Kelemen‘s (2014) 
study was of particular interest to Study Four in the present thesis because of 
their utilization of retrograde immortality. Retrograde immortality is absent from 
most contemporary religions, particularly the Abrahamic religions, and 
responses to questions about personhood before birth are much less likely to 
be influenced by cultural/religious learning than questions about personhood 
after death. Study Four tested the hypothesis that children exposed to religious 
symbolism will report greater conceptualization of retrograde immortality in 
comparison with children exposed to secular symbolism, regardless of age. 
 
The fifth and final study assessed the effect of religious and secular signs on 
agency detection and NFCC. Given the multi-faceted nature of religion, all 
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studies in the present thesis assessed specific aspects of religiosity. While 
Study Two and Three assessed religiosity-related inferential irrationality (RRII), 
Study Four assessed retrograde immortality, and Study Five assessed religious 
fundamentalism. Agency detection is theorised to play a significant role in the 
acquisition of religion (Barrett, 2004; Guthrie, 1993), and NFCC is positively 
correlated with religious fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). NFCC 
demands quick answers, while agency detection provides quick answers which 
religion qualifies (e.g., natural disasters might be attributed to Yahweh or 
Lucifer). Study Five investigated how agency detection explains the relationship 
between NFCC and religious fundamentalism. In this study, agency detection 
was separated into the detection of supernatural agency and the detection of 
natural agency; the former was hypothesized to positively mediate, and the 
latter to negatively mediate the relationship between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism. The hypothesis was predicted to occur when participants are 
exposed to secular symbolism intended to prime uncertainty and not when 
participants are exposed to religious (benign and punitive) symbolism intended 
to prime religious certainty. Each study is presented below as a separate 
empirical chapter 
 
.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Preliminary Study (Study One) 
 
4. Religious References in Nigerian Newspapers and Informational 
Conformity  
 
4.1  Introduction  
 
All news outlets, including tabloid and broadsheet newspapers, execute a basic 
informative function. According to Fiske (1992), if something ‗informs‘, then it 
concurrently disseminates knowledge and forms a subjective identity more 
compelling than reality; it forms a ‗believing subject‘, and provides a subjective 
lens through which the world is comprehended. From the first Nigerian 
newspaper (Iwe Iroyin) created in 1859 by the British missionary Henry 
Townsend, print media has played an extensive role in disseminating 
information in Nigeria. The present study investigates the presence of God 
references in two non-religious Nigerian national newspapers (The Guardian -
broadsheet and Daily Sun-tabloid) and discusses their implication for 
informational conformity. The study also serves to validate the centrality of 
religion in Nigerian society.  
 
Van Cappellen, Corneille, Stéphanie & Saroglou (2011) showed that exposure 
to religious references increases informational conformity, but only in 
participants who score high in dispositional submissiveness. This relationship 
was demonstrated by exposing participants to 20 religious words in one 
treatment and 20 neutral words in another treatment, and then having 
participants in both treatments engage in a numeric estimation task. While 
engaged in this task, participants were provided with three false figures, 
putatively given by three previous participants. Afterwards, all participants were 
administered self-reported measures for religiosity and submissiveness. The 
results showed that participants who were exposed to the religious references, 
and who scored high in submissiveness, conformed significantly more to the 
estimates given to them, regardless of their religiosity. However, a previous 
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study(Saroglou, Corneille, & Van Cappelen, 2009) demonstrated that mere 
exposure to religious concepts activates submissiveness accessibility 
(Experiment 1) and even leads to morally questionable submissive behaviour 
(Experiment 2). This finding suggests a rather circular relationship between 
religiosity and submissiveness, whereby religious concepts positively influence 
submissiveness, and submissiveness positively influences religiosity. 
 
Individuals do not conform to information just because they encounter it, certain 
conditions are required for this conformity to occur, and both religious doctrine 
and national newspapers fit adequately in their roles as ‗content‘ and ‗medium‘. 
As content, religious doctrine addresses an ambiguity that is difficult to ignore: it 
provides answers to existential questions, such as the existence of God, the 
purpose of life, and whether there is life after death (Batson & Stocks, 2004), 
and it  alleviates existential insecurity and uncertainty (Hogg, 2007; Norris & 
Inglehart, 2004; van den Bos et al., 2006). As mediums of information 
transmission, national newspapers are not as valid and reliable as peer-
reviewed journals or textbooks, but are still considered important popular 
sources of information (Williamson, Qayyum, Hider,& Liu, 2012). Newspapers 
are readily accessible and affordable to the general public, and they report 
promptly on real life events that have had a verifiable impact on society (reports 
on natural disasters or sports results, for instance), which acts to bolster their 
credibility among the general public. It was hypothesized that due to the highly 
religious nature of Nigerian society, there wouldbe a high ratio of God 
references in both Nigerian Newspapers. Further, there would be a higher rate 
of God references in the sensationalist tabloid newspaper than the broadsheet 
newspaper. God references were categorized into the following: fear of God, 
plea to God, submissiveness to God, prayer to God, gratitude to God, use of 
religious threat, and other.  
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4.2 Method 
 
Materials 
 
Two non-religious Nigerian national newspapers were chosen based on their 
national distribution, readership, and brand name recognition within the English-
speaking world. According to the International Research and Exchange Board‘s 
(IREX) Media Sustainability Index (MSI, 2012), The Punch, Daily Sun, This Day, 
and The Guardian have the widest circulation within the country. The Punch and 
Daily Sun both fall into the tabloid category, while This Day and The Guardian 
fall into the broadsheet category. These categories were determined by their 
journalistic ethics and socio-political and economic content, but not necessarily 
by page size. Daily Sun was used for the tabloid category because of its 
comparative brand name recognition, for instance; in Ireland there is the Irish 
Sun, in Scotland the Scottish Sun, in England The Sun, in Australia the Herald 
Sun, in the US the Chicago Sun-Times, etc. In the broadsheet category, The 
Guardian was used because of its comparative brand name recognition; it is 
present in the UK and US, and has variants in Australia (e.g., Swan Hill 
Guardian, Geraldton Guardian, Northern Guardian, Healesville and Yarra Glen 
Guardian). 
 
Only weekday Daily Sun and The Guardian newspapers were analysed, from 
Monday to Friday, during the month of May 2012, from the 1st to the 31st days of 
the month, excluding the 5th, 6th, 12th, 13th 19th, 20th 26th and 27th, which were 
Saturdays and Sundays. Weekends were excluded because of religious activity 
nationwide and possible atypically high religious content in both newspapers. All 
analyses were carried out using IBM SPSS Statistics 20 on a Windows 7 
computer. 
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Design and Procedure 
 
A two-proportion z-test was used to test the difference in rate of god references 
per word between the tabloid and broadsheet newspaper.Every weekday 
morning during the month of May 2012, the national Newspapers Daily 
Sun(tabloid) and The Guardian (broadsheet) were bought from the same 
vendor in Lagos, Nigeria. Every page was read for references to God. God is 
referred to by various names, such as Lord, Allah, and Jesus; all such 
references were included. 
 
Coding. 
 
As the frequency of references was being taken into account, a number of 
subthemes emerged, and were coded as: 1= Fear of God, 2 = Plea to God, 3 = 
Submissiveness to God, 4 = Praying to God, 5= Gratitude to God, 6 = Use of 
religious threat,and 7 = Other (uncategorised). The code ‗other‘ was used for 
clearly religious references that did not fit in any of the other six categories and 
could not be categorised into separate categories because they were either not 
clearly defined or did not appear enough times to warrant a category of their 
own. See Figure 4 for an example taken from the tabloid newspaper.  
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Figure 4.Example of ‗Use of religious threat‘ subtheme from the tabloid 
newspaper. 
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4.3 Results 
 
There were references to God every day in both the broadsheet and tabloid 
newspapers in the month of May 2012; out of every 1,000 words, references to 
God appeared 1.79 times in the tabloid and 0.66 times in the broadsheet. A two 
proportions z-test was carried out to test the difference in God references per 
number of words between the broadsheet and tabloid, with the significance 
level set at 0.01. The results show that the rate of God references per number 
of words in the tabloid (1,366 out of 765,440 words) was significantly higher 
than the rate of God references per number of words in the broadsheet (466 out 
of 680,363 words), z = 18.53, p < 0.01. See Figure 5 for further illustration of the 
difference in amount of God references per 1000 words between the tabloid and 
broadsheet. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Difference in rateof God references per 1000 words between tabloid 
and broadsheet newspapers. 
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Six categorized sub-themes of God references were identified; of these, 
submissiveness appeared more times per day than any other categorized sub-
theme in both the tabloid and broadsheet. Submissiveness appeared M = 16.70 
(SD = 9.53) times per day in the tabloid, and M = 5.52 (SD = 3.36) times per 
day in the broadsheet. The subtheme Use of religious threat appeared the least 
(M = 0.17, SD =0.49) times per day in the broadsheet, while the subtheme plea 
to God appeared the least (M = 1.48, SD = 2.68) times per day in the tabloid. 
See Table 2 for a list of means and standard deviations of the sub-themes 
identified. 
 
Table 2 
Mean and Standard Deviations per day of Subthemes Identified in theTabloid 
and Broadsheet Newspapers. 
 
                                                                 Newspaper type            
    Tabloid                 Broadsheet    
Theme                            Mean  SD  Mean  SD 
Submissiveness to God           16.70  9.53            5.52  3.36 
Gratitude to God                      7.91  5.53               3.13    2.42 
Prayer to God                          5.30  3.28  1.78  1.38 
Plea to God                             1.48             2.68  0.70  1.26 
Fear of God                             1.61             2.15  0.52  0.79 
Use of religious threat               1.52           2.19  0.17  0.49 
Other (uncategorised)            24.87              13.07  7.57  5.81 
 
 
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
The present study demonstrated that during the weekdays of a randomly 
selected month (May 2012), there were references to God every day in two 
categorically different non-religious Nigerian national newspapers (tabloid and 
broadsheet). The tabloid had significantly more references to God per number 
of words than the broadsheet. Further, a number of sub-themes in the type of 
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reference to God were identified; the sub-theme submissiveness appeared 
more times per day than any other sub-theme in both the tabloid and 
broadsheet. The results are discussed in terms of the high rate of God 
references (particularly the theme submissiveness) in non-religious Nigerian 
newspapers and its implication of informational conformity. The difference in 
rate of God references between the tabloid and broadsheet newspapers is also 
discussed.  
 
The rate of God references in the tabloid was almost three times higher than the 
broadsheet. It is noteworthy, however, that a substantial amount of articles in 
the tabloid had large amounts of quotes from interviewees and public speeches; 
these quotes carried most of the references to God, alongside the decidedly 
religious articles. Therefore, it was not always the tabloid journalist who 
referenced God directly, but indirectly through what he or she had heard or 
been told. Accordingly, it was not the same set of tabloid journalists, day after 
day, indoctrinating readers with religious dogma, but rather person after person, 
day after day, quoted by the same set of journalists. 
 
The contents of particular religions (e.g., Christianity or Islam) are learned 
socially; therefore it is crucial to consider the social factors that sustain them. It 
is theorised that newspapers and the stories they contain influence the attitude 
of their readers (Boykoff, 2008); they create believing subjects, who see reality 
through subjective lenses (Fiske, 1992). The average individual is, arguably, not 
as gullible as this might suggest; from what is known of informational 
conformity, certain conditions need to be met, to create an ideal ‗believing 
subject‘. For instance, reporting ‗blood is blue‘ would not be very successful 
because readers are familiar with both blood and the colour blue. 
 
From as early as Sherif‘s (1935) study, it was clear that individuals are 
influenced by informational conformity when the context is ambiguous and 
answers are provided by the majority. It is heightened when there is a genuine 
need for fact, and once accepted it is internalised, acted out in public as well as 
privately (Lonnqvist et al., 2009). Religion is highly ambiguous; there are 
thousands of gods and goddesses across the world divided by ethnicity and 
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epoch in civilisation. In the modern religions in Nigeria (Christianity and Islam) 
there are various contradictions and cryptic metaphors lost in translation in their 
holy books (the Bible and Quran respectively). As discussed earlier, most of the 
God references came from quotes of ordinary people interviewed or reported on 
by journalists. One of the hallmarks of conformity is the persuasion of a majority 
opinion (Sherif, 1935) and one of the hallmarks of informational conformity over 
other forms of conformity is the persuasion of authority (Lonnqvist et al., 2009). 
The Nigerian tabloid investigated expressed the religious opinion of the majority 
by publishing their quotes, thus somewhat endorsing the content of these 
quotes.        
 
Van Cappellen et al. (2011) showed that exposure to religious references 
increased informational conformity in dispositional submissive participants even 
when the context was non-religious. It has also been shown that mere exposure 
to religious references activates submissiveness accessibility and leads to 
morally questionable submissive behaviour (Saroglou, Corneille, & Van 
Cappelen, 2009). It was therefore suggested earlier that there might be a rather 
circular relationship between religiosity and submissiveness, whereby religious 
concepts positively influence submissiveness, and submissiveness positively 
influences religiosity. It could therefore be argued that while the journalists were 
writing, when the interviewees were being interviewed, when the speeches 
were being delivered or written, and when each participant non-consciously 
considered the role of religion in the event reported, submissiveness was 
implicitly activated in their minds. This vantage point may clarify why, among the 
sub-themes identified within the God references, submissiveness appeared 
more times than any other categorized sub-theme in both the tabloid and 
broadsheet. Submissiveness like many constructs can be multifaceted, based 
on the context in which it is used. In the process of coding the sub-themes for 
the theme reference to God, submissive was used in its function as a verb, i.e., 
the yielding of authority, and deferment of decision, opinion, and judgement to, 
an agent that is perceived as dominant to one‘s self. Examples of references 
that were coded as submissiveness in the tabloid include: ―…surrender to the 
Lord‖, ―…be contended with what Allah has provided for you‖, and ―…virgin 
Mary submitted herself to God‘s will‖. Given the high levels of religious 
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submissiveness discovered in the present study, more research is called for to 
explicitly investigate this construct of ‗submissiveness‘ in Nigerian society.  
 
The present study offered a window into the pervasiveness of religion in 
Nigerian society by rating the number of God references in two non-religious 
Nigerian newspapers. The informational conformity impact of the high presence 
of religious references was explored in the discussion section. However, 
conformity was not assessed directly, future studies interested in exploring the 
themes of the present study should utilize conformity measures, as well as 
submissiveness measures.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Study Two 
 
5.       A Default-Interventionist Approach to the Rationality vs. Religion 
          Debate (Laboratory Setting) 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Almost all the studies considered in the conceptual chapters above regarding 
the link between religiosity and dual process theories with relation to rationality 
were carried out in what Henrich et al. (2010)have termed WEIRD societies. 
The conclusions drawn from these studies are useful in assessing the rationality 
vs. religion debate in populations with a strong culture of secular thought 
alongside a strong culture of religious belief. However, the conclusions drawn 
from these studiesoffer inadequate explanations for religious belief in 
populations without a strong culture of secular thought alongside a strong 
culture of religious belief, particularly for highly rational individuals. For instance, 
Pennycook et al. (2012, 2013) studies utilized US and Canadian participants 
respectively, and offer little insight on how to account for the conflicting results in 
studies such as Buzdar et al. (2015) carried out in Pakistan.  
 
The present study was carried out in Nigeria, in line with the Henrich et al. 
(2010) emphasis on the need for psychology research to collect empirical data 
outside WEIRD societies, to broaden our understanding of mental phenomena 
across cultural variations. While WEIRD nations have witnessed an increase in 
secular thought in recent decades, placing more value on empirical analysis 
and scepticism (Bruce, 2011), developing countries (particularly sub-Saharan 
African countries) have witnessed a rise in religiosity (Anderson, 2013). For 
instance, the Win-Gallup (2012) global index on religiosity and atheism showed 
that out of 57 countries surveyed, Nigeria was the second-most religious; its 
neighbouring country Ghana was rated the most religious.  
 
Religions are numerous, and particular religions are multifaceted. Common 
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contemporary examples include Theravada and Mahayana in Buddhism, Sunni 
and Shia in Islam, and Catholicism and Evangelism in Christianity. However, 
within the different branches of particular religions there are often symbols that 
bind across dividing lines, such as the statue of Buddha in Buddhism, the 
Crescent moon in Islam, and the Crucifix in Christianity. The present study 
utilized iconography associated with the Christian religion only, therefore the 
studies presented below are not intended as an assessment of religion in 
general, but of Christianity within the specific cultural context of Nigeria. 
 
Rationality is also multifaceted and its generalization in the rationality vs. 
religion debate evades concrete conclusions, where at best it is agreed that 
some aspects of religion are rational and some are not, depending on how 
rationality is construed (Frances, 2015). Frances advances that in highly 
religious societies such as Nigeria—where most people maintain a normative 
religious worldview, whichhas been the status quo for many years, and where 
the religious society is functional (e.g., through prescribed moral codes)—
religious belief may be viewed as epistemologically rational. From a dual-
process perspective, Stanovich (1999) argues that deontic tasks (e.g., religious 
belief) that require normative responding through Type I cognitive processes are 
much less correlated with cognitive ability than abstract cognitive tasks (e.g., 
mathematical computations) that require analytical thought through Type II 
cognitive processes. From a philosophical perspective, Foley (1990) argues that 
it is futile to satisfy all conditions of rationality, and from a theological 
perspective Linde (2013) argues that religiosity is rational if religious belief is 
construed in a non-positivist way. Therefore, it is useful for studies interested in 
the rationality vs. religion debate to specify the facet of rationality that is of 
specific interest.   
 
Kalberg (1980) summarises Weber‘s categories of rationality as: practical, 
substantive, formal, and theoretical. Scherer (1985; 2011) however offers a 
more contemporary three category distinction of rationality: functional, 
consensual, and inferential. Functional rationalityserves a Machiavellian end; it 
is reasoning fostered by one‘s anticipation of an intended outcome, and can be 
thought of as a self-interested calculated response. It is therefore problematic, 
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for example, to term a devout Christian‘s belief/action toward going to Heaven 
after death as irrational, if rationality is construed as functional. Consensual 
rationality generally refers to the appeal to common sense to favour the majority 
view. It is also questionable, therefore, to term the belief/action of a religious 
individual from a highly religious country as irrational, if rationality is construed 
as consensual. Inferential rationality is analytical in its approach and lays 
emphasis on logical conclusive arguments. Inferential rationality meets the 
three criteria of the modernist conceptualization of rationality, i.e. it must (1) be 
universally valid, (2) have clear associations among different components of 
relevant arguments, and (3) be determined by specific logical rules (Van 
Huyssteen, 1999). Rationality in the present study is construed as inferential, 
and a specific religiosity-related inferential irrationality (RRII) scale was 
developed.  
 
Type I cognitive processes have been shown to be susceptible to priming 
across a number of studies. For instance, Tracy, Hart, and Martens (2011) 
showed that priming immortality led to more acceptance of intelligent design 
theory and rejection of evolutionary theory, even when attitudes toward 
evolutionary theory, level of education, religion, and religiosity were controlled 
for. Aveyard (2014) utilized contextual priming (Experiment Two) to influence 
Middle Eastern participants to cheat less on an unsupervised maths test, in 
comparison with participants who were not contextually primed. The present 
study utilized religious vs. secular primes to influence participants‘ Type I 
cognitive processing.   
 
Religiosity can be primed as either a punitive or benign construct. Theory of 
mind (ToM), according to Premack and Woodruff (1978) is the mental state an 
individual imputes to himself about himself, conspecifics, and other species. 
ToM has been theorised to be responsible for the perception and anticipation of 
the actions of supernatural agents such as God (Bering, 2002). A more 
contemporary account of ToM is that it involves two minds, that of the perceiver 
and that of the perceived (Waytz, Gray, Epley, & Wegner, 2010). Therefore, the 
kind of mental state the perceiver (mind one) attributes to a supernatural agent 
(mind two) might differ according to the religious prime mind one is exposed to 
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about mind two (e.g., a reminder of God‘s love or a reminder of God‘s wrath). 
Johnson and Kruger (2004) propose that the ‗fear of supernatural punishment‘ 
is a cognitive mechanism that evolved specifically for the acquisition and 
support of religious behaviour. Shariff and Rhemtulla (2012) show that crime 
rates are negatively predicted by belief in Hell and positively predicted by belief 
in Heaven, and Shariff and Aknin (2014) show that happiness and life 
satisfaction are associated with belief in Heaven and less so with belief in Hell.   
 
In the present study symbolism associated with two levels of religious belief 
(i.e., benign Christian and punitive Christian) and secular symbolism were used 
to prime participants before they responded to a religiosity-related inferential 
irrationality (RRII) scale. Although all religious symbols used were Christian, 
Nigeria is comprised of Muslims, Christians, and a minority of practitioners of 
indigenous religions. Therefore, participant religion was recorded and controlled 
for. High level of education has been linked with low religiosity across a number 
of studies (e.g., Halman & Draulans, 2006; Ruiter & Tubergen, 2009; Tracy et 
al., 2011). Therefore, the level of education of participants was also recorded 
and controlled for. 
 
It was hypothesized that secular primes would cause the default Type I 
cognitive processes of participants to generate more secular-consistent 
inferences and conclusions, which would influence their use of Type II cognitive 
processes to respond to (and hence score lower on) the RRII scale, in 
comparison with other participants. The following predictions were made 1) 
there would be a trend in non-analytic religiosity scores; in ascending order, 
participants primed with secular symbolism are expected to score the lowest, 
followed by participants in the control condition, followed by participants primed 
with benign religious symbolism, and lastly, participants primed with punitive 
religious symbolism will score the highest. 2) In comparison to participants 
primed with secular symbolism i) participants primed with benign religious 
symbolism will have higher RRII scores, ii) participants primed with punitive 
religious symbolism will have higher RRII scores, and iii) participants not primed 
with any symbols will have higher RRII scores. 
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5.2 Method  
 
Participants 
 
There were 123 participants (male = 80, female = 43) aged between 18 - 36 
years (M = 23.6, SD = 4.3). The majority were Christians (104), followed by 
Muslims (18) and one participant who classified himself as non-religious. Most 
participants (n = 82) were students of the University of Lagos, Nigeria 
(postgraduates, n = 3, undergraduates, n = 79), followed by university 
graduates (n =22) and non-students (n =19).  
 
Ethical Considerations  
 
The study was reviewed and approved by the Brunel University Research 
Ethics Committee. All participants were given a written informed consent sheet 
before participating in the study. Upon completion of the study all participants 
were fully debriefed and given an information sheet that summarised the 
purpose of the study and contained references to similar studies.  
 
Materials 
 
 A 35sqm closed room in an educational centre in Lagos, Nigeria was used as a 
laboratory. Four black and white A3 laminated posters containing visual illusions 
were used for the distraction task. The illusions included: The camouflaged 
Dalmatian (James, 1970), Hermann grid (Spillmann, 1994), Müller-Lyer illusion 
(Mack, Heuer, Villardi, & Chambers, 1985), and Roger Shepherd‘s Impossible 
Elephant (Shepard, 1990). There were two priming symbols in each 
experimental treatment, apart from the control treatment that had none. The 
symbols used for the secular treatment were (1) images of four ethnically black 
(two males and two females) and three ethnically non-black (two males and one 
female) scientists in a laboratory with a discursive sign that reads ―Question 
everything‖ and ―Separate fact from fiction‖ and (2) a red stop sign with the 
words ―stop and think‖. The symbols used for the benign Christian treatment 
were (1) a depiction of Jesus Christ, and (2) a crucifix with the word ―Christ‖. 
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The symbols used for the punitive Christian treatment were (1) a figure in 
flames with the caption ―Hell‖, and (2) a symbol with the words ―Hell is real‖. 
See Figures 6, 7, and 8 for examples of the symbols utilized in each of the 
benign religious, punitive religious, and secular treatments, and Appendix Dfor 
all the symbols utilized. 
 
 
Figure 6.Example of secular symbol. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.Example of benign religious symbol. 
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Figure 8.Example of punitive religious symbol. 
 
 
The Rational Experiential Inventory (REI-40; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) served as 
the main source for composing the nine-item five point RRII scale (1 = strongly 
agree, 5 = strongly disagree). The REI-40 was specifically designed to measure 
preferences for the processing of information, based on Epstein‘s Cognitive-
Experiential Self-Theory. REI-40 assesses the distinction between a rational 
and experiential preference for information processing. However, the present 
research was specifically interested in religiosity-related inferential irrationality, 
therefore some items were modified, some omitted, and new items were added 
to suit this purpose. Two items that were directly lifted from the REI-59 without 
modification include ―I generally prefer to accept things as they are than to 
question them‖ and ―It is enough for me that something gets the job done. I 
don‘t care how or why it works‖ (See Table 3). This method of starting a 
questionnaire based on a previous and widely used measure is not uncommon, 
for instance, in the development for a new assessment of epistemological 
beliefs, Ordoñez, Ponsoda, Abad, and Romero (2009) selected items from 
Bendixen, Schraw, and Dunkle (1998) and Schommer (1990, 1993, 1998).   
 
During the RRII scale development, two items were considered problematic 
because they did not load onto the same component as the other items in the 
scale. These items were ―It is not important to prove the things we believe and 
have faith in‖ and ―it is not important to try to understand every single thing 
around us‖. They were included, pending further analysis, because of their face 
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validity and relevance to the analytic vs. intuitive dual-process distinctions. 
These two items also did not load onto the same component as the other seven 
items in the present analysis. The RRII scale is conceived as one-dimensional, 
all seven items loaded onto the same component, apart from the two previously 
noted items. Therefore, to comply with the one-dimensional conceptualization of 
the RRII scale, these two items were excluded before the main analysis was 
carried out.  
 
Reliability of the 7-item RRLI questionnaire  
 
To check for internal consistency of the retained items in the RRLI 
questionnaire, Cronbach‘s alpha was computed. The results indicate a good 
internal consistency with an alpha value of α = .75 (p = .95), and the least 
correlated item in the scale was r = .40 (See Table 3).  
 
Validity of the 7-item RRLI questionnaire  
 
The minimum amount of data required to conduct factor analysis was met, with 
a sample size of 123 for 7 items, providing a ratio of at least 17 cases per 
variable. All 7 items correlate with a minimum of .4 with at least one other item, 
and the Kaiser-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .69, above the 
recommended value of .6. Further, Barlett‘s test of sphericity was significant (χ2 
= 169.78, df = 21, p<0.001), therefore, factor analysis was considered suitable.  
 
In the PCA of the RRLI questionnaire in the pilot study (see Appendix A for the 
initial development of the questionnaire), the items were reduced to provide a 
one-dimensional assessment of cognitive orientation toward or away from RRLI 
following experimental manipulation. A principle axis factoring (PAF) was carried 
out on the final 7-items to assess if they all loaded onto a single factor in order 
to justify computing all the variables into a single composite score to test the 
hypotheses of the main study. The PAF of the final 7-item RRLI questionnaire, 
using the oblimin rotation, because the items are correlated, showed only one 
factor passed the Kaiser rule, with an eigen value of 2.79 explaining 39.9% of 
the variance, the Cattell scree test also suggests one factor, with loadings 
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ranging from .48 to .59. See Table 3. Both the internal consistency and validity 
assessments justify combining the 7- items of the RRLI questionnaire into one 
composite, this composite was used as the DV (1) in the analysis of the main 
study.     
 
Table 3 
Items, Item-Scale Correlations and Factor Loadings of the Seven-Item RRII 
Scale 
Item-Scale     Factor 
  Item                                                                              Correlation     Loading 
 
 
  1. Faith and belief are more important than logic 
      and reason.                                                                        .47            .56 
  2. Accepting the events in your life by religious faith  
      is better than reasoning out the causes of the events.      .50            .58 
  3. Natural disasters are an act of God to punish sinful  
      nations.                                                                              .44            .52 
  4. Some dreams can predict the future.                                .45            .53 
  5. The truth of existence is revealed in the holy religious  
      books and no scientific endeavour can prove these  
      facts wrong.                                                                       .40            .48 
  6. I generally prefer to accept things as they are than  
      question.                                                                            .47            .57 
  7. It is not right to question anything written in any of the  
      holy books such as the Bible or Quran.                             .50            .59 
 
 
Design 
 
A trend analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the situational 
influence of the symbols (punitive religious, benign religious, secular, and no 
symbol) on RRII scores.The independent variable (IV) was type of symbolism 
with four levels: punitive Christian, benign Christian, secular, and control 
treatment (no symbol). The dependent variable (DV) was RRII.  
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Procedure  
 
The visual illusions used for the distraction tasks were placed about 6ft off the 
ground, on different walls of the laboratory, and remained in the same position 
through the different experimental treatments. The frames containing the 
priming symbols were placed on two sides of the wall above and away from the 
distraction tasks. The contents of the frames varied according to experimental 
treatment. Participants were randomly assigned to the different treatments. 
Upon arrival, participants were given a funnelled briefing; it was important that 
they did not become aware of the nature of the study until after completion (see 
Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). After informed consent was obtained, 
participants were asked to determine the contents of the visual illusions; none of 
the priming symbols were pointed to or mentioned. Immediately after 
completion, participants were asked to help fill in an unrelated measure for a 
different study (i.e., the RRII scale). Demographic information such as gender, 
level of education and religious affiliation were taken afterwards. Finally, the 
participants were probed regarding whether they thought anything had 
influenced their responses to the RRII measure; this was necessary to ensure 
that they were unaware of the priming influence of the symbols (see Bargh et 
al., 1996). Participants were then fully debriefed and the visual illusions were 
explained to them. 
 
5.3  Results  
 
The control variables religious affiliation and level of education were measured 
as categorical variables, however each of the categories in the variables were 
dummy coded and a two tailed Pearson correlation analysis was conducted 
between each category and the dependent variable (RRII score). None of the 
types of religion and levels of education were significantly correlated with RRII 
scores. Therefore, religious affiliation and level of education were excluded as 
control variables in the rest of the analysis. 
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Hypotheses Test: Situational influences of symbols on RRII Scores  
 
A trend analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the situational 
influence of the symbols (punitive religious, benign religious, secular, and no 
symbol) on RRII score. Levene‘s test was not significant (p = .10), indicating 
that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated. There was a 
significant effect of situational influence on RRII scores, F(3,119) = 8.23, p< 
.001. There was a significant linear trend, (1,119) = 23.25, p< .001, indicating 
that RRII score increased linearly from the secular treatment to the control 
treatment to the benign religious treatment, and to the punitive religious 
treatment.   
 
Three post-hoc tests using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .017 (.05/3) were 
carried out to compare RRII scores of participants primed with secular 
symbolism and participants in the other conditions. In comparison with 
participants exposed to secular symbolism (M =19.35, SD = 4.51), participants 
exposed to punitive religious symbolism (M =24.56, SD = 5.49) had significantly 
higher RRII scores p< .001, 95% CI [-8.49, -1.92], with an effect size of d = 
1.04. In comparison with participants exposed to secular symbolism participants 
exposed to benign religious symbolism (M =24.13, SD = 3.63) had significantly 
higher RRII scores p = .001, 95% CI [-8.09, -1.46], with an effect size of d = 
1.17. However, in comparison with participants exposed to secular symbolism, 
participants not primed with any symbols (M = 21.03, SD = 5.57) did not have 
significantly lower RRII scores p = .10, 95% CI [-5.05, 1.69], with an effect size 
of d = .33. See Figure 9 
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Figure 9.Error Bars with a 95% confidence interval of mean RRII scores 
according to type of symbol participants were exposed to.  
 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The results of Study Two supported the linear trend prediction that participants 
exposed to secular symbolism will have the lowest RRII scores followed by 
participants not exposed to any symbolism (control), followed by participants 
exposed to benign religious symbolism, and lastly, participants exposed to 
punitive religious symbolism will have the highest RRII scores. The results of 
Study Two carried out in Nigeria, replicated the general findings of previous 
studies carried out in different countries which report a significant influence of 
religious priming on self-reported religiosity. For instance, Ramsay, Pang, Shen, 
and Rowatt (2013) showed a significant religious priming effect on attitude 
toward outgroups with Singapore students, and Saroglou, Corneille, and van 
Cappellen (2009) reported a significant increase in submissiveness when 
participants from a Belgian university were primed with religiosity. 
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These findings are interpreted through the default-interventionist dual-process 
framework, which posits that the inferences and conclusions generated by 
default Type I cognitive processes influence and can constrain Type II cognitive 
processes (Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). Type I cognitive 
processes are prone to effects of religiosity priming (e.g., Aveyard, 2014; Tracy 
et al., 2011), and self-reported measures such as the RRII scale are filled in 
through conscious and controlled effort required for reading and understanding. 
In the secular treatment, it can be argued that the icons primed participants‘ 
Type I cognitive processing to generate a substantial amount of sceptical 
inferences and conclusions that their Type II cognitive processing acted on 
when responding to the RRII scale. Similarly the benign Christian icons would 
have primed participants‘ Type I cognitive processing to generate more religious 
inferences and conclusions that their Type II cognitive processing acted on 
when responding to the RRII scale. Finally, the punitive Christian icons would 
have primed participants‘ Type I cognitive processing to generate more religious 
inferences and conclusions that include supernatural punishment, which their 
Type II cognitive processing acted on when responding to the RRII scale.  
 
Argumentative theory (Mercier & Sperber, 2011a, 2011b; Mercier, 2011a, 2011b, 
2011c, 2011d) and Baumard and Boyer‘s (2013) modified dual-process model, 
under the unifying framework of the default-interventionist dual-process 
approach (Evans, 2007; Evans & Stanovich, 2013a), offer more explanatory 
power for the relationship between religious belief and rational thought for 
studies carried out in both WEIRD and non-WEIRD nations. For instance, it can 
be argued that in WEIRD nations that have a conspicuous secular worldview 
alongside a religious worldview, when individuals respond to religious 
questions, the inferences generated by their Type I cognitive processes might 
include secular as well as religious inferences. Further, in these WEIRD nations, 
the more inferentially rational individuals will use their Type II cognitive 
processes to justify and/or argue in favour of the secular over the religious 
inferences, while the less inferentially rational individuals will depend on the 
experiential/heuristic inferences generated by their Type I cognitive processes, 
or use their Type II cognitive processes (e.g., functionally or epistemologically) 
to justify the religious inferences generated by their Type I cognitive processes. 
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Similarly, it can be argued that, depending on individual learning and exposure, 
in highly religious nations that have only a conspicuous and normative religious 
worldview, both the more inferentially rational and the less inferentially rational 
might arrive at the same conclusions, albeit through different cognitive 
processes (i.e., through Type II for the former, and through Type I for the latter).    
 
Pennycook et al. (2013) advance that results such as theirs and those of the 
present study, which demonstrate the effect of situational influences on religious 
belief, suggest that religious beliefs are to a certain extent re-evaluated upon 
consideration. The present study adds that the particular inferences and 
conclusions generated by default Type I cognitive processes can vary, and it is 
these outputs that influence how individuals use their Type II cognitive 
processes to consciously consider their response to religiosity measures.    
 
One limitation of Study Two is that even though no participant reported being 
influenced by the supraliminal primes (i.e., the symbols) when probed, the 
laboratory room was a confined space. In the confined space, participants 
would have noticed the symbols and their self-reported RRII may have been 
motivated by social desirability considerations.Although this limitation could 
have been overcome through the use of subliminal priming, the present thesis is 
interested in the situational influences of visible symbols, particularly how visible 
religious symbols in highly religious country of Nigeria reinforces religious belief; 
therefore, supraliminal priming was used.  
 
It is worth noting that religious symbolism can be found in most homes and work 
environments in Nigeria, as well as on shopping bags, car plate numbers, 
stickers, etc. (Chiluwa, 2008; Ogunnike, 2013). In the next empirical chapter 
(Study Three) this limitation was addressed by carrying out the experiment on a 
busy street with numerous distractions such as traffic, pedestrians, street 
hawkers, and other symbols. It was intended that presentation of the primes in a 
crowded public space, as opposed to in the experimenter‘s laboratory, would 
help reduce the connection between the experimenter and the primes, and thus 
help address the social desirability limitations of Study Two. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
Study Three 
 
6.        A Default-Interventionist Approach to the Rationality vs. Religion 
Debate (Real Life Setting) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
Study Three replicated Study Two, however, while Study Two was carried out in 
a controlled laboratory setting, Study Three was carried out in a real-life setting. 
Experiments carried in controlled laboratory settings have numerous 
advantages, however, real-life setting experiments offer an extra advantage that 
laboratory experiments do not, that is, the ability to generalize results beyond 
the laboratory setting. The need to carry out a real-life setting experiment was of 
particular interest to the present thesis, because of the focus on the (non-
conscious) influence of visible religious symbols in Nigeria. Nigeria is a highly 
religious society and religious symbols are prevalent all over the country 
(Adeboye, 2012; Chiluwa, 2008; WIN-Gallup, 2012). To what extend can the 
results of Study Two be generalized outside the laboratory? Will the same trend 
observed in Study Two be found in a real-life setting experiment? 
 
The link between religiosity and non-conscious automatic processing has led to 
a series of studies investigating the role of analytic cognitive processing in 
religious disbelief (e.g., Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Buzdar, Ali, & Tariq, 2015; 
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Pennycook, Cheyne, 
Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014; Shenhav, Rand, & Greene, 2011; Siddiqa, 
2010). Shenhav et al. (2011) showed through the cognitive reflection test (CRT; 
Frederick, 2005) that individual differences in cognitive style predict belief in 
God, with participants (mostly US residents) showing an inverse relationship 
between cognitive style and belief in God. Pennycook et al. (2014) propose that 
individuals who are more analytic are also less religious because they are more 
sensitive to the conflict between their observation of the natural world and their 
immaterial religious beliefs. Pennycook et al. further propose a specific 
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cognitive mechanism, termed ―conflict detection‖, as being responsible for this 
process.  
 
The CRT measures the tendency for a reflective versus intuitive response in 
individuals. It is comprised of three mathematical questions that are worded to 
appear complex but require no mathematical expertise. The key to answering 
the CRT questions resides in how the questions are conceptualised. For 
instance, consider one of the three questions, ―In a lake, there is a patch of lily 
pads. Every day, the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to 
cover the entire lake, how long would it take for the patch to cover half of the 
lake?‖ A quick intuitive response might be to divide 48 by 2 (i.e., 24 days to 
cover half the patch if it takes 48 days to cover the entire patch). However, if this 
answer is reflected upon, one will realise that that will mean the patch will 
double in size to fill the lake on the 25th day. The answer, therefore, is 47 days 
because the patch doubles in size the next day. Studies that have shown an 
inverse relationship between cognitive ability and religiosity typically measure 
cognitive ability (e.g., through the CRT; Pennycook et al., 2012, 2013; Shenhav 
et al., 2011) before assessing if it predicts religiosity. However, it is not clear if 
priming analytical thinking through secular symbolism will significantly increase 
cognitive ability in comparison with priming religiosity. Therefore, Study Three 
utilized the CRT to test the extra prediction (not tested inStudy Two) that 
analytical-related secular primes will increase cognitive ability in comparison 
with religious primes. 
 
As with Study Two, it was also predicted that: 1) there would be a trend in non-
analytic religiosity scores, such that in ascending order, participants primed with 
secular symbolism are expected to score the lowest, followed by participants in 
the control condition, followed by participants primed with benign religious 
symbolism, and lastly, participants primed with punitive religious symbolism are 
expected to score the highest. 2) In comparison to participants primed with 
secular symbolism i) participants primed with benign religious symbolism will 
have higher RRII scores, ii) participants primed with punitive religious 
symbolism will have higher RRII scores, and iii) participants not primed with any 
symbols will have higher RRII scores. 
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6.2 Method  
 
Participants 
 
There were 238 participants (male = 195, female = 43), aged 18 - 60 years (M= 
29.72, SD = 6.68). The majority of the participants were Christians (198), 
followed by Muslims (35), practitioners of an indigenous Nigerian religion (3) 
and non-religious (2). Most were graduates (132), followed by undergraduates 
(48), postgraduates (31), and O Level holders (27).   
 
Ethical Considerations  
 
The study was reviewed and approved by the Brunel University Research 
Ethics Committee. All participants were given a written informed consent sheet 
before participating in the study. Upon completion of the study all participants 
were fully debriefed and given an information sheet that summarised the 
purpose of the study and contained references to similar studies.  
 
Materials 
 
The priming icons and distraction tasks were the same as those used in Study 
Two, apart from the Hermann grid which was replaced with the Ebbinghaus 
illusion, because the reflection from the sun affected its visibility. There were two 
priming icons in each treatment; one was printed on a t-shirt worn by the 
experimenter‘s confederate and the other was attached to the back of a 
clipboard carried by the experimenter. See Figures 10, 11, and 12 for examples 
of the icons utilized and Appendix Dfor all the icons utilized.The three item 
Cognitive Response Test (CRT) which measures the tendency for a reflective 
versus intuitive response. 
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Figure 10.Example of secular symbol. 
 
 
 
Figure 11.Example of benign religious symbol. 
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Figure 12.Example of punitive religious symbol. 
 
 
 
Design 
 
A trend analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to compare the situational 
influence of the symbols (punitive religious, benign religious, secular, and no 
symbol) on RRII scores. The independent variable (IV) was type of symbolism 
with four levels: punitive Christian, benign Christian, secular, and control 
treatment (no symbol). The dependent variables (DVs) were RRII score and 
CRT score. The control variables were type of religion and level of education. 
 
Procedure 
 
The study was carried out on a busy street of Abuja, the capital of Nigeria. The 
laminated A4 distraction tasks were pegged on a fence/tree behind the 
experimenter. Respondents were approached to help participate in a 
psychology experiment; those who agreed were given an informed consent 
form. At this point the experimenter‘s confederate approached wearing a t-shirt 
96 
 
 
 
containing the experimental prime which differed according to treatment. The 
experimenter thanked the confederate for stopping and asked him to kindly 
wait. After signing the consent form participants were engaged in the distraction 
task; they were asked to describe the visual illusions and their responses were 
written down on the clipboard held in a manner that ensured the back of the 
clipboard, containing the second icon, was within the sight of the participant 
(see Alter & Kwan, 2009). Participants were then asked to help fill in the RRII 
scale and CRT as part of a different study. Demographic details were taken 
afterwards, including age, religion, and level of education. Participants were 
asked if they thought anything had affected their response to the distraction 
tasks, the RRII scale and the CRT afterwards; all participants reported that 
nothing had affected their responses. Finally, participants were given the 
answers to the visual illusions, and fully debriefed on the purpose of the study. 
See Figures 13 and 14 for depictions of the presentation of the clipboard board 
prime to participants while they responded to the distraction task. See Appendix 
Efor more depictions.   
 
 
 
Figure 13.Presentation of prime during the distraction task. 
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Figure 14.Presentation of prime during the distraction task. 
 
 
6.3 Results  
 
Reliability analysis of the seven-item RRII scale revealed a Cronbach‘s alpha of 
.60. The control variables type of religion and level of education were measured 
as categorical variables, however each of the categories in the variables were 
dummy coded and a two-tailed Pearson correlation analysis was conducted 
between each category and the dependent variable (RRII). None of the types of 
religion were significantly correlated with RRII. Therefore, type of religion was 
excluded as a control variable. Some of the levels of education were correlated 
with both RRII scores CRT scores.   
 
There was a significant positive correlation between O Level holders and RRII 
scores, r (236) = .19, p = .004. There was a significant negative correlation 
between graduates and RRII score, r (236) = -.18, p = .007. There was a 
significant positive correlation between postgraduates and the CRT, r (236) = 
.20, p = .002. Therefore, O Level holders and graduates were controlled for in 
the set of hypotheses for the situational influences of symbols on RRII scores, 
and postgraduates were controlled for in the set of hypotheses for the 
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situational influences of symbols on CRT scores.   
 
Situational influences of symbols on RRII   
A trend analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to compare the 
situational influence of the symbols (punitive religious, benign religious, secular, 
and no symbol) on RRII scores. Levene‟s test was not significant (p = .28), 
indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance was not violated. 
There was a significant effect of situational influence on RRII score, F(3,232) = 
7.00, p< .001. There was a significant linear trend, p< .001, 95% CI [1.34, 3.50], 
indicating that RRII increased linearly from the secular treatment to the control 
treatment to the benign religious treatment, and to the punitive religious 
treatment. There was no significant effect of the covariate O Level on RRII 
scores, F(1,232) = 1.88, p = .172. There was no significant effect of the 
covariate Graduate on RRII, F(1,232) = 1.62, p = .204. 
 
Three post-hoc tests using Bonferroni adjusted alpha levels of .017 (.05/3) were 
carried out to compare self-reported RRII scores of participants primed with 
secular symbolism and participants in the other conditions. In comparison with 
participants exposed to secular symbolism (M = 22.30, SD = 4.26), participants 
exposed to punitive religious symbolism (M = 26.02, SD = 3.90) had 
significantly higher RRII scores, p < .001, 95% CI [-5.36, -1.25], with an effect 
size of d = .91. However, in comparison with participants exposed to secular 
symbolism participants exposed to benign religious symbolism (M = 23.90, SD 
= 3.97) did not have significantly higher RRII scores p = .340, 95% CI [-3.47, 
.57], with an effect size of d = .39. Similarly, in comparison with participants 
exposed to secular symbolism, participants not primed with any symbols (M = 
22.95, SD = 4.47) did not have significantly higher scores p = .100, 95% CI [-
2.57, 1.48], with an effect size of d = .15. See Figure 15 
 
Situational influences of symbols on the CRT  
Most of the participants in all the experimental treatments scored zero on the 
CRT which made the data zero-inflated, skewed, and unfit for parametric 
analysis. A nonparametric rank analysis of covariance (Quade, 1967) was 
conducted to assess the situational influence of symbols (punitive religious, 
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benign religious, secular, and no symbol) on participants‟ CRT scores, while 
controlling for level of education. There was no significant effect of situational 
influence on CRT score, F(3,234) = .95, p = .42. 
 
 
Figure 15.Error Bars with a 95% confidence interval of mean RRII scores 
according to type of symbol participants were exposed to.  
 
 
6.4 Discussion 
 
Study Three replicated the trend found in Study Two, and the difference in RRII 
scores between participants exposed to secular symbolism and participants 
exposed to punitive religious symbolism. However, the difference in RRII scores 
between participants exposed to secular symbolism and participants exposed to 
benign religious symbolism found in Study Two was not replicated. Participants 
struggled with the CRT questions and only one participant got all three 
questions correct (he was in the benign religious treatment). It might be that the 
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Nigerian population sample was not familiar with the CRT-type questions. 
Unsurprisingly, Quade‟s (1967) nonparametric rank analysis of covariance 
failed to show a significant situational influence of symbols (secular, benign 
religious, punitive religious, and no symbol) on CRT scores. Unlike Study Two, 
level of education had a significant effect on RRII scores in Study Three, as well 
as on CRT scores. However, since the CRT scores were not significantly 
different among the experimental treatments, it demonstrates that in this 
particular study the religious and secular icons did not inhibit or improve 
cognitive response/ability.  
 
Benign religious symbols are common on the streets of Nigeria (Chiluwa, 2008; 
Ogunnike, 2013), which might explain the difference in results between the 
laboratory study and the real-life setting study. Participants in the present study 
(i.e., the real-life setting) might have been primed by the benign religious 
symbols on the streets of Nigeria prior to participating in the study. 
Consequently, only the punitive religious experimental treatment was potent 
enough to significantly influence the inferences and conclusions produced by 
participants‘ Type I cognitive processes, which in turn influenced how they used 
their Type II cognitive processes to respond to the RRII scale.  
 
The results of both studies Two and Three support the argument that religious 
belief need not be viewed as synonymous with Type I cognitive processes or 
irrationality, because it is important to separate the cognitive process of rational 
thought from the content that is rationally processed (Linde, 2013) which can be 
religious or secular. In both studies Two and Three, when participants‘ Type II 
rational cognitive processing of the RRII scale was experimentally manipulated 
to be fixated on secular inferences and conclusions generated by their default 
Type I cognitive processes, they scored lower on the RRII scale. Similarly, when 
participants‘ Type II rational cognitive processing of the RRII scale was 
experimentally manipulated to be fixated on religious inferences and 
conclusions generated by their default Type I cognitive processing, they scored 
higher on the RRII scale. These differences in RRII scores were significant 
when the secular treatment was contrasted with both religious treatment in 
Study Two, and only the punitive religious treatment in Study Three.  
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One unavoidable limitation across both Study Two and Study Three is the 
unequal effect strength of the two icons intended to be diametrical (i.e., religious 
vs. secular); religious primes are well established, unlike secular primes, 
particularly in Nigeria. To address this shortcoming, descriptive text was used in 
the secular icons (e.g., ‗stop and think‘); this instruction, however, is fairly 
content-free and could imply either ‗stop and think about the rationality of 
religious claims‘ or ‗stop and think about the irrationality of religious claims‘ for 
instance. To address this issue, the secular icons were contextualised with 
relevant images (e.g., an image of scientists in a lab looking through 
microscopes). The Cronbach alpha of the RRII scale used for Study Three was 
low (.60) and couldn‘t be improved by deleting any items, this indicates a 
limitation in the reliability of the RRII scale. Therefore the results of Study Three 
should be interpreted with caution.  
 
Both Studies Two and Three shed light on three important points in the 
rationality vs. religion debate. First, religious belief can be rational, for example, 
if viewed epistemologically (Frances, 2015) or in a non-positivist manner (Linde, 
2013). Therefore, it is important to isolate the particular facet/s of rationality in 
the design of studies in a similar manner to the present study, which isolated 
religiosity-related inferential irrationality as the rationality facet of interest. 
Second, it is important to not conflate cognitive contents with cognitive 
processes (Linde, 2013); rational thought in general is a cognitive process while 
religious and secular beliefs are contents or items which can be processed by 
rational thought. Lastly, critics have wondered how the religious can be termed 
irrational when some of the most analytical minds in the past have been 
religious. For instance, Ball (2012) wonders how Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel 
Kant, and George Berkeley, all of whom he claims are religious, can be termed 
irrational. Dosdad and Manrique (2015) argue that Copernicus, Kepler, Galileo, 
Newton, Boyle, Bacon, and Descartes were all scientific revolutionaries and 
claim that they were also all religious. Through the default-interventionist dual-
process approach presented here, religious belief is not generalised as 
synonymous with rationality-devoid Type I cognitive processes. The questions 
that should be asked are, what inferences and conclusions are being fed to the 
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individual‘s Type II cognitive processes by his/her default Type I cognitive 
processes? And what situational conditions influence the particular inferences 
and conclusions generated by an individual‘s default Type I cognitive 
processing? The scientific revolutionaries mentioned above have bodies of work 
that prove the quality of their ability to think rationally. They also lived in 
societies in which religiosity levels were not unlike those of the Nigerian society 
investigated here. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
Study Four 
 
7.        Reasoning by Analogy: Inference of Retrograde Immortality by 
           Priming Future Immortality in Nigerian School Children 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
Conceptualization of future immortality (i.e., life after death) reveals intuitive 
patterns of reasoning about the enduring qualities of personhood (Bering, 2002; 
Bering & Bjorklund, 2004). Cultural/religious narratives however often inform 
responses to questions on future immortality, even in studies carried out with 
children (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Harris & Giménez, 2005). To address this 
shortcoming, Emmons and Kelemen (2014), in a cross-cultural study (urban 
Ecuador and rural Shuar) assessed children‘s conceptualization of retrograde 
immortality (i.e., life before birth). This novel approach reduces the chances of 
culturally acquired responses in children in societies with no dominant 
retrograde immortality script. Nonetheless, religious situational influences that 
prime future immortality might still affect how individuals express their belief in 
retrograde immortality, even in studies carried out with children. The present 
study was carried out in Nigeria which has a dominant future immortality 
worldview, sanctioned by Islam and Christianity (Isanbor & Ekiugbo, 2014) and 
also by various indigenous religions (e.g., Adamolekun, 1999). Through 
children‘s ability to reason by analogy (Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006) it 
was hypothesized that exposure to a religious future immortality prime (crucifix) 
will lead children to express more belief in retrograde immortality when 
compared with children exposed to a secular prime.  
 
When faced with novel phenomena, reasoning by analogy enables children to 
generate inferences by extracting relevant information based on relational 
similarity and transferring knowledge across contexts (Chen, Sanchez, & 
Campbell, 1997; Goswami, 2001; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006). The 
cognitive mechanism responsible for the ability of children to make analogies 
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has been argued to underlie the development of all cognition (Hofstadter, 2001), 
and to be paramount for enabling children to comprehend the world (Thibaut, 
French, & Vezneva, 2010). Although studies have demonstrated reasoning by 
analogy in children as young as 18 months (e.g., Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 
1997), competency is not attained until adolescence (Richland, Morrison, & 
Holyoak, 2006). Just as important as developmental changes, however, is the 
knowledge base of the child. For instance, if problem set B requires inferences 
from problem set A, an individual without knowledge of problem set A would not 
be able to make the correct inference for problem set B, regardless of age. The 
above is informed by the relational primacy theory (Gentner & Rattermann, 
1991; Goswami, 1992; Lindsey & Burchinal, 2013), which posits that 
satisfactory knowledge is imperative for reasoning by analogy. 
 
It is estimated that about 93% of all Nigerians practice either of the two world 
dominant doctrinal religions, Christianity and Islam (Chiluwa, 2012; Mandryk & 
Johnstone, 2001). Most denominations of Christianity and Islam validate future 
immortality and have no retrograde immortality script (with the exception of 
Mormonism). Children in Nigeria become acquainted with Christianity and/or 
Islam from a very young age, and like adults are exposed to religion through all 
popular forms of media and schooling (Adeboye, 2012; Marquette, 2012; Taiwo, 
2013). Accordingly, children in Nigeria should possess the prerequisite 
knowledge of future immortality to be able to reason by analogy about 
retrograde immortality when primed with religious future immortality.  
 
Harris and Giménez (2005) demonstrated that when Spanish children aged 
seven to eleven years old were given a religious vs. secular narrative of the 
death of an elderly person, those in the religious treatment expressed more 
belief in future immortality.  Similar results were obtained by Astuti and Harris 
(2008) with a Vezo population sample (in Madagascar) consisting of children 
and adults. Whereas Harris and Giménez (2005) had used ―God‖ and ―priest‖ in 
the religious narrative and ―doctor‖ and ―hospital‖ in the secular narrative, Astuti 
and Harris used ―corpse‖ (secular) and ―tomb‖ (religious) as equivalents, 
according to the Vezo cultural/religious worldview. In both studies, however, it 
can be argued that the narratives used to prime the participants might be 
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interpreted as instructions by the participants. For instance, ―…The priest came 
to talk to Sara… your grandmother is with God now‖ (Harris & Giménez, 2005, 
p. 8) may have influenced participants in the religious treatment to 
conceptualise future immortality, because the experimenter validated this 
conceptualisation by stating that the dead agent was with God (i.e., to continue 
to exist). To address this shortcoming, the present study investigated how mere 
exposure to religious symbolism associated with future immortality (vs. secular 
symbolism), with no explicit narrative, might positively influence expression of 
belief in retrograde immortality in children, through their ability to reason by 
analogy. It was predicted that children exposed to religious symbolism will 
report greater conceptualization of retrograde immortality in comparison with 
children exposed to secular symbolism, regardless of age. 
 
7.2  Method 
Participants 
 
Eighty-eight children (male = 41, female = 47) from a nonreligious school 
located in Lekki, Lagos; the former capital of Nigeria. The school is located in a 
predominantly Christian neighbourhood. All participants were Nigerian and were 
divided into four age groups: 5- to 6-year olds (n = 12), 7- to 8-year olds (n = 
23), 9- to 10-year olds (n = 25), and 11- to 12-year olds (n = 28).  
 
Ethical considerations  
 
The study was reviewed and approved by the Brunel University Research 
Ethics Committee. All participants, the parents of participants, and the head 
teacher of the school the research was carried out in were given an information 
sheet and signed a consent sheet before participants participated in the study.  
 
Material and procedure  
 
Participants were assessed in the school administrator‘s private office. Each 
participant was assured that there were no right or wrong answers and that they 
would not be graded on the answers they provided. Participants were also 
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assured that their teachers would not be informed of their performance, and that 
they were free to leave anytime they felt like it even though their parents, head 
teacher and themselves had signed the participation consent sheet approved by 
the Brunel University Ethics Committee. 
 
After the participants had settled in, an experimental procedure similar to 
Emmons and Kelemen (2014) was utilized. The present experiment, however, 
had two different experimental treatments (religious and non-religious). In each 
treatment, children were presented with three images, each on a laminated A4 
sheet. The background of the images differed according to experimental 
treatment (see Figure 16). 
 
Figure 16.Religious and non-religious primes depicting A) pre-life, B) in utero, 
and C) baby periods. 
 
 
Panel A represents the pre-life period (to prime retrograde immortality), panel B 
represents the in utero period, and panel C represents the period after birth. 
The images were laid out linearly, from A to C; however, panel C was discussed 
first for clarity. Panel B was discussed next, followed by panel A. During the 
discussion, the images were pointed to and the participants were asked to 
imagine that the people depicted represented themselves and their mothers. 
Panel A (which represented retrograde immortality) was carefully explained to 
107 
 
 
 
participants as depicting the period when their mother was young and they had 
not yet entered her stomach. The depictions were then mixed up and the 
participants were asked to arrange them linearly (i.e., A-B-C). Most participants, 
especially the older children, got it right at their first try and all participants got it 
right after the depictions were explained a second time.  
 
Panels B and C were then removed from the table, leaving only the Panel A 
(see Figures 17 and 18). Participants were asked a series of 12 ―yes-no‖ 
questions with Panel A in view. See Table 4 for the list of questions. Similar to 
Emmons and Kelemen (2014), all questions were preceded by the phrase 
―Think about yourself during this period when you have not entered your 
mother‘s stomach. During that time, could…‖ Representative questions include 
―could your heart work?‖ (biological category) and ―could you remember 
things?‖ (epistemic category). Each ―yes‖ or ―no‖ response was further probed; 
a common response to the first representative question was ―because my heart 
was too small‖ if the initial answer was ―no‖ and ―because I am a human being‖ 
if the initial answer was ―yes‖. 
 
 
 
Figure 17 Presentation of future immortality prime  
 
 
Figure 18 Presentation of non-religious/secular prime 
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Initial responses were coded as functional if the participant answered ―yes‖ and 
non-functional if the participant answered ―no‖. In some instances, the 
justification for initial ―yes-no‖ answers overrode their initial functionality score. 
For example, when asked ―… could you be hungry?‖ (psychobiological 
category), an initial ―no‖ response coded as non-functional was rescored as 
functional if when probed, the participant reveals that she could not be hungry 
―because I have already eaten‖. The experimenter and another coder, blind to 
the hypothesis of the study, coded the responses. Interrater reliability was 
Kappa = .91, and all disagreements were resolved afterwards by discussion 
and revisiting the coding criteria used in Emmons and Kelemen (2014). 
 
Table 4 
List of Retrograde Immortality Questions 
Category              Question 
Biological   Could your eyes work? 
                                           Could your heart beat? 
 
Psychobiological  Could you be thirsty? 
                                           Could you be hungry? 
 
Perceptual   Could you watch something? 
                                           Could you listen to something? 
 
Epistemic   Could you think things? 
                                           Could you remember things? 
 
Emotional   Could you feel sad? 
                                           Could you feel happy? 
 
Desire   Could you want anything? 
                                           Could you desire anything? 
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7.3 Results 
In each of the six question categories participants could have a retrograde 
functionality score of between 0 and 2. Most participants had a score of zero, 
making the data zero-inflated and therefore skewed and unfit for parametric 
tests that assume normality. An ordered logistic regression within the GLIMMIX 
(SAS) mixed-modeling framework was used to estimate the difference between 
situational influence (religious vs. secular), age group (5 – 6 years, 7 – 8 years, 
9 – 10 years, and 11 – 12 years), and question category (biological, 
psychobiological, perceptual, epistemic, emotional, and desire) on retrograde 
functionality scores.  
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects revealed that situational influence, age group, and 
question type all had significant main effects on retrograde immortality 
functionality score: situational influence, F(1,510) = 29.60, p< 0.0001; age 
group, F(3,510) = 5.32, p = 0.0013; question type, F(5,510) = 7.60, p< 0.0001. 
There was no significant interaction between situational influence and age 
group, F(3,510) = 1.63, p = 0.18, or between situational influence and question 
type, F(5,510) = 0.61, p = 0.69. A simple effects comparison of least square 
means was carried out to assess the specific differences in retrograde 
immortality score according to situational influence (religious vs. non-religious) 
across age group (4 levels) and question type (6 levels). A p value criterion of 
p= 0.05/10 was utilized. At p = 0.005, there were significant differences between 
the religious and non-religious situational influence across all age groups apart 
from children aged between 5-6 years old (see Figure 19 and Table 5). 
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Figure 19.Least squares means of retrograde immortality functionality scores 
according to situational influence and age group with 95% confidence interval 
bars. 
 
 
The results presented above suggest that participants aged between five and 
six years old were not affected by the situational influences. Further, in Emmons 
and Kelemen (2014), participants aged between five and six years old were 
excluded from the study because they could not distinguish the pre-life period 
from the in utero period. For these two reasons participants aged between five 
and six years were excluded from the rest of the analysis. 
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Figure 20.Least squares means of retrograde immortality functionality scores 
according to situational influence and question category with 95% confidence 
interval bars. 
 
At p = 0.005 (i.e., 0.05/10), there were significant differences between the 
religious and non-religious situational influence in two of the three physical 
question categories (biological and psychobiological). There were no significant 
differences in any other question category. Bonferroni correction was utilized in 
Studies Two  and Three successfully, however due to the larger number of 
comparisons being made in the present study, and the resulting significance 
value (i.e., 0.005), there is an increased tendency for Type II error (McLaughlin 
& Sainani, 2014). Therefore, a simulation-based method (Edwards & Berry, 
1987) was used to correct for familywise error. Under the simulation adjusted p 
values, at p =0.05, there were significant differences between the religious and 
non-religious situational influence in all question categories apart from one of 
the three mental question categories (desire). See Figure 20 for a graphical 
representation of retrograde functionality scores across question types, and 
Table 5 for the means, estimates, t values, p values, and simulation adjusted p 
values.  
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Table 6 
 Odds Ratio Estimates of Retrograde Immortality for the Religious vs. Secular 
Groups  
 
Comparison               Estimate         DF        95% Confidence Limits 
Religious vs. Secular Group 3.72    509     2.323        5.952 
 
Justification of Retrograde Immortality Responses  
 
A content analysis of the justification of participants‘ retrograde immortality 
functional scores was carried out. Retrograde immortality scores were 
categorized as ―non-functional biological‖ or ―functional biological‖ when 
participants gave an explicit biological justification (e.g., reproductive reasons), 
―non-functional limited‖ when participants gave reasons that they were not 
biological (e.g., environmental reasons), ―functional fate‖ when participants gave 
fate related reason (e.g., destined to be born), ―functional social‖ when 
participants referenced another member of their social group (e.g., their 
mother), ―functional psychological‖ when participants referenced another mental 
state that were not asked about (e.g., responding that they are always happy 
when asked if they could think), ―functional spiritual‖ or ―non-functional spiritual‖ 
when participants gave a spiritual/religious reason (e.g., references to God), 
and lastly, ―other‖ when the justifications could not be categorized (e.g., ―I don‘t 
know‖). See Emmons and Kelemen (2014) for a full description of the codes. 
The only justification codes of interest in the present study however were the 
functional and non-functional spiritual codes. The experimenter and another 
blind coder, blind to the hypotheses of the study, coded the responses, 
interrater reliability was Kappa = .80, all disagreements were resolved 
afterwards by discussion and revisiting the coding criteria used in Emmons and 
Kelemen (2014). An ordered logistic regression within the GLIMMIX (SAS) 
mixed-modeling framework was used to estimate the difference between 
situational influence (religious vs. non-religious), age group (7 – 8 years, 9 – 10 
years, and 11 – 12 years), and question category (biological, psychobiological, 
perceptual, epistemic, emotional, and desire) on the justification for retrograde 
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functionality scores.  
 
Type III Tests of Fixed Effects revealed that situational influence, age group, and 
question type all had significant main effects on the justification for retrograde 
functionality score; situational influence, F(1,878) = 61.71, p< 0.0001; age 
group, F(2,878) = 5.84, p = 0.003; question type, F(11,878) = 8.59, p< 0.0001. 
There was no significant interaction between situational influence and age 
group, F(2,878) = 0.31, p = 0.74, or between situational influence and question 
type, F(11,878) = 0.34, p = 0.98.  
 
As the present study was particularly interested in retrograde immortality 
functionality justifications that were spiritual, a second analysis was run to 
assess if situational influences had a significant effect on spiritual justifications 
for retrograde functionality. Justifications coded as ―functional spiritual‖ and 
―non-functional spiritual‖ were scored as one and all other codes were scored 
as zero. Under the religious situational influence, 1.86% of the participants gave 
spiritual justifications for their retrograde immortality responses (non-spiritual 
justifications = 50.77%), while under the non-religious situational influence 
0.11% of the participants gave spiritual justifications for their retrograde 
immortality responses (non-spiritual justifications = 47.26%). Chi-square test 
showed significant difference in spiritual-themed justifications for retrograde 
immortality responses between participants under the religious and non-
religious situational influences, χ2 (1) = 12.88, p = .0003, as did the Fisher‘s 
Exact Test, p = .0001. 
 
Effect of Situational Influences on Consistent Non-functional Theorists  
 
A final analysis was carried out to determine if participants‘ who had zero (non-
functional) retrograde immortality scores across all 12 questions differed 
according to situational influence. Under the religious situational influence, 
11.36% of the participants were consistent non-functional theorists (functional 
theorists = 39.77%), while under the non-religious situational influence, 18.18% 
of the participants were consistent non-functional theorists (functional theorists 
= 30.68%). Chi-square test showed no significant difference in consistent non-
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functional theorising between participants in the religious vs. non-religious 
situational influences, χ2 (1) = 2.37, p = 0.12.  
 
7.4  Discussion 
 
The present study extended Emmons and Kelemen‘s (2014) research on the 
effect of age and question type on children‘s expression of belief in retrograde 
immortality, by assessing the role of religious vs. non-religious situational 
influences.  The results presented above show that children aged from seven to 
twelve years old expressed more belief in retrograde immortality when under 
the religious situational influence in comparison with the non-religious 
situational influence. The particular religious prime children were exposed to 
under the religious situational influence was a depiction of Christian future 
immortality, and not retrograde immortality. The effect was predicted to occur, 
however, as a result of children‘s ability to reason by analogy, that is, to extract 
relevant information and generate inferences by relational similarity, and to 
transfer knowledge across contexts (Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; 
Goswami, 2001; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006). 
 
Research in both future immortality studies (e.g., Bering 2002) and retrograde 
immortality studies (e.g., Emmons & Kelemen, 2014) show that as children get 
older they express less belief in personhood continuity. The results of the 
present study (see Table 5) consistently mirrored this pattern with children 
under the religious situational influence (apart from five to six years olds) and 
with children under the non-religious situational influence. In support of the 
hypothesis presented in the present chapter, results also show that despite the 
decrease of expressed belief in retrograde immortality with the increase of age, 
there were also significant differences in expressed belief in retrograde 
immortality between participants in the religious vs. non-religious situational 
influences at all age group levels (excluding five to six years olds). Very young 
children do not fully comprehend biological reproduction (Bernstein & Cowan, 
1975); this was evident in Emmons and Kelemen‘s study which showed that five 
to six year olds could not differentiate the pre-life period from the in utero 
period, and were consequently excluded from the rest of the analysis. Five to 
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six years olds were also excluded in the present study because the results 
demonstrated that children in this age group did not show a significant 
difference between the religious treatment vs. the non-religious treatment, even 
though the difference was highly significant for all the other age groups 
(p<.001).    
 
Bering and colleagues show that children are more likely to express belief in the 
continuation of mental states of personhood (epistemic, emotion, and desire) 
than physical states (biological, psychobiological, and perceptual). Although 
studies have generally replicated this distinction in the expression of belief in 
mental states vs. physical states, there have been particular differences in 
which states some of the categories belong. For instance, in Emmons and 
Kelemen (2014) children expressed more belief in only two of the three 
categories of mental state (i.e., emotions and desire, but not epistemic). In Bek 
and Lock (2011), a factor analysis showed that the perceptual category did not 
load onto the same factor as the other physical state categories (i.e., biological 
and psychobiological) but loaded onto the same factor as the mental state 
categories. In the present study, the simulation adjusted significance criterion 
showed that all state categories were significantly different (except desire) 
between the religious vs. non-religious treatment in the expression of belief in 
retrograde immortality. However, under the more conservative Bonferroni 
correction significance criterion, only the biological and psychobiological 
categories were significant. More research is called for that disambiguates 
physical state categories from mental state categories, particularly whether the 
perceptual category belongs in the physical state, mental state, or some other 
undefined state.  
 
In Emmons and Kelemen‘s (2014) retrograde immortality study, in which no 
religious primes were utilized, spiritual justifications for retrograde immortality 
were rare (Study One = 2%, Study Two = 0%). In the present study, which did 
utilize religious primes, it was hypothesised that participants under the religious 
situational influence would have a significantly higher spiritual justification for 
retrograde immortality than participants under the non-religious situation 
influence. The content analysis revealed that although there was a lower count 
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than expected (overall spiritual justification: religious situational influence = 
1.86%, non-religious situational influence = 0.11%), there was still a significant 
difference in spiritual justifications used between participants under the religious 
vs. non-religious situational influence.  
 
Frameworks that assess the relationship between intuitive cognitive biases and 
religious acquisition in children propose that children‘s tendency to think of 
personhoods as eternally enduring through death (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; 
Bering et al., 2005) and before birth (Emmons and Kelemen, 2014) reveals 
intuitive patterns of reasoning which predispose us to become religious. Bering 
and colleagues studied children to assess this intuitive pattern of reasoning 
because of children‘s lack of exposure to relevant cultural/religious scripts, and 
also because of their maturing cognitive abilities (evidenced in the result that 
intuitive conceptualisation of immortality decreased with age). Emmons and 
Kelemen (2014), in addition to showing the effects of age and question 
category, utilised retrograde immortality (which is unscripted in most Western 
religions) to assess children‘s untutored responses, particularly upon 
consideration of retrograde immortality for the first time. The present study 
demonstrated that even when asking children about immortality, and even when 
the immortality in question is retrograde (as opposed to future), relevant 
situational influences can still have a significant impact on the way children 
conceptualize the enduring qualities of personhood.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
Study Five  
 
8. Agency Detection, Cognitive Closure, and Religious   
           Fundamentalism 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
Situational influences that lead to ambiguity and uncertainty are theorised to 
heighten our bias toward agency detection (Barrett, 2004; Guthrie, 1993) and 
arouse our need for cognitive closure (NFCC; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). 
Individuals who score high on NFCC tend to favour any answer to no answer 
and to dismiss contradictory information (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). Religion 
provides a secure knowledge structure and offers meaning to ambiguous 
events (Ladd, 2007), which adherents are motivated to hold on to, to buffer 
distress produced by uncertainty (Inzlicht, Tullett, & Good, 2011). Religious 
fundamentalists in particular are theorized to generally believe in a return to the 
foundations of their faith, that the truth criterion of their faith is absolute, and that 
there is a mutual exchange of commitment between believers and their deity in 
fulfilling their religious creed (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Gribbins & 
Vandenberg, 2011). Studies have also shown a positive correlation between 
NFCC and religious fundamentalism (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2010). The present 
study, carried out in Nigeria, however tests the novel hypothesis that agency 
detection mediates the relationship between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism, when individuals are uncertain. 
 
Agency detection is inherent in general perceptual functioning, and its 
oversensitivity is theorised to lead to anthropomorphism, which is a core 
characteristic of many religions (Guthrie, 1993). Individuals high in NFCC are 
prone to accept inferences generated by ubiquitous implicit cognitive systems 
such as an Hyperactive Agency Detection Device (HADD). Barrett (2004) posits 
that the HADD is a specific cognitive mechanism that is prone to identify agency 
even when none exists, and its sensitivity increases when individuals are 
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uncertain and/or in ambiguous and threatening situations.  
 
Agency detection might point to a supernatural agent (e.g., the Christian God), 
to a natural agent (e.g., human) or non-natural agent (e.g., artificial intelligence), 
this conception of a multi-faceted agency detection device is in line with Atran 
and Norenzayan (2004). The first study presented below (Study Five A) sort to 
(1) replicate the observed positive correlation between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010), (2) test the correlation between 
detection of supernatural agency and human agency. These correlations are 
hypothesized to be significant in the control condition only and not in the other 
conditions were participants were primed first (with either secular, benign 
religious, or punitive religious symbols) before responding to the agency 
detection measures (both supernatural and natural). Study Five B collected the 
natural un-primed measures of participants‘ supernatural and natural agency 
detection before the presentation of the primes.  
 
In Study Five B secular symbols that promote scepticism were hypothesized to 
prime religious uncertainty, hence activate NFCC, unlike religious symbols 
which reinforce the religiosity and provide closure. Under primed uncertainty 
(i.e., participants exposed to pro-sceptic secular symbols), it was predicted that 
(1) supernatural agency will positively mediate the relationship between NFCC 
and religious fundamentalism,and (2) natural (human) agency will negatively 
mediate the relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalism.      
 
The casual steps method (Baron & Kenny, 1986) traditionally used in mediation 
analysis has come under much criticism (Hayes, 2009; 2012, MacKinnon, 
Lockwood, Hoffman, West & Sheets, 2002). Critics argue the casual steps 
method increases Type II Error because the indirect effect is inferred, albeit 
logically, by a set of criteria, rather than a direct test of mediation itself (Hayes, 
2012). Simulation studies have also shown that the causal steps method has 
very low power in comparison with other methods used to test for mediation 
(e.g., Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). The present study utilized the bootstrapping 
method because it requires fewer assumptions than the empirical M-test, and 
simulation studies show that the bootstrapping method has very high power in 
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comparison with other methods used to test for mediation (Hayes, 2009). 
 
8.2 Method 
 
8.2.1 Study Five A  
 
Study Five A is a preliminary study to investigate if (1) the reported positive 
correlation between NFCC and religious fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, 
2010) will be replicated, and (2) to investigate if detection of supernatural 
agency and human agency are correlated. These correlations were 
hypothesized to only occur in the control condition, free of experimental 
manipulation.  
 
Participants 
 
There were a total of 273 Nigerian participants recruited in Akoka-Yaba, Lagos 
State. Due to frequent power outages 71 participants did not complete the 
experiment and were excluded from the analysis. Therefore, the actual number 
of participants used for the analysis was 202 (Male = 116, female = 81, missing 
data = 5), with a mean age of 22.1 years (SD = 3.75). Most participants were 
religious (Christian = 156, Muslim = 38, Non-religious = 2, Hindu = 1, missing 
data = 5). Participants were educated to different degrees (O level = 9, 
undergraduate = 149, graduates = 29, postgraduates =10, missing data = 5). 
 
Ethical Considerations  
 
The present study was reviewed and approved by the Brunel University 
Research Ethics Committee. All participants were given a written informed 
consent sheet before participating in the study. Upon completion of the study all 
participants were fully debriefed and given an information sheet that 
summarised the purpose of the study and contained references to similar 
studies. The same procedure was followed for Study Five B. 
 
 
121 
 
 
 
Materials  
 
Need for cognitive closure (NFCC). The brief Need for Closure Scale developed 
by Roets & Van Hiel (2011) was used as a measure of NFCC. The scale was 
designed based on items from Webster and Kruglanski‘s (1994) original NFCC 
scale and the revised version (Roets & van Heil, 2007). The brief Need for 
Closure scale measures NFCC as a one-dimensional construct and is 
composed of 15 items measured on a six-point Likert scale from ‗completely 
disagree‘ to ‗strongly agree‘. Representative items are ―I don‘t like situations that 
are uncertain‖ and ―When I have made a decision I feel relieved‖ (Cronbach‘s M 
= 65.98, SD = 11.57, α = .85). 
 
Detection of supernatural agency. The 3-item index of supernatural control (Kay 
et al., 2010) was used as a measure of detection of supernatural agency. Items 
were measured on a seven-point Likert item scale (from ‗tremendously doubtful‘ 
to ‗tremendously likely‘); representative items are ―It is feasible that God, or 
some type of non-human entity, is in control, at least in part, of the events within 
our universe‖ and ―The events that occur in this world unfold according to God's, 
or some other non-human entity's, plan‖ (M = 14.47, SD = 4.05, α = .67). 
 
Detection of human agency. The numerical judgement task (Valdesolo & 
Graham, 2014) was used as a measure of detection of human agency. The 
measure consists of ten number strings composed of a series of 12 randomly 
computer-generated one‘s and two‘s. Participants are asked to determine on a 
ten-point scale (‗definitely random‘ to ‗definitely human‘) the degree to which 
they think the numbers were designed by a human agent or by a computer 
program. Numbers were randomly generated using an online random number 
generator provided by the webpage Intemodino. Examples of the number 
strings include ―212212222212‖ and ―112111221211‖. All participants were given 
the same set of number strings (M = 60.74, SD = 18.64, α = .79). 
 
Religious fundamentalism. The revised religious fundamentalism scale 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) was used as a measure of religious 
fundamentalism. The scale consists of 12items and is measured on a nine-point 
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Likert scale (from ‗very strongly disagree‘ to ‗very strongly agree‘). Examples 
include ―The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and 
ferociously fighting against God‖ and ―The fundamentals of God‘s religion 
should never be tampered with, or compromised with others‘ beliefs‖ (M = 
74.58, SD = 16.37, α = .74). 
 
Religious (punitive and benign) and secular situational influences. A graphic 
designer created a series of animations containing the supraliminal primes. The 
animations were presented as a game that required participants to perform a 
dual-n-back task (Jaeggi et al., 2003) where independent tasks (visual and 
auditory) are presented simultaneously to occupy participants‘ attention, 
discouraging them from consciously attending to the primes. The task consisted 
of counting red/black and yellow flowers placed by the windows of houses, as 
well as the number of doorbells they heard. The animation was a point-of-view 
sweep of a block of houses, which ended on a large building opposite the block 
of houses in an upward motion before fading to black. The street that led to the 
large building and the large building itself differed according to experimental 
treatment. The punitive religious treatment had two symbols of reminders of 
hell, one was a lamppost banner with a depiction of Hell with the words ―beware 
of Hell‖, the other was an animated character holding a placard with the words 
―Hell is real‖, the large building was a church called ‗House of God‘ with a 
crucifix symbol. The benign religious treatment had two symbols, one was a 
lamppost banner with a depiction of Jesus Christ, the other was an animated 
character holding a placard with the words ―God loves you‖ and the large 
building was a church called ‗House of God‘ with a crucifix symbol. The secular 
treatment had two symbols, one was a lamppost banner with the words ―think 
rationally‖, the other was an animated character holding a placard with the 
words ―question everything‖ and the large building was labelled ‗Institute of 
Science and Technology‘. In the control treatment, participants engaged in the 
same dual n-back task but were not exposed to any symbols. All participants 
engaged in a familiarization dual n-back task that contained no situational 
influences, the animation was point-of-view sweep that led to the block of 
houses used for the priming treatments. See Figures 21, 22, and 23 for still 
frames of the animation and Appendix D for more still frames. 
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Figure 21.Still frame of secular animation prime 
 
 
Figure 22.Still frame of benign religious animation prime 
 
 
 
Figure 23.Still frame of punitive religious animation prime 
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Procedure 
 
The study was carried out in an internet café and all the response measures 
were hosted on Survey Monkey. The animations were also saved on the 
computers because there were some instances of slow internet connection 
when the animations had to be played locally (according to experimental 
treatment).  
 
Participants were asked to assist in a study investigating memory retention and 
other psychological constructs. Although memory retention was related to the 
dual n-back task, it was unrelated to the hypotheses of the study. It was 
important that participants did not become fully aware of the hypothesis of the 
study until after completion (see Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). The first 
identical pages of the information sheet of the secular, benign religious, punitive 
religious, and control experimental treatments were left open on different 
computers chosen randomly every day. Potential participants were asked to 
randomly choose any computer to read the information sheet. Participants then 
proceeded to (1) the consent sheet, (2) the familiarization dual n-back task and 
(3) the priming dual n-back task. 
 
 Afterwards, participants were asked to help complete questionnaires for 
another study that included the (4) NFCC, (5) detection of supernatural agency, 
(6) detection of human agency, and (7) religious fundamentalism measures. 
Note that the numbers above represent the sequence of presentation of the 
information sheet, primes, and measures. After the completion of all measures, 
demographic details were taken and participants were probed for suspicion of 
knowledge of the priming function of the dual n-back task (see Bargh, Chen, & 
Burrows, 1996). Participants were then fully debriefed of the complete nature of 
the study and offered free time to use the internet. See Figure 24 for 
photographs of participants participating in the study. See Appendix E for more 
photographs. 
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Figure 24.Photographs of participants participating in Study Three. 
 
 
8.2.1.1 Results and Discussion 
 
A Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient was computed to assess the 
relationship between the Need for cognitive closure (NFCC) and religious 
fundamentalism, and the relationship between detection of supernatural agency 
and detection of human agency. NFCC and religious fundamentalism were 
significantly positively correlated in the control treatment, r(51) = .31, p = .012.  
 
Detection of supernatural agency and detection of human agency were 
significantly positively correlated in the control treatment r(51) = .45, p< .001. 
The correlations between both NFCC and religious fundamentalism, and 
between detection of supernatural agency and detection of human agency were 
not significant in the secular, benign religious and punitive religious treatments 
(see Table 7).  
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Table 7 
 NFCC, DSA, DHA, and Religious Fundamentalism Bivariate Correlations 
across Treatments 
The direction of bivariate correlations in the control treatment is predicted and is 
1-tailed; all other treatments are 2-tailed. ** Correlation is significant at the level 
0.01 level (1-tailed). * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed). 
1NFCC = Need for cognitive closure, 2 DSA = Detection of supernatural agency. 
3 DHA = Detection of human agency, 4 RF = Religious fundamentalism  
 
In line with the secular vs religious (benign and punitive) situational influences 
theme of the present thesis, the different correlations presented in Table 7 were 
tested for secular symbolism vs. benign religious symbolism, and secular 
symbolism vs. punitive religious symbolism differences. There were no 
significant differences between any of the comparisons, apart from the 
Treatment   Measure  1                  2  3             
Control  1. NFCC1   
   2. DSA2  .34** 
   3. DHA3  .30*  .45** 
   4. RF4   .31*  .26*  .16 
 
Secular  1. NFCC1   
   2. DSA2  .22 
   3. DHA3  .01  -.04 
   4. RF4             .04  -.33*            -.03 
Benign religious 1. NFCC1   
   2. DSA2  .43** 
   3. DHA3  .11  -.08 
   4. RF4            .04   .12  .16 
Punitive religious 1. NFCC1 
   2. DSA2  .34* 
   3. DHA3           -.12  -.14   
   4. RF4             .09  -.09  -.07 
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correlation between religious fundamentalism and detection of supernatural 
agency in the secular symbolism vs. benign religious symbolism group. See 
Table 8. 
 
Table 8 
One Tailed Comparison of Correlations between Secular and religious (Benign 
and Punitive) Symbolism. 
Comparison between    NFCC/      NFCC/       NFCC/        RF/            RF/           DSA/                
Experimental Groups    RF            DSA           DHA           DSA           DHA         DHA 
Secular vs. Benign        z = 0         z = -1.15      z = -0.49     z = -2.25     z= -.93       z = .19 
Religious Symbolism     p = .5       p = .1251     p = .3121    p = .0122    p = .1762   p = .4247 
Secular vs. Punitive       z = -.24    z = -.61        z = .61        z = -1.18     z= .19        z = .47 
Religious Symbolism     p = .4052 p = .2709     p = .2709    p = .119      p = .4247   p = .3192 
1 NFCC = Need for cognitive closure, 2 DSA = Detection of supernatural 
agency, 3 DHA = Detection of human agency, 4 RF = Religious fundamentalism 
 
 
Studies that report a correlation between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalismutilized measures that were taken free of experimental 
manipulation (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2010). Results presented above support 
this finding and further showed that the correlation between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism is not observed under either secular or religious situational 
influences. Therefore, in Study Five B, which tested the main hypotheses of the 
study, all variable measures were taken before the priming procedure apart 
from the dependent variable (religious fundamentalism), which was taken after 
the priming procedure.  
 
8.2.2 Study Five B 
 
Study Five B tested the hypothesis that agency detection will explain the 
relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalism when participants are 
uncertain. Specifically, it was hypothesized thatdetection of supernatural agency 
will positively mediate, and detection of human agency will negatively mediate 
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the relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalism. The above 
mediated relationships were hypothesized to occur when participants are 
exposed to the secular symbols intended to prime uncertainty, and not religious 
primes which reinforce religiosity and provide closure. 
 
Participants 
 
There were a total of 161 Nigerian participants recruited around Akoka-Yaba, 
Lagos State. Due to frequent power outages 19 participants did not complete 
the experiment and were excluded from the analysis. Three participants failed 
the priming suspicion probe and were excluded from the analysis (see Bargh 
and Chartrand, 2000).  Therefore, the actual number of participants used for the 
analysis was 139 (Male = 84, female = 54, missing data = 1) with a mean age of 
21.73 years (SD = 3.43). Most participants were religious (Christian = 116, 
Muslim = 22, Non-religious = 2, missing data = 1). Participants were educated 
to different degrees (primary education = 1, O level = 9, undergraduate = 109, 
graduates = 17, postgraduates =2, missing data = 1) 
 
Materials  
 
Need for cognitive closure (NFCC). The brief Need for Closure Scale (Roets & 
Van Hiel, 2011) was used as a measure of NFCC, Cronbach‘s α = .84, M = 
64.76, SD = 9.63. 
 
Detection of supernatural agency.The 3-item index of supernatural control (Kay 
et al., 2010) was used as a measure of detection of supernatural agency, 
Cronbach‘s α = .57, M = 14.88, SD = 2.80. 
 
Detection of human agency.The numerical judgement task designed by 
Valdesolo and Graham (2014) was used as a measure of detection of human 
agency, Cronbach‘s α = .61, M = 56.63, SD = 9.11. 
 
Religious fundamentalism. The revised religious fundamentalism scale 
(Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2004) was used as a measure of religious 
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fundamentalism, Cronbach‘s α = .73, M = 65.54, SD = 12.99. 
 
Religious (punitive and benign) and secular situational influences. The same 
virtual dual n-back tasks used in Study Five A were used. 
 
Procedure 
 
The procedure was the same as Study Five A, apart from the sequence of 
presentation, which comprised of (1) the consent sheet, (2) NFCC measure, (3) 
detection of supernatural agency measure, (4) detection of human agency 
measure, (5) the familiarization dual n-back task, and (6) the priming dual n-
back task. Afterwards, participants were asked to help complete questionnaires 
for another study that included the (7) religious fundamentalism measure. 
 
8.2.2.1 Results and discussion 
 
Nonparametric bootstrapping was used to test all the mediational models in the 
analysis (Hayes, 2009, Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007). There is significant 
mediation if the 95% bias corrected confidence bootstrap intervals do not 
contain zero (Preacher et al., 2007; Preacher & Hayes, 2004). All products were 
mean centered and heteroscedasticity-consistent SEs were used. All mediation 
models were based on a bootstrapping of 5000 samples (Hayes, 2013). 
 
The relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalismwas mediated by 
both detection of supernatural agency and detection of human agency when all 
the experimental treatments were combined. Higher levels of NFCC led to 
higher levels of detection of supernatural agency, which in turn led to increased 
religious fundamentalism. Higher levels of NFCC led to higher levels of 
detection of human agency, which in turn led to decreased religious 
fundamentalism. That is, the higher the need for cognitive closure, the higher 
the tendency to detect agency in the form of both detection of supernatural 
agency and detection of human agency.When the experimental treatments were 
analyzed separately this same pattern was only repeated in the secular 
condition, intended to prime uncertaintywith descriptive symbols such as 
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‗…question everything‘ and ‗stop and think rationally‘. In the religious priming 
treatments (benign and punitive), detection of agency (human and supernatural) 
did not mediate the relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalism, 
apart from one exception. In the punitive religious treatment, detection of 
supernatural agency mediated the link between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism. See Table 9 for the total and specific indirect effects of the 
combined and individual treatments, as well as the BootLLCI and BootULCI of 
the combined and secular treatment for significant mediation (i.e., Boot LLCI 
and Boot LLCI that do not contain zero). 
 
Table 9 
Total and Specific Indirect Effects of NFCC→DSA→ RF and NFCC→DHA→RF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Situational          Standardised      Boot SE      BootLLCI       BootULCI 
Influence                          Beta Weight 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Combined          Total                -.03                 .06            -.1578                 .0910 
                           DSA1                .07                .04              .0151                .1600 
                           DHA2              -.10                 .05            -.2230                -.0249 
 
Secular      Total               -.12                 .12            -.3538                 .1027 
                           DSA1               .11                 .07             .0033                 .2880 
                           DHA2              -.23                 .12            -.5165               -.0445   
 
Benign      Total        -.12                 .12            -.4166                .0494 
religious             DSA1               -.04                 .06            -.1981                .0354 
                          DHA2               -.08                 .09            -.3324                .0206   
 
Punitive      Total         .08                 .11            -.1826                .2905 
Religious            DSA1                 .13                 .08             .0142                .3362 
                           DHA2              -.05                 .07            -.3129                .0294 
Confidence intervals are 95% bias corrected, based on 5000 bootstrap 
samples. 1 DSA = Detection of supernatural agency, 2 DHA = Detection of 
human agency, NFCC = Need for cognitive closure, RF = Religious 
fundamentalism.  
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        .06*                                   1.46                                    .10*                                 2.07     
 
 
-.48*                      
                          .03 (.14)                                                                    -.05(.24) 
 
 
      .29*                                    -.48*                                .42                                   -.97***                                                                
 
 
        Secular, Benign Religious, and        Secular Treatment 
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-.48*                      
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                   Benign Religious          Punitive Religious 
 
Figure 25.Unstandardised regression coefficients and SEs (in parentheses) of 
NFCC→ DSA→RF and NFCC→DHA→RF mediation paths when all 
experimental treatments are combined and when they are analysed individually.   
*P< 0.05, **P< 0.01, ***P< 0.001,    positive relationship,    negative relationship 
NFCC = Need for cognitive closure, DSA = Detection of supernatural agency 
DHA = Detection of human agency, RF = Religious fundamentalism  
 
A direct causal effect was not postulated between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism. Although studies have shown a positive correlation between 
NFCC and religious fundamentalism (Brandt & Reyna, 2010), this does not 
imply causation. The modern approach to mediation analysis does not require a 
DSA 
RF NFCC 
DHA 
DSA 
RF NFCC 
DHA 
DSA 
RF NFCC 
DHA 
DSA 
RF NFCC 
DHA 
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significant X→Y direct effect to investigate the X→M→Y indirect effect (Hayes, 
2009; 2012). In the situational variations of the model tested, the mediators 
‗detection of supernatural agency‘ and ‗detection of human agency‘ operated in 
different directions (apart from the benign religious treatment), when this is 
observed, the effects cancel each other out to produce non-significant direct 
and total effects, this however has no bearing on the specific indirect effects 
(Hayes, 2012).   
 
In line with the secular vs religious (benign and punitive) situational influences 
theme of the present thesis, the standardised beta weights of secular 
symbolism vs. benign religious symbolism, and secular vs. punitive religious 
symbolism were assessed. There were no significant differences between any 
of the comparisons. See Table 10 below     
Table 10 
Comparison of Standardized Beta Weights between Secular and Religious 
(Benign and Punitive) Symbolism. 
Comparison between                                                            Mediators 
Experimental Treatments                                   Detection of                  Detection of                         
                                                                       Supernatural Agency        Human Agency                                                                              
Secular vs. Benign Religious Symbolism       t(91) = 1.63, p = .1072    t(91) = 1, p= .3200 
Secular vs. Punitive Religious Symbolism      t(81) = 0.19, p = .8512    t(81) = 1.30, p= .1988 
 
The single positive effect of NFCC on agency detection supports Barrett‘s 
(2004) conception of HADD as a specific cognitive device. The present 
research however also demonstrated that HADD is a multi-functioning device, 
and perhaps more insight can be gained in utilizing Atran and Norenzayan‘s 
(2004) view of HADD as a cognitive system. The studies were carried out in the 
highly religious country of Nigeria and it will be interesting to investigate if the 
findings reported here will be repeated in less religious cultures.  
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CHAPTER 9 
 
9. Concluding Chapter 
 
This chapter will review and summarize the theoretical frameworks that 
contributed to the research questions assessed in the present thesis, as well as 
summarize the main findings from the experiments carried out. Theoretical and 
experimental limitations will be considered, and lastly, brief recommendations 
for future research and policy will be offered.  
 
One primary interest of the present thesis was to assess signs (religious and 
secular) from a psychological perspective to offer new insights to an already 
rich theoretical framework of semiotics. Beyond Peirce‘s (1955, 1978) triadic 
model (i.e., representamen, object, and interpretant) and Saussure‘s (1916, 
1986) dyadic model (i.e., signifier and signified), which are still relevant in 
semiotics, Cousins‘ (2012) telic triadic model (i.e., signifier, intendant, and 
signified) offered an ideal framework to situate the research paradigm of the 
present thesis. The particular facet of interest in Cousins‘ model was the 
intendant, primarily for two reasons. Firstly, the signifier and signified facets 
have been thoroughly explored, particularly through the Saussarian framework 
and its offshoots. Secondly, the intendant facet is theorised to be a subjective 
representation of internalised goals and motivations stored in the memory of the 
individual, and as such it offers an ideal avenue for psychological exploration. 
 
Within the general psychological theoretical frameworks considered, the dual 
theory of cognition was of interest, particularly because the priming effect of 
signs are theorised to occur primarily through Type I cognitive processing 
(Bargh, 2006; Custers & Aarts, 2005;Evans & Stanovich, 2013a; Gollwitzer, 
2011; Strahan, Spencer, & Zanna, 2002). The dual process theory of cognition 
was also utilized because the two variables of interest (religiosity and 
scepticism) are theorised to occur through Type I and Type IIcognitive 
processes, respectively. To engage critically with dual theories of cognition, 
several frameworks were considered and two consequential conclusions will 
now be put forward, based on consideration of previous literature and the new 
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results presented above.  
 
Firstly, cognitive processing is not limited to two systems but better viewed as a 
collection of systems, subsystems, and specific mechanisms which function 
through Type I and/or Type II cognitive processing (Baumard & Boyer, 2013; 
Eraña 2011; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Secondly, the default-interventionist 
dual-process framework (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002, 2005; Stanovich, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2008) presently offers more 
clarity than other dual process frameworks in understanding the relationship 
between religiosity/scepticism and Type I/Type II cognitive processing. 
 
The conclusions put forward in the present thesis, and by Stanovich and 
colleagues, about the dual process theory of cognition (i.e., that there are many 
systems, subsystems, and mechanisms which function through two different 
interacting processes), offered the opportunity to critically engage with the weak 
massive modular view advanced by Carruthers (2006, 2008), and consequently 
examine specific ubiquitous cognitive processes and mechanisms proposed by 
CSR researchers. The first study carried out was a preliminary study to gather 
primary data about the level of religiosity in Nigeria through quantifying the rate 
of God references in two non-religious Nigerian national newspapers. The 
studies of primary interest were Studies Two to Five, which will be explored in 
depth below. Studies Two and Three showed a general priming effect of 
religious vs. secular signs, and this effect will be discussed in terms of the 
conditions which gave rise to the results found (i.e., the tedium effect in 
doctrinal religiosity, the intendant in semiotics, and automaticity in dual process 
theories). Study Four assessed the effect of a religious sign (crucifix) on a more 
specific cognitive process (i.e., immortality bias). Study Five A replicated the 
correlation found in previous studies between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism, and showed a positive correlation between detection of 
supernatural agency and detection of human agency. Finally, Study Five B 
assessed the effect of religious and secular signs on an even more specific 
mediated relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalism through 
detection of supernatural agency (positive mediation) and detection of human 
agency (negative mediation). 
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9.1 The Intendant, the Tedium Effect, and Automaticity  
 
Cousins (2006) describes the intendant as a subjective disposition toward an 
end goal attained consciously but that becomes latent and preconscious. This 
preconscious goal informs the link between the signifier and the signified, 
without the individual having to make a conscious inference. For instance, a 
Christian need not consciously link a signifier such as a crucifix with the 
signified (e.g., Christianity), and with a particular goal (e.g., forgiveness of sins 
or going to Heaven). The inference or thought processes that connect the 
signifier (i.e., the crucifix) to the signified (Christianity) and the particular goal 
(forgiveness) would have already been established consciously, through 
previous interactions. The intendant, however, due to its subjective nature, 
changes according to the particular individual and the particular context in which 
it is used (see Figure 3 for an illustration).  
 
Several studies show that signs can be utilized to elicit implicit goals stored in 
memory (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; 
Glaser & Banaji, 1999; Moskowitz, 2002; Shah, Kruglanski, & Friedman, 2002), 
even when the goal has been modified by recent experience, given that the old 
implicit goal/associative knowledge had been repeated enough times to be 
embedded in memory (Devine, 1989). High levels of frequency of repetition is a 
core characteristic of doctrinal religiosity, as opposed to imagistic religiosity 
(Whitehouse, 1995, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2004, 2005). The 
religious signs of interest in the present thesis are from Christianity, which is a 
doctrinal religion. High levels of repetition leads to what Whitehouse has termed 
the ‗tedium effect‘, where over-familiarity with particular units of information 
leads to a deficiency in active conscious processing of those units, as a 
consequence of the high level of repetition. Within the automaticity research 
paradigm, Stanovich (2004) terms the tedium effect of Type II-cum-Type I 
processes as the set of autonomous subsystems (TASS), while Smith and 
DeCoster (1999, 2000) term them ‗functionally parallel neural networks‘.   
 
The associations between the religious signifiers, the intendant, and the 
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signified for the participants in Studies Two and Three were acquired socially. 
Although Nigeria is constitutionally a secular country, the society is highly 
religious, and the religious signs utilized are highly conspicuous within the 
country (Chiluwa 2012;Gallup, 2010; Mandryk & Johnstone, 2001; WIN-Gallup, 
2012). Study One revealed the high presence of religion in putatively non-
religious Nigerian national newspapers (i.e., there were multiple references to 
God every day in both the tabloid and broadsheet newspapers assessed); see 
also Appendix F for sample pictures of religious signs in Nigeria.   
 
Religion has been linked with Type I cognitive processing, which is associative, 
non-conscious, fast, and autonomous, while scepticism toward religion has 
been linked with Type II cognitive processing which is abstract, conscious, slow, 
and controlled (e.g., Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Buzdar, Ali, & Tariq, 2015; 
Pennycook, Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012; Shenhav, Rand, & 
Greene, 2012). The present thesis however challenged this framework, opting 
rather for the default-interventionist account (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013;Stanovich, 2004; Stanovich & West, 2008). Within the default-
interventionist framework, Type II processes intervene on default Type I 
processes, depending on the individual processing the information and the 
context in which the information is processed. Studies Two and Three showed 
that in the highly religious country of Nigeria, when the situational context was 
manipulated by exposing participants to secular signs, participants scored lower 
on an irrationality measure (i.e., RRII) in comparison with participants exposed 
to religious signs, particularly signs signifying a punitive God. These results 
were observed regardless of the educational level and religiosity of the 
participants. The results in Studies Two and Three were discussed in terms of 
the primed content generated by Type I cognitive processing which Type II 
cognitive processing acted on.  
 
Mercier and Sperber‘s (2011a, 2011b) argumentative theory of reasoning also 
helps to illuminate the conclusions in the above paragraph. According to Mercier 
and Sperber, controlled and conscious reasoning, which is a Type II cognitive 
process, evolved to support the conclusions generated by evolutionarily older 
cognitive mechanisms (i.e., Type I cognitive processes). Therefore, if 
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participants do not consciously use their Type II cognitive processes to override 
the inferences generated by Type I processes, then the use of these Type II 
processes will be restricted to justifying the inferences and conclusions 
generated by Type I processes.     
 
9.2       Religious and Secular Signs and Their Interactions with Specific 
Cognitive Processes  
 
Beyond the general dual process theory of cognition, the present thesis 
engaged with more specific cognitive mechanisms and processes theorised to 
support the acquisition of religion. Firstly, the strong informationally 
encapsulated view of modularity by Fodor (1983) was considered to be too 
restrictive, therefore less restrictive views of modularity were engaged with, 
such as Carruthers‘s frugal view (2006, 2008) and Barrett and Kurzban‘s (2006) 
functional specialization view. Fodor‘s (2000) later work was also cited to be 
critical of the all-or-nothing informationally encapsulated view of modularity, 
particularly in explaining high level cognition.  
 
Bering and colleagues (e.g., Bering, 2002, 2006; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; 
Bering, Hernandez, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005) advance that the bias to think that 
the enduring qualities of personhood continue after death reveals an intuitive 
pattern of reasoning that predisposes us to religiosity. Within this theoretical 
framework, the continuity of mental states (epistemic, emotional, and desire) 
are favoured over physical states (biological, psychobiological, and perceptual). 
Bering argues that since it is epistemologically impossible to know what it is like 
to be dead, the knowledge base from which one imagines a divergent stance 
and a discrepant reality is itself imagined. Further, from this imagined 
knowledge base, it is easier to conceptualise the absence of physical states 
than the absence of mental states.  
 
Responses to questions about the continuity of personhood after death are 
often confounded by cultural and religious knowledge. To address this problem, 
relevant studies are usually carried out with children, who in comparison with 
adults have far less exposure to acquired knowledge about life after death. 
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Younger children also have developing abstract reasoning skills and rely more 
on intuitive inferences. Within these studies, younger children generally report 
more continuity of personhood after death than older children. This observation 
is interpreted as an indication that younger children, by virtue of their developing 
reasoning skills, use intuitive patterns of reasoning to conclude that personhood 
continues after death.  
 
Emmons and Kelemen (2014) devised a novel methodological method to further 
reduce the impact of acquired cultural/religious knowledge on questions about 
the continuity of personhood. They asked children questions about themselves 
before they were born, to ascertain if children conceived of their personhood as 
having existed before birth. This approach was used because of the relative 
lack of cultural/religious scripts which address life before birth (i.e., retrograde 
immortality), in comparison with life after death (i.e., future immortality). Study 
Four in the present thesis utilized Emmons and Kelemen‘s approach but further 
investigated the effect of a future immortality sign (the crucifix) on children‘s 
reports of retrograde immortality. Children were hypothesised to make the 
connection between future immortality and retrograde immortality through their 
ability and tendency to reason by analogy (Chen, Sanchez, & Campbell, 1997; 
Goswami, 2001; Hofstadter, 2001; Richland, Morrison, & Holyoak, 2006; 
Thibaut, French, & Vezneva, 2010).  
 
In Study Four, conceptualization of retrograde immortality was compared 
between children who were exposed to a religious/future immortality sign and 
children who were exposed to a secular/non-religious sign. The results showed 
that children who were exposed to the religious sign reported stronger beliefs in 
retrograde immortality than children who were exposed to the non-religious 
sign, regardless of age. The connection children made between the future 
immortality sign and the conception of retrograde immortality sheds more light 
on the nature of the intendant, which has not been previously explored. 
According to Cousins (2006), the links between the signifier, the intendant, and 
the signified, would have to have been already established in the mind of the 
perceiver. However, the children in Study Four exposed to the religious sign 
were able to make a novel link (i.e., crucifix - life before birth - continuity of life), 
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based on a previously established link (i.e., crucifix- life after death-continuity of 
life). Carruthers‘ (2006) argument about the role of a central integrating module 
which integrates inferences from different specific cognitive mechanisms and 
processes might also explain the above observed phenomenon. According to 
Carruthers, this integration extends beyond similar semantic content; for 
instance, metaphors can forge an integration through language between weakly 
associated concepts, that otherwise would have never been integrated, and 
when thus integrated can generate additional inferences, which are then 
strengthened through rehearsal.     
 
The fifth and final study investigated how agency detection explains (mediates) 
the relationship between NFCC and religious fundamentalism. To briefly recap, 
it is theorised that the ubiquitous tendency of humans to infer agency in chains 
of events (even when none might exist) predisposes us to religiosity (Barrett, 
2002, 2004; Guthrie 1993). Barrett argues that the sensitivity of HADD 
increases when individuals are uncertain or are in ambiguous situations. NFCC 
is a motivated response to find any plausible answer in uncertain and 
ambiguous situations (Amit & Sagiv, 2013; Kruglanski, 1989, 1990; Kruglanski & 
Webster, 1996). Religion qualifies inferences generated by HADD, by providing 
specific names of perceived agents, and minimally counterintuitive narratives 
which are memorable and which inform our conceptualisation of the 
supernatural agent‘s theory of mind. Religious fundamentalism over-attributes 
the detection of supernatural agency and under-attributes the detection of 
human agency. Therefore the mediated relationship between NFCC and 
religious fundamentalism by detection of supernatural agency (positively) and 
detection of human agency (negatively) was tested in the context of exposure to 
religious signs that prime religious certainty and secular signs that prime 
uncertainty. 
 
The results of Study Five showed that secular signs which instructed 
participants to ―stop and think rationally‖ and ―think for yourself and question 
everything‖ provided the appropriate situational context for both detection of 
supernatural agency to positively mediate and detection of human agency to 
negatively mediate the relationship between NFCC and religious 
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fundamentalism. This mediated relationship was not observed when 
participants were exposed to signifiers indicating a benign God, and only 
detection of supernatural agency positively mediated the relationship between 
NFCC and religious fundamentalism when the signifiers indicated a punitive 
God. The implications of using secular signs in public places will be discussed 
below. 
 
9.3 How Might Conformity Explain the Results of the Series of  
Experiments Carried Out? 
 
Classic conformity distinguishes between normative and informational 
conformity (Deutsch & Gerald, 1955). Normative conformity occurs when 
individuals alter their behaviour to obtain and/or maintain group desirability 
(Lonnqvist et al., 2009; Navarrete, Hall, & Fessler, 2005), and to avoid social 
disproval (Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). Informational conformity occurs when 
individuals alter their behaviour due to a desire for accuracy; it is more 
internalised than normative conformity and its effect is more pronounced when 
the individual lacks competent information (Lonnqvist et al., 2009). 
 
The results of Study One revealed a high rate of God references in two non-
religious Nigerian national newspapers, particularly in the tabloid newspaper, 
and that God references appeared every day in both newspapers. No individual 
is born with knowledge of particular religious narratives or answers to existential 
questions, such as life after death. Nigeria is a highly religious country, such 
that religious explanations for natural occurrences are predominant, as in the 
rest of Africa (Luyaluka, 2016). If individuals that read these papers come 
across God references every day from different journalists quoting different 
interviewees, given that the theory of conformity holds, this would influence 
them to (1) maintain their religiosity in light of the religiosity of others, and (2) 
embed the God references / religious references of others to become even 
more religious (although see Section 9.4 below) 
 
In both Studies Two and Three, the primes used were supraliminal, that is, 
although participants could see the symbols, they were not meant to know that 
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the symbols were part of the experiment, or that the symbols were meant to 
have any influence on them. As discussed in Section 3.3, according toCEST 
(Epstein et al., 1996) and the argumentative theory (Mercier & Sperber, 2011), 
at least in ambiguous situations, when individuals conform, they would have 
already done so automatically and non-consciously, and only moments later try 
to justify why they had altered their behaviour (i.e., for normative or 
informational reasons). One explanation, other than the default-interventionist 
dual process theory, for the results observed in both Studies Two and Three is 
that having seen the symbols, participants might have non-consciously 
conformed to the perceived ideology of the experimenter (i.e., secularism in the 
secular treatment with secular symbols and religiosity in the religious treatments 
with the benign and punitive religious symbols). Further, when probed, 
participants would have searched for reasons (consciously) to justi fy their 
responses, which might not have been the real reasons for their responses 
(given that the process that led to their responses occurred autonomously and 
non-consciously). 
 
In light of the above, Studies Four, Five A, and Five B offer better 
methodological strengths that avoid the confounding effects of conformity. In 
Study Four, participants were asked questions about how they conceive of life 
before birth (i.e., retrograde immortality). In this experimental procedure, there 
was no apparent position that the participants could think would be preferred by 
the experimenter. The primes presented were not necessarily pro-retrograde 
immortality or anti-immortality. Instead, the religious prime alluded to future 
immortality (crucifix) and the secular prime was an image of a hospital. 
Therefore, it can be argued that conformity played no significant role in the 
results obtained in Study Four. 
 
Study Five A was a correlational study, with the primary interest being to confirm 
that NFCC and religious fundamentalism will be positively correlated, as 
reported in other correlational studies free of experimental manipulation (e.g., 
Brandt & Reyna, 2010). A further aim was to investigate if (religious vs. secular) 
experimental primes would affect this relationship, which they did. The above 
results informed Study Five B, which took measures of NFCC, supernatural 
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agency detection, and natural agency detection before presentation of the 
religious versus secular primes. When participants were filling in the NFCC and 
agency detection measures, there was no indication (i.e., no symbols) to 
suggest which kind of answers would be favourable to the experimenter, and 
hence to influence participants to conform to this ‗favourable‘ set of answers. 
Therefore, it can also be argued that conformity played no significant role in the 
results which showed that the relationship between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism is positively mediated by detection of supernatural agency and 
negatively mediated by detection of human agency. 
 
9.4 Studies One, Two, and Three in Relation toWilliam James’s Social  
Selfand Erving’s Dramaturgical Analysis  
  
According to James (1890), individuals possess multiple personality 
dimensionswhich are expressed according to situational context (e.g., in a 
religious gathering vs. a secular social gathering). Study One showed the high 
prevalence of religious references in two non-religious Nigerian national 
newspapers. Newspapers disseminate information; they provide a lens through 
which reality is comprehended (Fiske, 1992). Even if the high presence of God 
references in the newspapers does not influence individuals to conform 
(through informational conformity, which becomes embedded in one‘s 
worldview), individuals who read these God references become more 
acquainted with the opinions of religious others. Proficient knowledge of the 
religiosity of others (which is high among the majority in Nigeria) has 
implications for both James‘s social self and Erving‘s (1959) dramaturgical 
analysis. 
 
If one is religious, and by implication has a religious social self which he/she 
displays in the appropriatecontext, knowledge of the religious references in the 
newspapers (Study One) and various other mediums in Nigeria should give the 
individual more confidence that his religious social self is accepted and 
dominant within society. By the same token, this knowledge base also gives the 
individual (the actor) a source of reference when acting out to please religious 
others (an audience), given that the actor‘s primary goal in his presentation is 
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an accepting audience (Erving, 1959).    
 
Similarly in Studies Two and Three, participants could have easily acted out to 
be more sceptical in the secular experimental treatments and more religious in 
the religious experimental treatments. Further, if participants in these studies 
possessed an analytical social self as well as a religious social self, they should 
have had no problem switching between these different social selves according 
to context (i.e., religious or secular). These generalisations however cannot be 
made for Studies Four, Five A, and Five B, for the same reasons explained in 
the section above on conformity (i.e., individuals would have been unaware of 
the particular intent of the experimenter, who was the sole audience). 
 
9.5 Studies Four, Five A, and Five B in Relation toWilliam James’s 
Spiritual Self 
 
As described in Section 1.4.2, James‘s (1890) spiritual self is the most 
abstractly defined of all his classes of selves. James refers to the spiritual self 
as ―… a man‘s inner or subjective being, his psychic faculties or dispositions…‖ 
(pp. 296), and the ―central nucleus of the Self‖ (pp. 298). These so-called 
―mysterious operations‖ of the self, mysterious because the onset of the 
operations are not open to conscious introspection, and rathercan only be 
known once the operation has begun, were above reconciled with Type I 
cognitive processes and with specific cognitive mechanisms within CSR. 
 
Within CSR, it is theorised that the acquisition and maintenance of religion is 
aided by the by-products of mental adaptations that evolved to fulfil non-
religious functions (Barrett, 2000; Boyer, 1994, 1996, 2000; Guthrie, 1980, 
1993; McCauley, 2000; Sperber, 1996). These mental adaptations are 
conceived of as specific cognitive mechanisms (e.g., HADD [Barret, 2004]; 
immortality bias [Bering, 2005]). Study Four investigated immortality bias, that 
is, the general bias towards thinking that at least some qualities of personhood 
continue after death (Bering, 2002; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004, Bering, 
Hernandez Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2005). Through introspection, why might one 
think this? It‘s impossible to know that some form of one‘s life will continue after 
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death, yet some individuals strongly believe in it, and past research (e.g., Bering 
& Bjorklund, 2004; Emmons & Kelemen, 2014), as well as Study Four of the 
present thesis has shown that this bias exists even in children. Could this 
feeling of knowing, without evidence or instruction, that life continues after death 
(and possibly had been in existence before birth) be one of the mysterious 
intuitive dispositions referred to by James (1890)? 
 
Study Five A replicated the correlation between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism reported by previous studies (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2010). This 
finding throws light on the general thesis of CSR that specific cognitive 
mechanisms (in this case NFCC) support and maintain religiosity (e.g., Sperber, 
1996). Study Five B showed that two of these specific cognitive mechanisms 
(NFCC and HADD) contribute toward religious fundamentalism; specifically, that 
agency detection mediates the relationship between NFCC and religious 
fundamentalism. But what is NFCC and what is agency detection? They are 
Type I processes not open to conscious introspection, and we do not willingly 
engage in NFCC or agency detection; they are autonomous, fast, and go on to 
influence conscious Type II cognitive processing. Like immortality bias, both 
NFCC and agency detection fit James‘s (1890) description of mysterious 
dispositions of the spiritual self. Mysterious not because of metaphysical 
properties, but because of the way these dispositions arise and are strongly felt. 
These Type I cognitive processes (and their relationship with Type II cognitive 
processes) particularly fit James‘s (1890) description that we only get a sense 
of where the sensory input facilitated by our psychic disposition ends and motor 
input begins.     
 
9.6 Limitations  
 
Content analysis, carried out in the preliminary Study One, is a descriptive 
method and provides little insight into the underlying motives behind the themes 
identified. Study One was carried out as an unobtrusive introduction to the 
religious climate of Nigeria, where all later studies were also carried out. 
Religious signs are ubiquitous in Nigeria, including churches/mosques and the 
signposts that lead to them or advertise them; there are signs warning of Hell 
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and others offering deliverance (see Appendix F). In the most rural of places, 
churches are the only colourful buildings and usually the only ones that stand 
out. In urban environments there are churches, mosques, and religious signs on 
almost every road and on many streets and closes. For instance, in one of the 
houses in which I stayed during my field trip, there were two churches in the 
same close, as well as a couple of others around (e.g., behind the house) which 
I couldn‘t see but often heard when they were conducting religious activities. In 
more exclusive vicinities religious signs are still present but are sparser. It was 
therefore a challenge to try to quantify the number of religious signs, as no one 
single area represented the entire country. To overcome this, a content analysis 
of two national newspapers was utilized, because although there are state-to-
state differences in Nigeria, the two newspapers that were analysed can be 
found in every state.  
 
Content-analysis of media however can be unreliable because newspapers 
report topical issues, and the identification of a particular theme (e.g., debate on 
depicting the image of Mohammed after the Charlie Hebdo shooting in France) 
may not necessarily be the enduring concern or theme of that newspaper. 
 
The most outstanding limitation in the experiments carried out (apart from the 
preliminary Study One) was also a necessary methodological design feature. 
Using signs to prime participants to make predictable responses is most useful 
when the presentation of the sign is subliminal, particularly when automaticity or 
non-conscious cognitive processing is expected. For instance with masked 
priming (Forster & Davies, 1984), the relevant sign is presented to participants 
on a screen for very few milliseconds and followed afterwards by a non-
significant sign. The prime is presented for few milliseconds so the participant 
does not perceive the sign consciously but non-consciously. This is a much 
better methodology from which conclusions can be drawn about the non-
conscious/automatic effects of signs. However, the main concern of the present 
thesis was to explore the effects of conspicuous religious signs in Nigeria on 
Nigerians. It was of particular interest to have the signs visible, as they would be 
in a real life setting of a highly religious country. 
 
146 
 
 
 
In the studies carried out, the attention and conscious cognitive processing of 
participants were occupied by engaging them in a distraction task on which they 
had to concentrate. This was done to prevent the participants from consciously 
thinking about the signs. Although none of the participants in Studies Two and 
Three reported being influenced by the signs, and only a hand-full reported 
being influenced by the signs in Study Four (who were excluded from the 
analysis), it cannot be concluded with certainty that the signs did not make the 
participants consciously (through Type II processing) select their responses.  
 
To address this social desirability factor, one of the studies (Study Three) was 
carried out on a busy street where there were other signs (commercial, 
government, and religious signs). It was intended that the presence of the other 
signs would make the experimenter‘s signs less conspicuous. Studies Four and 
Five circumnavigated this problem by testing very specific mediated cognitive 
processes which participants could not be aware of. Further, in Study Five B 
some of the variables (i.e., NFCC, detection of supernatural agency, and 
detection of human agency) were measured before participants were exposed 
to the signs. 
 
The fieldwork in the present thesis was only carried out in two states; the former 
capital Lagos, and the present capital Abuja. Nigeria has a total of 36 states and 
these two states are not representative of the entire country, therefore caution 
should be applied when generalising the results of the experiments carried out. 
Nonetheless, like most capital states in countries with diverse ethnic groups, a 
greater mix of Nigerians can be found in Lagos and Abuja than in any other 
individual state in Nigeria. 
 
CSR gains its explanatory power particularly from evolutionary psychology and 
cognitive psychology to explain how religion is acquired. Evolutionary 
psychology has received criticism for mistaking metaphors for mechanisms 
(e.g., Gantt, Melling, & Reber, 2012; Gantt & Thayne, 2012). Gantt and 
colleagues‘ main point of contention is that the term ‗mechanism‘ has been 
unduly appropriated from the physical sciences such as engineering, where 
mechanisms are physical (e.g., a bolt) to psychology where what are termed as 
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mechanisms are not physical, and therefore should be termed as metaphors. 
Perhaps, when Gantt and colleagues write that these mechanisms are not 
physical, they refer to the emergent qualities of the mind and observed 
behaviour. Contemplating the emergent qualities of the mind has a long 
standing tradition particularly in philosophy (e.g., Lewes, 1875; Dennett, 1984; 
Wilson, 2015), however Gantt and colleagues did not engage with this literature 
and never used the word ‗emergent‘ in their criticism against evolutionary 
psychology in the two articles referenced. Evidence in support of evolutionary 
psychology comes from a wide variety of related fields (e.g., primatology, 
ethology, anthropology, biology and archaeology). Nonetheless, the specific 
mechanisms utilized in the present thesis have not yet been physically identified 
and labelled, therefore, there is reason to apply caution when considering the 
cognitive mechanisms theorised to be responsible for religion. Engaging 
critically with criticisms against evolutionary psychology, and by extension, 
CSR, can only help to further our understanding. 
 
9.7 Recommendations  
 
Two sets of recommendations will be offered; the first address future research 
in psychology and the second address policy. The policy recommendations are 
offered on three interconnected levels: macro, institutional, and individual.  
 
9.7.1 Recommendations for Future Research in Psychology 
 
In line with Evans and Stanovich (2013), it is recommended that dual theories of 
cognition should stop using the terms System 1 and System 2, because 
cognition is made up of many systems, sub-systems, and mechanisms. Novel 
to the present thesis is the insistence that in the rationality vs. religion debate, 
often explained through Type I and Type II processes within socio-cognitive 
psychology, it is fundamental to separate content from process. Individuals can 
use their Type II cognitive processing to arrive at very irrational religious 
conclusions, and the conclusion generated by Type I cognitive processing need 
not be irrational every time. For instance, through coincidence Type I 
processing could produce a rational secular conclusion, because the content 
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could be rational even if the process through which it was achieved was not. 
Therefore, it is important that future studies interested in dual-process theories 
generally, and in the rationality vs. religion debate through dual-process theories 
specifically, recognise and apply the difference between content and process.  
 
Rationality is multifaceted, and overlooking this fact has led to circular 
arguments within the rationality vs. religion debate, where each side of the 
debate offers valid points for or against the rationality of religion, albeit with 
each side referring to a different facet of rationality. For instance, on one hand, 
arguments against the rationality of religion focus on inferential rationality, 
pointing out how particular religious beliefs are not universally valid and are 
undermined by specific logical rules. On the other hand, arguments for the 
rationality of religion focus on other forms of rationality, such as epistemological 
rationality, which concerns the individual‘s subjective source and history of 
knowledge of his/her religious belief and epistemic goal. For any rationality vs. 
religion debate to be productive, the particular facet/s of rationality will have to 
be pre-defined, and all points for or against the rationality of religion will have to 
be on the particular predefined facet/s. 
 
Studying the way we conceptualize ourselves without our physical body has 
benefitted greatly from asking participants how they conceive of their biological 
and mental functions after death. This methodology has benefitted from 
assessing the intuitive concepts of young children rather than adults whose 
responses might be confounded by their religious beliefs and/or religious 
exposure. Recently, this methodology has been improved upon by asking young 
children about how they conceive of themselves before birth rather than after 
death. Questioning children about life before birth rather than life after death is 
considered an improvement on the previous methodology because children old 
enough to comprehend questions about life after death are also cognitively 
mature enough to comprehend and to be exposed to the religious belief of their 
parents/guardians, particularly in highly religious countries. In most of these 
religions however, there are no explicit narratives about life before birth (notable 
exceptions are the religions of the East with a doctrine of reincarnation). 
Another aim of questioning children rather than adults is to elicit an intuitive 
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response, preferably one they had never thought of before. Children are 
exposed to death through various means, for instance, the death of pets, family 
members, and fictional characters, and may therefore be afforded more 
opportunity to consider what happens after death in comparison with before 
birth. The present thesis enhanced this line of research by showing that even if 
children are unfamiliar with questions about life before birth, they can be 
predictably influenced to make the same judgements about life before birth as 
they would about life after death, by (1) the influence of life after death primes 
and (2) their ability to reason by analogy. Studies interested in this line of 
research should understand the history of the methodological improvements 
outlined above and seek to improve on them further. 
 
Agency detection supports the acquisition of religion (Barrett, 2004; Guthrie, 
1993). However, detected agency can be natural (e.g., a human) or 
supernatural (e.g., a god). The results of the present thesis indicate that a high 
tendency to attribute agency to a natural cause (human in this case) has an 
opposite effect on religious fundamentalism in comparison with a high tendency 
to attribute agency to a supernatural cause. More research needs to be carried 
out to further substantiate this finding across various contexts. For instance, 
although the research in the present thesis was carried out in the highly 
religious country of Nigeria, similar research could be carried out in a highly 
secular country such as Sweden.    
 
The role of specific cognitive mechanisms and processes in the acquisition of 
religion is the bedrock of CSR. The role of NFCC has not been given much 
attention and needs to be given as much thought as has gone into agency 
detection and theory of mind. NFCC has been shown in previous studies, as 
well as in the present thesis, to be positively correlated with religious 
fundamentalism. The results of the present thesis also indicate that NFCC is 
positively correlated with agency detection (detection of both human and 
supernatural agency). More studies ought to be carried out to investigate the 
relationship between NFCC and other specific cognitive mechanisms and 
processes hypothesized to be responsible for the acquisition of religion.  
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9.7.2 Policy Recommendations 
 
The present section will offer policy recommendations relevant to Nigeria at 
three interconnected levels (macro, institutional, and individual). The macro 
level addresses the state and federal governments, the institutional level 
addresses educational and media institutions, and the individual level 
addresses individuals in Nigerian society. 
 
Before the various policy recommendations are discussed it is important to 
make a disclaimer. Modern secularism holds dearly all the tenets of human 
rights, including freedom of religious practice and freedom of speech. All the 
recommendations outlined below are not intended to impinge upon the rights of 
individuals to practice any religion of their choice. The present thesis is not 
concerned with disproving any particular religion, but rather with promoting 
healthy scepticism, which could be useful to any school of thought, but 
especially to those devoted to use of the scientific method. 
 
9.7.2.1Macro Level 
 
The macro level policy recommendations are targeted towards the state and 
federal government of Nigeria, which have a significant level of influence over 
all individuals and institutions.  
 
9.7.2.1.1 Recommendations for government policy 
 
The provision of welfare systems in low Socioeconomic Status (SES) 
communities  
 
Socioeconomic status (SES) has been shown, across a number of surveys and 
studies, to be inversely related to religiosity, i.e., religiosity increases as SES 
drops, and vice versa (Barber, 2011; 2012; Heaton, 2013; Norris & Inglehart, 
2004; WIN-Gallup, 2012). Low SES individuals, with no other means to address 
existential problems, are more likely (than individuals with means) to rely on 
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religion to solve their problems. Further, the more desperate low SES 
individuals are, the greater the reliance on religion will be, including the use of 
functional rationality to achieve their desired end. Recall that functional 
rationality is principally interested in the end result (e.g., wealth), and not the 
means through which it is achieved (e.g., as often happens in some rural 
Nigerian low SES communities, the torturing of a child who is accused of 
witchcraft and therefore of hindering the economic progress of the family). The 
provision of welfare systems in the most affected parts of Nigeria will contribute 
towards the reduction of reliance on religion in addressing existential problems 
brought about by low SES. 
 
Cautionary Note: High SES and the financial ability to address existential 
problems such as poverty are not failproof solutions for reducing religiosity and 
religious fundamentalism. For instance, a considerable number of religion-
influenced terrorists are not low SES individuals (Atran, 2003). Similarly, Umar 
Farouk Abdulmutallab, the only Nigerian in recent times to receive notoriety for 
planning a religion-related terrorist attack on the US, is from a high SES family 
(Yusha‘u, 2014). 
 
Pros: Provision of welfare systems that address existential concerns (e.g., 
provision of free medical care and shelter) offers benefits that would seem to far 
exceed the costs of reducing the level of religiosity in any society.  
 
Contemporary Example: Sweden is a high welfare system, high SES country, 
and one of the least religious countries in the world. To be clear, it is not 
necessarily being implied here that the high SES and the welfare system of 
Sweden led to the low religiosity of its citizens. It is implied, however, that the 
high SES and high welfare system of Sweden addresses the conditions that 
would have led low SES individuals to seek religious means to address their 
existential concerns, such as free medical care instead of prayers, and 
accessible bank loans for business initiatives instead of blaming witches or evil 
spirits for financial instability.  
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Encourage and promote nudge initiatives  
 
The ‗nudge‘ concept (Rainford & Tinkler, 2011; Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) draws 
on advances in cognitive and social psychology as well as behavioural 
economics. The nudge concept is predicated on the view that humans are 
default cognitive misers, that is, they are prone to using cognitive shortcuts 
(e.g., biases and stereotypical thinking enabled by Type I cognitive processes). 
Therefore, nudge programmes encourage the practical application of this 
knowledge by promoting the intelligent design of public spaces in order to 
positively influence individuals to make predictable choices beneficial to 
themselves and to society. 
The series of studies in the present thesis (apart from Study One) all show that 
religious vs. secular situational influences have significant impacts on the way 
individuals rate their levels of religiosity and religious fundamentalism. It is 
recommended that state and federal governments become aware of the impact 
of excessive religious symbolism within Nigeria and take steps to balance the 
impact of religious symbolism by creating public spaces that encourage healthy 
scepticism.  
 
Cautionary Note: Critics of nudge programmes maintain that attempts by the 
government to impact on the thought processes of individuals are intrusive, 
condescending, and in violation of individual autonomy (Oliver & Brown, 2010). 
 
Oliver and Brown (2010) make a valid point about the inappropriateness of the 
government to interfere with the autonomy of the thoughts of individuals within 
any society. Their point, however, assumes naïvely that individuals make 
decisions in a vacuum, or that there are not a host of other influences 
(particularly, commercial ones) that intentionally design public spaces to 
influence the autonomy of individuals. See Stewart (2005) and Thaler and 
Sunstein (2008) for similar counter-arguments to Oliver and Brown‘s point. As 
Nigeria is already awash with religious symbolism that nudges individuals 
toward religiosity, the provision of public spaces that nudge individuals toward 
scepticism would serve to balance the amount of religious vs. secular situational 
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influences on the cognition of individuals in Nigeria.  
 
Pros: The implementation of nudge initiatives does not require legislation; it is 
non-intrusive, and is often cost-effective (Rainford & Tinkler, 2011). 
 
Contemporary Example: The Behavioural Insights Team, created by the UK 
government and tasked with designing and implementing nudge initiatives in the 
UK.  
 
9.7.2.2 Institutional Level 
 
This section will offer recommendations for educational and media institutions in 
Nigeria.  
 
9.7.2.2.1 Recommendations for educational institutions  
 
When and where religion is taught in educational institutions in Nigeria, it should 
be done comprehensively, with the level of academic depth varying according to 
the level of the educational institution (i.e., primary, secondary, and tertiary). 
Specifically, all major religions of the world should be taught, and crucially, the 
recorded history of the religions, and as well as the period in which these 
religions were created, should be taught. For instance, in Christianity, teaching 
students about the Roman empire‘s use of crucifixion as a regular form of 
execution will give students a better comprehension of the significance or 
insignificance of ‗the cross‘. Teaching students about the moral teachings of 
Confucius in China hundreds of years before Christianity, or the Egyptian 
civilisation thousands of years before Christianity, will give students a sense of 
scope.  
 
It is often futile to encourage individuals to be sceptical, and to arrive at thought-
out conclusions through the use of Type II cognitive processing, when they do 
not possess the knowledge which their Type II processing requires (recall the 
emphasis in the present thesis on separating content from process). For 
instance, consider a Nigerian whose view of the cosmos is shaped by lay 
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Christian doctrine, and who thus views Heaven and Hell as above and beneath 
Earth respectively. This individual would lack the knowledge (i.e., content) 
required to accurately contemplate (i.e., process) the size and relevance of 
Earth, in comparison to a Nigerian who has knowledge of the vastness of the 
cosmos, the billions of stars in Earth‘s Milky Way galaxy, the billions of other 
galaxies, and the billions of miles between planets (Stern, 1991; Sumi et al., 
2011). 
 
Education should purvey not propaganda (religious or otherwise) but rather 
known facts, accepted within the general academic community (including valid-
counter points), regardless of who this knowledge might offend. Within the 
scientific community, the theory of evolution is the only widely-accepted account 
of the origin of all species. This theory should be taught at all levels of education 
in Nigeria, even to critics of the theory, because it is necessary to understand 
any theory before criticising or ridiculing it. The emphasis throughout the 
present thesis is not to believe in the theory of evolution because it is popular or 
influential, or in religious doctrine because it is intuitive or influential. Rather, the 
emphasis in the present thesis and the recommendation made here is the 
application of healthy scepticism towards all truth claims, and this type of 
reasoning should be encouraged in Nigerian children from as early as possible. 
 
Evidence presented in the present thesis suggests that secular signs can help 
promote healthy reasoning attitudes such as scepticism. Rather than the 
multitude of religious signs in schools in Nigeria, having secular signs could 
plausibly help nudge students away from making inferentially irrational religious 
conclusions. These secular signs do not have to be anti-religious; scepticism is 
not committed to disproving religion per se, it is committed only to investigating 
the validity of all propositions, including religion, pseudoscience, and real 
science. If the perceiver of the sign has no knowledge of the sign, the signified 
and the intendant, then the sign will have no effect. In schools, the intendant 
would have to be repeatedly taught to students for them to be able to make the 
connection between the signifier (i.e., secular sign) and the signified (i.e., 
scepticism) through an acquired implicit motivation/goal for objective truth (i.e., 
the intendant). 
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Cautionary Note: Education, just like high SES, is not failproof for preventing 
high religiosity and religious fundamentalism. Drawing on the same examples 
used above, a considerable number of religion-related terrorists are well 
educated (Atran, 2003). Similarly, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian 
religion-related terrorist was educated in one of the top universities in the UK 
(Yusha‘u, 2014). 
 
Pros: Almost every sphere of modern life benefits from education, from the 
invention of mobile phones for communication to the creation of vaccines for 
medical intervention. Education should not be hindered or half-taught as a result 
of religious or other biases. It should be the fundamental right of all students to 
be presented with all the known facts so that they can make up their own minds 
about what they choose to believe. It should also be emphasized in the 
educational institutions of Nigeria that academia in general, and science in 
particular, is not predicated on faith-based beliefs but on factual evidence and 
falsifiable tests. 
 
Contemporary Example: In 2014, the British government banned the teaching of 
creationism as evidence based theory in all free and state schools, from primary 
school level upwards. Teaching the theory of evolution was also made a 
compulsory part of the curriculum of these schools.  
 
9.7.2.2.2 Recommendations for media institutions 
 
The media institutions of Nigeria carry the huge responsibility of disseminating 
information throughout the country. In the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948), Article 19 states: 
 
―Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and  
expression;this rightincludes freedomto hold opinions  
without interferenceand to seek, receive and impart  
information andideas through any media and regardless  
of frontiers‖ (p. 4). 
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Nonetheless, journalists in all democratic countries should be held to very high 
standards. For instance, the Code of Ethics for Nigerian Journalists (1998) 
mandates accuracy and fairness (Section 2) as well as social responsibility in 
promoting peace (Section 12). Study One in the present thesis found that the 
national newspapers (Daily Sun to a significantly larger extent, and the 
Guardian to a significantly lesser extent) published religious assertions 
presented as fact. This practice should be considered a breach of ethical 
standards. Newspaper articles with religious overtones should not interfere with 
the presentation of real events in putatively non-religious national newspapers.  
 
Nigeria is currently witnessing an unprecedented amount of religion-related 
terrorism, with the most prominent religious terrorist group being Boko Haram. 
Boko Haram is affiliated with Islam and has carried out several attacks on non-
Muslims (as well as on Muslims that don‘t fit their fundamentalist criteria). It 
would be more socially responsible for the media institutions to take an active 
role in promoting interfaith cohesion among the various religious groups in 
Nigeria, rather than to support the propaganda of any religious group. For 
instance, conspicuous media portrayal of Christianity as the only way to 
Heaven, and of non-Christians as heathens destined for Hell, does not serve to 
promote interfaith cohesion but rather reinforces the distance between 
Christians and Muslims.  
 
9.7.2.3  Individual Level 
 
Recognition of the predisposition to use cognitive shortcuts  
 
The most important recommendation for the individual level is for individuals to 
recognise the human predisposition to use default cognitive shortcuts (Evans, 
2008; Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Posner, 
1980; Smith & Collins, 2009; Wason & Evans, 1975). These cognitive shortcuts, 
such as various biases, stereotype knowledge, and religious doctrine learnt 
during childhood and reinforced throughout adulthood, provide immediate 
answers but might not necessarily serve the best interests of the individual. 
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Topics such as religion should be considered through the use of conscious and 
controlled Type II cognitive processing. This should entail the gathering of 
scientific as well as historical facts to challenge or reaffirm what has been learnt 
during childhood, or transmitted culturally from someone else without evidence. 
 
Beware of situational influences on cognitive processes  
 
Several studies outlined above indicate that relevant situational influences such 
as symbols can cause individuals to act in predictable ways. The series of 
studies carried out in the present thesis support these findings and also show 
how religious and secular symbols interact with specific cognitive processes, 
such as immortality bias, NFCC, and agency detection. It is recommended that 
individuals should be aware of the presence of such influences in their 
environments when making important decisions with lasting consequences. 
Individuals should also be aware of the potential effect of symbols they place 
around themselves (e.g., in work environments). 
 
9.8 Concluding Remarks  
 
Results presented above suggest that religious and secular symbols can have 
significant situational influences on the cognition of individuals in Nigeria. These 
influences often occur without the awareness of the individual, by reinforcing 
already learned associated constructs. Nigeria is one of the most religious 
countries in the world and religious symbolism is conspicuous in every sphere 
of Nigerian society, from work environments to educational institutions. 
Christianity and Islam are the two dominant religions in Nigeria and they are 
doctrinal. This means that they have a very high level of repetition, which leads 
to the tedium effect (i.e., where over-familiarity with religious doctrine leads to a 
deficiency in active conscious processing of the contents of the particular 
repeated religious doctrine). 
 
The religion vs. rationality debate assessed through dual-process theories is 
often carried out in Western countries where secularism is just as conspicuous 
as religion. This has led many dual-process researchers to conclude that 
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religious people lack analytic Type II cognitive processing to engage with 
healthy scepticism and instead rely on heuristic Type I cognitive processing. 
This account however fails to explain why analytic individuals in highly religious 
countries are religious. A more appropriate approach to the rationality vs. 
religion debate through the dual process framework is to separate process (i.e., 
Type I and Type II processing) from content (i.e., religion and secularism). 
When content is separated from process, the dual-process framework can be 
utilized to argue that in very religious countries such as Nigeria, highly analytical 
individuals can use their Type II analytic cognitive processing to evaluate 
religious doctrine. Particularly, when these individuals do not have the 
necessary secular knowledge (i.e., content) to contemplate alternatives to 
religious doctrine (See example about the cosmos above). 
 
Although healthy scepticism is recommended in the present thesis, this 
recommendation is not necessarily against any religion, if the doctrine of that 
religion can withstand non-biased evidence-based enquiry. By the same token, 
healthy scepticism should be used to assess all scientific claims. The common 
thread through the macro, institutional, and individual level recommendations 
made here is the need to nudge individuals to apply healthy scepticism, and 
one way to do this is through intelligent and intentionally designed public spaces 
with secular symbolism. An important finding in the present thesis is that caution 
should be applied when putting up these secular symbols because they can 
have different intendants for different individuals.  
 
For individuals that score high on the detection of supernatural agency, 
exposure to secular symbols that create uncertainty can have the same effect 
as religious symbols that signify a punitive (rather than benign) God, when 
religious fundamentalism is assessed. Recall that the intendant is a subjective 
disposition toward an end goal that is attained consciously but that becomes 
latent and preconscious. If secular symbols are to be put in public places in 
Nigeria, caution should be used when putting these symbols in communities 
that have a high tendency to over-attribute agency to the supernatural. In these 
communities several educational measures should be put in place first (i.e., 
scientific and historical counterpoints to religion) before the use of signs to 
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promote scepticism. Without such educational measures, individuals in these 
communities might be prompted to be sceptical about secularism, because their 
knowledge (pro-religious) will be used to this end regardless of the process (i.e., 
Type I or Type II). Therefore, beyond the intelligent design of public spaces, 
moulding the particular intendant is crucial, so also is the need to be aware of 
the tendency for humans to use default cognitive shortcuts. 
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Appendix A 
 
I 
 
RRII Questionnaire Development 
 
The Rational Experiential Inventory (RE1-40) (Pacini & Epstein, 1999) served 
as major source for the choice of items, the REI-40 was specifically designed to 
measure preferences for the processing of information, theoretically based on 
Epstein‘s (1973) Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory (CEST), it assess the 
distinction between a rational and experiential preference for information 
processing. This is very closely related to the distinction the research intended 
to assess, however, the present research is more specific in the sense that it is 
particularly interested in the influence of religious and superstitions beliefs, 
therefore the items had to be modified or invented to suite our purposes, two 
items were directly lifted from the REI-40 (Q11. I generally prefer to accept 
things as they are than question them & Q 12. It is enough for me that 
something gets the job done. I don‘t care how or why it works)* 
This method of starting a questionnaire based on a previous and widely used 
measure is not uncommon, for instance, in the development for a new 
assessment of epistemological beliefs (EB), Ordon˜ez rtal., (2009) took items 
from Schommer‘s (1990, 1993, 1998) Epistemological Questionnaire (EQ) and 
Bendixen, Shraw, and Dunkles‘s (1998) Epistemic Beliefs Inventory (EBI). The 
ideology behind the scientific method, i.e., questioning, research, and evidence 
also informed the choice of questions, particularly if responses conformed to 
this ideology or not. 
 
Method 
 
14 items were developed for the Religiosity Related Logical Irrationality (RRLI) 
questionnaire. The items were straightforward and easy to understand 
statements that reflected the reality of the sample population. The items were 
examined by senior colleague playing a supervisory role, and changes were 
made based on recommendations provided. During the item generation the 
research questions in the main study were repeatedly referred to ensure the 
items in the questionnaire are representative of the hypothesis (Rattray, 2005) 
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and relevant literature was also consulted to ensure face and content validity  
 
The statements were measured on a 5 point likert scale (1 = strongly agree, 5 = 
strongly disagree). Likert scales are generally used to measure participants 
attitude toward statements, with each polar end representing an unfavourable or 
favourable response (Brinkman, 2009). Participants had to rate each statement 
according to how they felt about it, examples of items include: ―I generally prefer 
to accept things as they are rather than to question them‖ and ―Natural disasters 
are an act of God to punish sinful nations‖. The items were purposely overtly 
logically irrational to avoid any conceptual issues that might arise, as well as to 
expose the difference in reasoning styles we anticipated to find between 
participants in the different experimental treatments in the main study.  
 
Participants 
40 participants (male = 26, female = 14) were approached in Lagos State, 
Nigeria. All participants were Nigerian (age mean = 28 years). Many people 
approached refused to respond to the questionnaire, some were not sure of the 
purpose of the study even after explanation, and many found the questions too 
sensitive, hence, the low amount of respondents.      
 
Procedure 
Respondents were approached directly by the researcher, the majority of the 
respondents were approached at the National Library of Nigeria in Lagos States 
and the rest of the respondents were approached in their places of work along 
Herbert Macaulay Road where the library is situated. Participants were offered 
no incentives, although few people outside the library refused to take part, there 
were no dropouts, as everyone who agreed to participate completed the 
questionnaire. The researcher stood in close proximity while the questionnaire 
was being filled in, and responded in a non-biased manner to questions asked 
by the respondents, taking care not to influence their responses. The 
questionnaire took about 10 minutes to complete on average. 
 
Results 
A Principal Component Analysis (CPA) was carried out on the computer 
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program SPSS. Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) analysis supported Principal 
Component Analysis at the lower threshold, R = .56, Kaiser (1974) recommends 
values from .5 and above.  Barlett‘s test indicates that there is no breach of 
sphericity (χ2 = 147.39, df = 91, p<0.001). However, the number of respondents 
was very low and might have compromised the analysis carried out. Kaiser 
criterion revealed four components with eigenvalues greater than one and 
Cattell scree plot criterion identified a 4-factor solution that explained 60% of the 
variance, see Table 2 for the list of items and component loadings. 
 
The items in the RRLI questionnaire were conceived as a one-dimensional 
measure away or toward RRLI. Using a minimum factor loading of .3 most of 
the items loaded onto the first component (Q1, Q6, Q8, Q10, Q11, & Q14), Q2, 
Q4 and Q9 loaded onto both component 1 and component 4, 2 & 3, and 2 
respectively, these items were not eliminated but highlighted to be reconsidered 
following further analysis. During the administration of the questionnaire it 
became clear that the items in component 2 were problematic, a large number 
of respondents were not sure what was meant by ‗specialist meteorologist‘ in 
Q5 and ‗stem-cell research‖ in Q3. These 2 items were therefore eliminated 
because they lacked clarity. Respondents also had a hard time responding to 
Q7, some respondents were not quite sure of the generality of the word ‗event‘, 
they thought about its social denotation (e.g., party), further, Q7 loaded onto the 
component containing other items respondents had trouble interpreting 
(component 2) and a second component (component 3), it was therefore 
eliminated.  Q12 failed to meet the criteria for minimum factor loading (0.3) on 
the pattern matrix, it was also one of the two items lifted word for word from the 
REI-40, further scrutiny revealed that although it measures the distinction in 
information processing between a rational and experiential orientation it might 
not be specific enough to tap into RRLI, which by definition is religiosity related, 
therefore it was eliminated. Q13 loaded unto component 3 and 4, this suggests 
that it might be measuring a different aspect of irrationality than RRLI, further 
exploration of the question revealed that it might not be specific enough and it 
might be more related to epistemic rationality, a subjective mode of reasoning 
fostered by one‘s beliefs as supported by one‘s evidence of those beliefs (Kelly 
2003). The total number of items left after the elimination of unwanted was 9. 
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Table 1 
CPA Loadings  for Direct Oblimin Oblique Rotation for Initial Religiosity Related 
Logical Irrationality (RRLI) Questionnaire  
Item                                                                                              Components 
                                                                                     1           2           3         4     
 
Q 1.   Faith and belief are more important than  
          logic and reason                                              .78 
 
Q 11. I generally prefer to accept things as they  
          are than question them                                   . 69 
 
Q 14. It is not right to question anything written  
          in any of the holy bookssuch as the Bible 
          or Quran                                                           .62 
 
Q 10. The truth of existence is revealed in the  
          holy religious books and noscientific  
          endeavour can prove these facts wrong          .65 
 
Q 8.   Accepting the events in your life by religious  
         faith is better thanreasoning out the causes  
         of the events                                                     .58 
 
Q 6.  Some dreams can predict the future                .48 
 
Q 9.  It is not important to understand every single  
         thing in the worldaround us                              .43      .47 
 
(table continues) 
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Continued table 
 
Item                                                                                              Components 
                                                                                      1          2         3         4            
 
Q 2.  It is not important to prove the things we  
         believe and have faith in                                       41                             .61   
 
Q 4.  Natural disasters are an act of God to punish  
        sinful nations                                                         .31      .47      .41 
 
Q 12. It is enough for me that something gets the 
          job done. I don‘t carehow or why it works           .25            
 
Q 5.   I agree with advanced weather control,  
          where specialist meteorologistscan play  
         God in altering weather conditions                               .51  
 
Q 3.   I agree with stem-cell research where  
          scientists can play God inmodifying the  
          genetic composition of humans                                    .72 
 
Q 7.   I agree that every event that occurs can be  
          reduced to physical causes                                                             .50   .57  
  
Q 13.  Every idea we hold to be true must be  
           repeatedly verified physicallyelse rejected                                     .48   .41 
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APPENDIX B: Questionnaires 
I 
9 Item intermediate Questionnaire 
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ii 
 
9 Item intermediate Questionnaire 
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III 
 
 7 Item Final Questionnaire 
 
PLEASE TICK THE CIRCLE YOU MOST AGREE WITH 
 
 
 
1. Faith and belief are more important than logic and reason                      
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              DisagreeStrongly 
Agree         Disagree 
 
2. Accepting the events in your life by religious faith is better than reasoning 
out thecauses of the events                 
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              Disagree       Strongly 
Agree         Disagree 
 
3. Natural disasters are an act of God to punish sinful nations       
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              Disagree       Strongly 
Agree         Disagree 
 
4. Some dreams can predict the future       
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              Disagree       Strongly 
Agree         Disagree 
 
5. The truth of existence is revealed in the holy religious books and no 
scientific endeavour can prove these facts wrong         
 
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              Disagree       Strongly 
Agree         Disagree 
 
6. I generally prefer to accept things as they are than question them  
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              Disagree       Strongly 
Agree         Disagree 
 
7. It is not right to question anything written in any of the holy books such as 
the Bible or Quran       
 
Strongly    Agree      Neutral              Disagree       Strongly 
Agree         Disagree 
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IV 
 
 The cognitive response test (CRT) 
 
 
 
 
Please tick the right answer 
 
1. A bat and a ball cost N1.10 in total. The bat costs a dollar more than the 
ball. How much does the ball cost?  
 
A. N10       B.     N5 
B. N2        D.     N6 
 
 
 
2. If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it 
take 100  machines to make 100 widgets? 
 
A. 5 minutes       B.    6 minutes 
C. 10 minutes      D.    4 minutes
  
 
 
 
3. In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles in 
size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how long 
would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake? 
 
A. 37 days       B.    24 days 
 C.  42 days       D.    47 days  
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V 
 
Need for cognitive closure (NFCC) scale 
15 Item NFCC Scale (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011) based on the original 42-item 
scale (Webster &Kruglanski,1994) and  the revised version (Roets & Van Heil, 
2007) 
 
1. I don‘t like situations that are uncertain.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
 
2. I dislike questions which could be answered in many different ways.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
3. I find that a well ordered life with regular hours suits my temperament.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
4. I feel uncomfortable when I don‘t understand the reason why an event 
occurred in my life.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
5. I feel irritated when one person disagrees with what everyone else in a 
group  believes.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
 
6. I don‘t like to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from 
it.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
 
(Questionnaire continues) 
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Questionnaire continued 
 
7. When I have made a decision, I feel relieved.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I‘m dying to reach a solution very 
quickly.  
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
9. I would quickly become impatient and irritated if I would not find a 
solution to a  problem immediately. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
10. I don‘t like to be with people who are capable of unexpected actions. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
11. I dislike it when a person‘s statement could mean many different things. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
12. I find that establishing a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
 
13. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
14. I do not usually consult many different opinions before forming my own view. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree  
       Agree          Strongly 
agree 
      
 
15. I dislike unpredictable situations. 
Completely 
disagree 
Disagree
  
Somewhat 
disagree 
Somewhat 
agree 
       Agree  Strongly 
agree 
      
 
VI 
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Detection of supernatural agency test 
 
Numerical judgement task 
The following series of number strings were either intentionally designed by a 
human or randomly generated by a computer program. Rate how you perceive 
each by circling the rate number from 1 (definitely random) to 10 (definitely 
human). The series of numbers will appear one at a time 
 
I.         1  2  1  1  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
 
 
II.        2  2  1  2  2  1  1  2  1  1  2  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
 
 
III.      1  2  1  2  2  2  1  1  2  1  2  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
 
 
1V.     1  2  2  2  2  1  2  1  1  1  1  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
 
 
V.         2  2  2  1  2  2  1  1  2  2  2  1 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
 
(Questionnaire continues) 
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Questionnaire continued 
 
 
VI.       2  1  1  1  2  2  2  1  2  1  2  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human      
 
 
VII.     2  1  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  1  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human     
 
 
VIII.   1  1  2  1  1  1  2  2  1  2  1  1 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human    
 
 
IX.       2  1  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2  2 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
 
 
X.        2  2  2  2  2  1  2  2  2  2  2  1 
          
         1 2          3          4         5         6         7       8        9             10 
           Definitely        Definitely  
 Random              Human                                                                                                                   
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VII 
 
Detection of supernatural agency test 
 
 
3 item index of belief in supernatural control (Kay, Moscovitch, and Laurin, 
2010) 
 
 
 
1. It is feasible that God, or some type of non-human entity, is in control, at 
least in part, of the events within our universe.  
 
Tremendously 
doubtful 
 
Very 
doubtful 
 
Somewhat 
doubtful 
 
Neither 
doubtful nor 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
 
Very 
likely 
 
Tremendously 
likely 
 
 
 
      
 
 
2. The events that occur in this world unfold according to God's, or some 
other non-human entity's, plan.  
 
Tremendously 
doubtful 
 
Very 
doubtful 
 
Somewhat 
doubtful 
 
Neither 
doubtful nor 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
 
Very 
likely 
 
Tremendously 
likely 
 
 
 
      
 
3. There exists a spiritual order to the universe, such as Karma  
 
Tremendously 
doubtful 
 
Very 
doubtful 
 
Somewhat 
doubtful 
 
Neither 
doubtful nor 
likely 
Somewhat 
likely 
 
Very 
likely 
 
Tremendously 
likely 
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VIII 
 
 
Revised religious fundamentalism scale  
 
(Altemeyer &Hunsberger, 2004) 
 
 
-4 = You very strongly disagree with the statement. 
-3 = You strongly disagree with the statement. 
-2 = You moderately disagree with the statement. 
-1 = You slightly disagree with the statement. 
0 = You feel exactly and precisely neutral about the statement. 
1 = You slightly agree with the statement. 
2 = You moderately agree with the statement. 
3 = You strongly agree with the statement. 
4 = You very strongly agree with the statement. 
 
 
Important: You may find that you sometimes have different reactions to 
different parts of a statement. For example, you might very strongly disagree (―-
4‖) with one idea in a statement, but slightly agree (―+1‖) with another idea in 
the same item. When this happens, please combine your reactions, and [record] 
how you feel on balance (a ―-3‖ in this case). 
 
 
1. God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and 
salvation, whichmust be totally followed. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
2. No single book of religious teachings contains all the intrinsic, fundamental 
truthsabout life. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
3. The basic cause of evil in this world is Satan, who is still constantly and 
ferociouslyfighting against God. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
4. It is more important to be a good person than to believe in God and the right 
religion. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
 
(Questionnaire continues) 
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Questionnaire continued  
 
5. There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, 
you can‘t goany ―deeper‖ because they are the basic, bedrock message that 
God has givenhumanity. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
6. When you get right down to it, there are basically only two kinds of people in 
theworld:the Righteous, who will be rewarded by God; and the rest, who will 
not. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
7. Scriptures may contain general truths, but they should NOT be considered  
completely,literally true from beginning to end. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
8. To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, 
fundamentally truereligion. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
9. ―Satan‖ is just the name people give to their own bad impulses. There really 
is nosuchthing as a diabolical ―Prince of Darkness‖ who tempts us. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
10. Whenever science and sacred scripture conflict, science is probably right. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
11. The fundamentals of God‘s religion should never be tampered with, or  
compromised with others‘ beliefs. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
         
 
12. All of the religions in the world have flaws and wrong teachings. There is no  
perfectly true, right religion. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
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IX 
 
Retrograde immortality questionnaire 
 
Table 1: List of retrograde immortality questions 
Category             Question 
Biological   Could your eyes work? 
                                           Could your heart beat? 
 
Psychobiological  Could you be thirsty? 
                                           Could you be hungry? 
 
Perceptual   Could you watch something? 
                                           Could you listen to something? 
 
Epistemic   Could you think things? 
                                           Could you remember things? 
 
Emotional   Could you feel sad? 
                                           Could you feel happy? 
 
Desire   Could you want anything? 
                                           Could you desire anything? 
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APPENDIX C 
 
ETHICS RELATED DOCUMENTS  
 
I  
 
Studies Two and Three: Informed consent sheet 
 
Informed consent sheet: A case study of perception and cognition in Nigeria  
The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons who 
participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so. Please read the 
following and sign it if you agree with what it says.  
I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project entitled "A 
Case Study of Perception and Cognition in Nigeria‖ to be conducted in Lagos State, 
Nigeria, with Mark Iruayenama Specifically, I have been told that I will be asked to 
determine the contents of four posters on wall followed by responding to two simple 
one page questionnaires. The session should take no longer than 25 minutes to 
complete.  
I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I also understand 
that if at any time during the session I feel unable or unwilling to continue, I am free to 
leave without negative consequences. That is, my participation in this study is 
completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from this study at any time. My withdrawal 
would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise. My name will not be linked with 
the research materials, as the researchers are interested in perception and cognition in 
general -- not any particular individual's ideas. I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions regarding the procedure, and my questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I have been informed that if I have any general questions about this 
project, or ethical issues relating to the project, I should feel free to contact Mark 
Iruayenama at Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk.  
If I have any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research is or has 
been conducted I may contact one of the Co-Chairs of the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee, Professor Taeko Wydell at taeko.wydell@brunel.ac.uk or Dr Tara Marshall 
at tara.marshall@brunel.ac.uk.  
I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study. My 
signature is not a waiver of any legal rights. Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for my records.  
____________________    ___________________ 
Participant‘s Signature      Please Print Date  
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-
named has consented to participate. Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed 
consent form for my records.  
__________________________   _________________________ 
Principal Investigator Signature     Please Print Date  
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II 
 
Studies Two and Three: Consent sheet 
 
A case study of perception and cognition in Nigeria 
The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons who 
participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so. Please read the 
following and sign it if you agree with what it says. 
I freely and voluntarily consent to be a participant in the research project entitled "A 
Case Study of Perception and Cognition in Nigeria‖ to be conducted in Nigeria, with 
Mark Iruayenama.  Specifically, I have been told that I will be asked to determine the 
contents of four posters followed by responding to two simple one page questionnaires. 
The session should take about 15 minutes to complete. 
I have been told that my responses will be kept strictly confidential. I also understand 
that if at any time during the session I feel unable or unwilling to continue, I am free to 
leave without negative consequences. That is, my participation in this study is 
completely voluntary, and I may withdraw from this study at any time. My withdrawal 
would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise. My name will not be linked with 
the research materials, as the researchers are interested in perception and cognition in 
general -- not any particular individual's ideas. I have been given the opportunity to ask 
questions regarding the procedure, and my questions have been answered to my 
satisfaction. I have been informed that if I have any general questions about this 
project, or ethical issues relating to the project, I should feel free to contact Mark 
Iruayenama at Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk. 
If I have any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research is or has 
been conducted I may contact the chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee, 
Dr Achim Schuetzwohl at achim.schuetzwohl@brunel.ac.uk. 
I have read and understand the above and consent to participate in this study. My 
signature is not a waiver of any legal rights. Furthermore, I understand that I will be 
able to keep a copy of the informed consent form for my records. 
__________________________   _________________________ 
Participant‘s Signature                   Please Print Date  
I have explained and defined in detail the research procedure in which the above-named has 
consented to participate. Furthermore, I will retain one copy of the informed consent form for my 
records.  
______________________   ________________________ 
Principal Investigator Signature     Please Print Date  
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III 
 
Studies Two and Three: Debriefing form 
 
 
A case study of perception and cognition in Nigeria 
 
The study is a psychology experiment designed to investigate the mediating role of 
perception on cognition, particularly how different degrees of religious symbolism and 
non-religious symbolism influences logical irrationality. This study is situated within the 
context of implicit social cognition and the automaticity of higher mental states, and this 
is situated within the broader context of socio-cognitive psychology. 
The following hypotheses will be tested: 
H1a: There would be a significant difference in RRLI scores between participants in the 
neutral religious condition and participants in the rationality condition 
H1b: There would be a greater significant difference in RRLI scores between 
participants in the punitive religious condition and participants in the rationality 
condition compared to the difference in RRLI scores between participants in the neutral 
religious condition and participants in the rationality condition. 
 
The following studies might be of interest to you: 
1. Bargh, J. A., Chen, M., & Burrows, L. (1996). Automaticity of social behavior: Direct 
effects of trait construct and stereotype activation on action. Journal Of Personality And 
Social Psychology, 71(2), 230-244 
2. Dijksterhuis A.P. & Nordgren, L.F. (2006). Perspectives on Psychological Science , 
Vol. 1, No. 2 , pp. 95-109 
 
 
Once again, thank you for taking part in this study. 
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IV 
 
Studies Two and Three: Ethics Checklist / Approval 
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V 
Study Four: Complete Ethics Checklist and Approval  
 
Reasoning by Analogy in Nigerian School Children. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNIVERSITY RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
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APPLICATION FORM  
FOR  
RESEARCH ETHICS APPROVAL 
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SECTION A: GENERAL 
 
1. Title of the Study: Reasoning by Analogy: Inference of Retrograde Immortality by Priming 
Future Immortality in Nigerian School Children. 
Project Start Date: 12/10/14 Project End Date: 12/10/15 
 
2. Full name of applicant: Mark Abiye Iruayenama 
Position Held:  
School: School of Health and Life 
Sciences  
Course Title (if student): Psychology Research (PhD) 
Email: Mark.Iruayenama@br
unel.ac.uk 
Telephone: 07949954405 Fax:  
Please provide details of any and all other researcher(s) who will work on the research project:  
Name(s): Mark Abiye Iruayenama 
Position Held: PhD candidate 
Location: Gaskell Building  
Contact details (e-mail/ telephone/fax): Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk 
Name(s):  
Position Held:  
Location:  
Contact details (e-mail/ telephone/fax):  
Name(s):  
Position Held:  
Location:  
Contact details (e-mail/ telephone/fax):  
 
3. Is this a student proposal? Yes * No  
If yes, please complete the remainder of this section. 
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Supervisor Name: Dr Michael E. Price  Position held: Senior Lecturer and 
Deputy Head of 
Psychology, Brunel 
University, London 
Location: Gaskell Building  
Contact details (email/telephone/fax): michael.price@brunel.ac.uk 
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4. Declaration to be signed by the Applicant or the supervisor in the case of  a student:  
1.2 I confirm that the research will be undertaken in accordance with the Brunel 
University Ethical Framework, Good Research Practice Policy, and Code of 
Research Ethics. 
1.3 I will undertake to report formally to the relevant University Research 
Ethics Committee for continuing review approval. 
1.4 I shall ensure that any changes in approved research protocols are reported 
promptly for approval by the relevant University Ethics committee. 
1.5 I shall ensure that the research study complies with the law and Brunel 
University policies on the use of human material (if applicable) and health 
and safety. 
1.6 I am satisfied that the research study is compliant with the Data Protection 
Act 1998, and that necessary arrangements have been, or will be, made with 
regard‬ to‬the‬ storage‬ and‬processing‬ of‬participants’‬ personal‬ information‬
and generally, to ensure confidentiality of such data supplied and generated 
in the course of the research. 
(Note: Where relevant, further advice is available from the Information 
Access Officer, e-mail data-protection@brunel.ac.uk). 
1.7 I will ensure that all adverse or unforeseen problems arising from the 
research project are reported in a timely fashion to the Chair of the relevant 
University Research Ethics Committee.  
1.8 I will undertake to provide notification when the study is complete and if it 
fails to start or is abandoned. 
1.9 I have met and advised the student on the ethical aspects of the study design 
and am satisfied that it complies with the current professional (where 
relevant), School and University guidelines. 
 
 
Signature of Applicant: …M.A.I……….                                     Date: …...8/10/14……. 
 
 
Signature‬ of‬Supervisor:……Michael‬ Price................... Date……9/10/14………… 
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SECTION B: FUNDING 
 
5. If the research is externally funded, what is the source of the funding?   No 
 
5.1. Are there any conditions attached to the funding? 
YES  NO *  
If yes, please specify. 
 
 
SECTION C:  THE RESEARCH 
 
6. In lay terms, please provide an outline of the proposed research, including:  
1.10 background 
1.11 objectives 
1.12 research methodology 
1.13 contribution of research 
1.14 justification of benefit 
(max 1000 words). 
Reasoning by Analogy: Inference of Retrograde Immortality by Priming Future Immortality in Nigerian 
School Children. 
 
Background 
Within the cognitive science of religion (CSR) there has been some interest on how the conceptualization of future 
immortality (i.e., life after death) reveals intuitive patterns of reasoning about personhood (e.g., Bering, 2002; 
Bering & Bjorklund, 2004). Responses to questions on future immortality however are often informed by religious 
or cultural narratives, even in studies carried out with children, demonstrated by assessing the influence of religious 
vs. secular primes (Astuti & Harris, 2008; Harris & Giménez , 2005). To address this shortcoming, Emmons and 
Kelemen (2014), in a cross-cultural‬study‬(urban‬Ecuador‬vs.‬rural‬Shaur)‬assessed‬children’s‬conceptualization‬ of‬
retrograde immortality (i.e., life before birth). This novel approach reduces the chances of culturally acquired 
217 
 
 
 
responses in children in cultures with no dominant retrograde immortality script.  
 
Objectives 
The proposed study aims to contribute to this body of knowledge in two ways: First, by replicating Emmons and 
Kelemens (2014) cross-cultural retrograde immortality study in a different culture (Nigeria) which showed that as 
children aged from five to 12 years old got older they were just as likely to believe in biological immortality as the 
younger children but less likely to believe in biological immortality. Second, and novel to the present study, by 
assessing‬if‬children’s‬ability‬ to‬reason‬by‬analogy‬will‬ make‬them‬conceptualize‬retrograde‬immortality‬ more‬when‬
primed with future immortality symbolism (in comparison with children primed with secular symbolism).   
 
Research Methodology 
Children (5 yrs – 12 yrs) will be tested in an unoccupied classroom individually, within their school premises. They 
will be introduced to the study by telling them that they will be asked questions about the past and things they could 
do then. The experimenter will inform the children that the questions will not be graded, and are not part of a test.  
 
Children will be presented with three drawings representing three developmental periods in their past (Emmons & 
Kelemen, 2014). The images consist of culturally appropriate renditions of a Nigerian woman and infant (see 
Appendix II). The three images include: a pre-life image  (depiction of a young mother), an in utero image 
(depiction of a pregnant mother), and a baby period image (depiction of a baby). The images will be presented to the 
children following the procedure set out by Emmons and Kelemen (2014). Crucially, and novel to the present study, 
two sets of images will be presented to the children; one containing religious symbolism and another containing 
secular symbolism (see Appendix III). 
 
According to experimental condition (religious symbolism vs. secular symbolism), all three images will be initially 
laid out on the table linearly (i.e., prelife period, in utero fetal period, and baby period). Children will be told to 
imagine the drawings are of themselves and their mother. The baby period will be discussed first (while pointing to 
the drawing of the baby), followed by the in utero fetal period (explaining that that they were in their mother's 
belly), and lastly the pre-life period (explaining that it was before they were born). After the introduction of the 
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drawings, they (the drawings) will be mixed up and the children will be asked to order them linearly to ascertain if 
they understand that the drawings represent three distinct stages of their past. If any child fails to order the images 
correctly the order of the images will be reviewed and the child will be given a second chance to answer.  
 
When the three different drawings have been understood by the child, the pre-life image alone (religious symbolism 
vs.‬no‬symbolism)‬ will‬ be‬laid‬down‬on‬the‬table‬and‬the‬child‬will‬ be‬asked‬12‬“yes-no”‬questions‬ about‬mental‬and‬
bodily functions they might have had during their pre-life period. (See Appendix IV for the list of questions). All 12 
questions‬will‬ be‬prefaced‬the‬following‬ way:‬“Think‬ about‬yourself‬during‬ this‬time‬when‬your‬mother‬still‬ was‬not‬
pregnant‬with‬you.‬During‬that‬time‬(Could‬you‬feel‬happy?)”. 
 
Contribution of Research 
Findings from the research will contribute toward the cognitive science of religion's claim that humans possess 
implicit intuitive patterns of reasoning engaged by explicit concepts acquired through cultural transmission (e.g., 
Atran & Norenyazan, 2004; Barrett, 2000, 2004; Guthrie, 1993).  If the predictions are correct, and novel to the 
proposed research, it will also show that children are able to reason by analogy about untutored religious 
conceptions based on their knowledge of tutored religious concepts (when primed with tutored religious concepts).  
 
Justification of Benefit 
The study aims to demonstrate that religious symbolism serves not only reinforce tutored religious concepts but can 
also influence the conceptualisation of untutored religious concepts. This will provide further support for the claim 
within the cognitive science of religion that  humans possess implicit intuitive patterns of reasoning about 
personhood which cultural narratives (e.g., religion) exploit.  
Attach any questionnaires, psychological tests, etc. 
7. Who originated the study? 
 
The researcher (Mark Iruayenama) as an extension of Emmons and Kelemen's (2014) study, which was 
also an extension of Bering and Bjorklund's (2004) study. 
8. Location of study  
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8.1 Where will the study take place?  
Nigeria  
8.2 If the study is to be carried out overseas, what steps have been taken to secure research and 
ethical permission in the country of study? (Please attach evidence of approval if available.)  
The research is to be carried out in a private school in Nigeria, currently the school has no ethics 
committee to grant ethical approval. However, I have discussed in depth with the school proprietor and 
teachers about the nature of the research, as well as given out documents explaining the procedure to 
be followed. After this process I obtained permission to carry out the research with the school (see 
Appendix I).      
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9. Multi-centre and off-campus studies 
If this is a multi-centre or off-campus study, please answer the appropriate questions below; 
otherwise, go to Question 10. 
9.1 Does this project involve a consortium (other research partner organisations)? 
YES  NO *  
If yes, please complete the details below in Question 9.2. 
9.2 Who has overall responsibility for the study?  
     Brunel University 
Please provide details of the contractual agreement between Brunel University and the other 
organisation(s). 
9.3 Is this an off-campus study? 
YES * NO   
If yes, please provide signed, written permission from an appropriate level of management within 
the relevant organisation(s). See appendix I  
10. Has approval been sought from other Ethics Committees and LRECs? 
YES  NO *  
Please enclose copies of approval letters, where applicable. 
11. If appropriate, has the protocol been reviewed by a statistician? 
YES  NO *  
If yes, give the name of the statistician:  
Position held:  
11.1 Define (where necessary) the statistical power of the study. 
 
12. Who will have overall control of the data generated? 
The researcher (Mark Iruayenama) / Brunel University   
13.How do you propose to disseminate the results of your research? 
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Dissertation / academic journal  
 
14. PROCEDURES 
Please state whether the project includes procedures which: (please tick the appropriate box) 
 YES  NO 
a. are physically invasive; 
  * 
b. involve the use of human tissue or taking of bodily samples; 
  * 
c. involve the use of biological, radiological, chemical or hazardous 
substances; 
  * 
d. are psychologically/socially intrusive. 
  * 
If you have answered YES to any of the questions in 14 above, please complete 
questions 15 and 16; otherwise proceed to question 17.  You must also consult the Head 
of Risk and Radiation to ensure compliance with Health and Safety regulations. 
 
15. Specific procedures involved: 
Include details, as applicable, of: 
 -the dosage and route of administration of the drug(s) used in and under research, other substances and/or appliances to be ad ministered/used, and 
the method of administration or use,  
-measurements and samples to be taken; 
-tests to be performed; 
-the use of visual aids or the administration of psychological tests. 
 
15.1 Might the procedure(s) cause pain, distress, disruption or intrusion to a participant? 
YES  NO   
If yes, please explain. 
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15.2. Are there any particular requirements or abstentions which will be imposed upon the participant 
(e.g., multiple visits, abstention from alcohol, tobacco, etc.)? 
YES  NO   
If yes, please explain. 
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16. If tissue and/or samples are to be taken, please state the nature, amount and frequency. 
 
16.1 What arrangements will be made for the storage of the tissue and/or samples and for disposal at 
the end of the study? 
 
17. Products and devices 
17.1 Does the research involve the testing of a product or device? 
YES  NO *  
If yes, please describe it. 
 
17.2 If this research involves a drug, is it being used in accordance with its licensed uses?  
YES  NO *  
If no, please explain why: 
 
The research does not involve use of a drug 
 
SECTION D:  THE PARTICIPANTS 
 
For the purposes of this section, “participants” include human subjects, their data, their organs and/or 
tissues. For participants to be recruited to the research, please state:  
18. the number of participants: 160 
19. if data are to be collected on different sites, please state the number of participants at each site: 
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Site 1:  Number of participants:  
Site 2:  Number of participants:  
(insert additional sites if necessary) 
20. How have you arrived at this number?  Please state proposed inclusion/exclusion criteria. 
The participants will be made up of four distinct age groups, each group will require a minimum of 30 
participants. The figure (160) was arrived at estimating 40 participants per age group.   
 
5 - 6 year olds = 40 
7 – 8 year olds = 40 
9 – 10 year olds = 40 
11 – 12 year olds = 40 
The inclusive criteria will be that participants understand the task and the exclusion criteria will be failure 
of participant to understand the task after two detailed explanations, and falling out of the population 
sample age range (5- 12 years old). 
 
21. Age group or range (e.g., under 60s):  5- 12 year olds  
22. Sex: Male Not 
pre-
determ
ined  
 Female Not 
pre-
deter
mine
d  
 
23. Do participants belong to any of the following vulnerable groups? 
Children: YES * NO   
Participants unable to give informed consent in their own right (e.g., people with learning 
difficulty): 
 YES  NO *  
Other vulnerable groups(e.g., mental illness, dementia, students, refugees, unemployed, 
prisoners): 
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 YES  NO *  
 
The above list is indicative, not definitive.  Care will need to be taken to formulate inclusion/exclusion 
criteria that clearly justify why certain individuals are to be excluded, to avoid giving the impression of 
unnecessary discrimination.  On the other hand, the need to conduct research in “special” or “vulnerable” 
groups should be justified and it needs generally to be shown that the data required could not be 
obtained from any other class of participant. 
If the answer to any of the aboveis yes, please complete Questions 24 to 28; otherwise 
proceed to Question 29. 
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 24. Please explain why it is necessary to conduct the research in such vulnerable participants and 
whether required data could be obtained by any other means. 
 The nature of research centres around assessing untutored conceptualisation of personhood based on 
intuition. Children  have been used across a number of studies to assess this construct because 
children are less likely to be familiar with (other) cultural narratives of retrograde immortality, hence 
responses will be predominantly based on intuition.  
 25. Please state what special or additional arrangements have been made to deal with issues of consent 
and the procedures to safeguard the interests of such participants. 
 1. A consent form will be given to children to take home to their parents to sign  
2. A language appropriate consent form will be given to children to sign 
 26. Please describe the procedures used to ensure children (i.e., persons under 18 years) are able to 
provide consent/assent to participation. 
 Consent will be sort from both the parents of the children and the children on two seperate consent 
forms (see Appendices VI and VII ). If either or both a child and parent refuse to sign the consent form 
that child will be excluded from the study and reassured that he/she will face no negative 
consequences; academic or otherwise. 
 27. If appropriate, please state whether and how parental consent, or the consent of the legal guardian 
and/or order/declaration of the court, will be sought in relation to the participation of children in the 
research. 
 Both the information sheet and parent's consent form will be given to the teacher responsible for 
every school year to give to the children in their respective years. The teachers will instruct the 
children to give the information sheet and consent form to their parents / legal guardians, and collect 
the signed (or unsigned documents) back. The teachers will be further instructed not to persist if any 
child fails to return his/her signed/unsigned consent sheet for any reason. However, if a child requests 
for another information sheet and consent form due to misplacing the ones that were given to 
him/her that child will be given the same set of information sheet and consent form to take home.   
 28. If the participant is unable to consent in their own right, will you seek the prior approval of an 
informed independent adult and any other person or body to the inclusion of the participant in the 
research? 
  YES * NO   
 State precisely what arrangements will be put in place. 
  
The headmaster of the primary school, who is the overall head in charge of the children while at school  
will be explicitly informed about the background of the study as well as the predictions of the study. 
He will then make the informed choice of approval (or disapproval). 
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Recruitment and Selection 
The Research Ethics Committee will need to be satisfied with the effectiveness and propriety of recruitment 
and selection procedures given the participant involved, e.g., that the participant will not feel in any way 
obliged to take part, that advertisements do not appear to offer inducements.  The Committee will be 
particularly interested in cases where a participant’s relationship with the investigator could raise issues 
about the voluntary status or motive of the participant’s involvement in the research (e.g., students).  
29. How will the participants in the study be selected, approached and recruited (please indicate the 
inclusion and exclusion criteria)?  
The headmaster of the school will inform individual teachers in charge of various classes, and the 
teachers will inform the children (crucially adding that they are not being academically assessed).  
 
The inclusive criteria will be that participants understand the task and the exclusion criteria will be failure of 
participant to understand the task after two detailed explanations, and falling out of the population sample 
age range (5- 12 years old). 
 
 
If you are proposing to advertise, please attach a copy of the advert to be used. 
30. Where are you recruiting the participants? From their primary school  
 
31. Relationship of participant to investigator: None  
32. Will the participants take part on a fully voluntary basis? 
 YES * NO   
33. Will Brunel University students be involved as participants in the research project?  
 YES  NO *  
If yes, please provide full details. 
 
34. Will payments or other inducements be made to participants? 
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 YES  NO *  
If yes, give amounts, type and purpose. 
 No payments will be made to the participants, however, a desktop computer will be donated to the 
school.  
Information to Participants and Consent  
35. Will participants be informed of the purpose of the research? 
 YES * NO   
If no, please explain why. 
 
36. Will the participants be given a written information sheet?  
 YES * NO   
If yes, attach a copy.   
If no, please explain why.   The participation sheet will be signed by the headmaster on behalf of the 
children, however, before participation the information and consent sheet will be read out to the children 
so they understand that they are free to leave without consequence. 
37. Will written consent be obtained? 
 YES * NO   
If yes, attach a copy of consent form. 
If no, please explain why. 
 
38. Where potential participants will/may suffer from any difficulties of communication, state the methods 
to be employed both to present information to the participants and achieve consent.  If written, please attach 
a copy. 
English language is the first language in Nigeria and all academic work is carried out through the 
English language. Hence, no difficultly is communication is anticipated. Any child who fails to 
understand the questions after two detailed explanations will be excluded from the study.  
39. Please state how you will bring to the attention of the participants their right to withdraw from the 
study without penalty. 
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Before commencing the information sheet and consent sheet will be read out to participants and each 
participant will be given the opportunity to ask questions.  
Where relevant: 
39.1 Will‬ information‬ be‬given‬ to‬the‬participants’‬ GP‬(if‬ deemed‬necessary)? 
 YES  NO *  
39.2 Have the participants consented to having their GP informed? 
 YES  NO *  
40. Please state what measures will be taken to protect the confidentiality of the participant’s data (i.e., 
arising out of the research and contained in personal data). 
No names will be linked with the study or data collected. 
41. How long will the data be retained following completion of the study? 
Ten years  
42. How will participants be informed of the results of the study if they so wish? 
If the report is published in an academic journal the headmaster will be informed about it. If the 
headmaster or any of the parents of the children are interested in seeing the results, a copy will be sent 
out to everyone that requests for it.   
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SECTION E: RISKS AND HAZARDS 
 
43. Risk to research participants  
43.1 Do you think there are any ethical problems or special considerations with the proposed study? 
 YES  NO *  
If yes, please give details: 
 
43.2 Are there any potential hazards or risks to participants? 
 YES  NO *  
If yes, please specify them and state what precautions have been taken to minimise and deal with them:  
 
44. Risk to researchers 
44.1 Are there any potential hazards or risks for the researchers and others associated with participation in the 
research (as distinct from the research participants)? 
 YES  NO *  
If yes, specify them and state what precautions have been taken to minimise and deal with them. 
 
45. Has a Health & Safety risk assessment been carried out? 
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YES * NO   
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SECTION F: COMPENSATION FOR DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURY 
 
46. Is Brunel University providing indemnity for compensation in the event of personal injury or death 
arising out of participation in the research? 
 YES * NO   
47. If the insurance cover is not being provided by Brunel University, please provide written confirmation 
that you have insurance cover for negligent and non-negligent harm. 
48. Has a manufacturer provided commercial equipment and/or mechanical devices? 
 YES  NO *  
If yes, please state what arrangements have been made to compensate or provide indemnity in the event 
of personal injury or death arising from the use of the equipment or mechanical devices.  
 
 
SECTION G: CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 
49. Are there any potential conflicts of interest arising from the project, deriving from relationships with 
collaborators/sponsors/participants/interest groups? 
 YES  NO *  
Please disclose all relevant personal and commercial interests. 
 
50. Does the project require access to intellectual property rights (IPR) belonging to third parties? 
 YES  NO *  
50.1 If yes, has use of such IPR been cleared with the relevant owners? 
 YES  NO   
51 Are arrangements in place to ensure the proper attribution and acknowledgement of  inventive contributions to 
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the project by all participants/collaborators? 
 YES  NO *  
If yes, please provide evidence of this. 
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Permission from an Appropriate Level of Management 
 
 
 
 
 
235 
 
 
 
 
Religious Symbolism Treatment 
 
        1. Pre-life Image            2.   In utero image                      3.   Baby image  
 
 
 
Secular Symbolism Treatment 
 
 
 
1. Pre-life Image            2.   In utero image                      3.   Baby image  
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List of Questions  
 
Table 1. Retrograde immortality questions 
Question  
category 
Questions 
Biological Could your eyes work? 
Could your heart beat? 
Psychobiological  Could you be thirsty? 
Could you be hungry? 
Perceptual Could you watch something? 
Could you listen to something? 
Epistemic Could you think things? 
Could you remember things? 
Emotional Could you feel sad? 
Could you feel happy? 
Desire Could you want anything? 
Could you desire anything? 
 
 
Note:‬All‬ 12‬questions‬will‬ be‬prefaced‬the‬following‬ way:‬“Think‬ about‬yourself during this 
time when your mother still was not pregnant with you. During that time (e.g., Could your eyes 
work?)”. 
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INFORMATION SHEET  
Reasoning by Analogy in Nigerian School Children. 
The Department of Psychology at Brunel University requires that all persons who 
participate in psychology studies give their written consent to do so.   
The participant freely and voluntarily consents to participate in the research project 
entitled "Reasoning by analogy in Nigerian School Children” to be conducted with Mark 
Iruayenama from Brunel University as principal investigator.  The broad goal of this 
research program is to explore children's perception of the enduring qualities of 
personhood and the questions to be put forward to them assesses how they 
conceptualise events in their past. Specifically, children will be asked a series of 12 
questions requiring yes-no answers after the context of the questions have been 
explained to them with the aid of pictures.  The session should take no longer than 15 
minutes per participant to complete. 
All responses will be kept strictly confidential. At any time during the session if the 
participant feels unable or unwilling to continue, the participant is free to leave 
without negative consequences.  That is, participation in this study is completely 
voluntary. Withdrawal would not result in any penalty, academic or otherwise.  No 
name will be linked with the research materials, as the researchers are interested in 
the perception of personhood in general, not any individual's responses in particular. 
Participants will be given the opportunity to ask questions regarding the procedure, 
and all questions must be answered to the participant's satisfaction.   
If the participant has any general questions about this project, or ethical issues relating 
to the project, the participant should feel free to contact Mark Iruayenama at 
Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk. If the participant has any concerns or complaints 
regarding the way in which the research is or has been conducted the participant may 
contact the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics Committee Dr Achim Schuetzwohl 
at achim.schuetzwohl@brunel.ac.uk or the co-convener Dr Bridget Dibb at 
bridget.dibb@brunel.ac.uk 
 
 
238 
 
 
 
PARENT’S CONSENT FORM  
Reasoning by Analogy in Nigerian School Children  
Please note, as it says on the information sheet provided to you, you are free to 
withdraw your child /   children from the study with no negative consequences 
academic or otherwise. That is, your child will not be affected if you refuse (or if your 
child refuses) to participate. 
 YES NO 
1.     I have read the Research Participant Information Sheet (on behalf of my 
child). 
  
2.     I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this study.   
3.     I understand that my child is free to withdraw from the study:   
 at any time (Please note that your child will be unable to withdraw 
once the data has been included in any reports, publications etc.) 
  
 without having to give a reason for withdrawing   
4.     I understand that my child will not referred to by name in any          
report/publications resulting from this study 
  
5.‬‬‬‬‬I‬understand‬ that‬my‬child’s‬ school work/marks etc. will not be affected 
should my child decide not to participate 
  
6.     My child agrees to take part in this study   
 
Parent’s name:  
Parent’s signature: 
Date: 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR NAME:  
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR SIGNATURE: 
DATE: 
One copy to be kept by the parent and one by the researcher  
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CHILDREN’S CONSENT FORM  
Reasoning by Analogy in Nigerian School Children 
 YES NO 
1.     I have read the Research Participant Information Sheet    
2.     I have had the chance to ask questions and talk about this study.   
3.     I understand that I am free to refuse to take part    
 at any‬ time‬ (Please‬note‬ that‬ you‬ can’t‬ collect‬ back‬you‬ information‬
after it has been used in reports, publications etc.) 
  
 without giving a reason   
4.     I understand that I will not be called by name when the study is reported   
5. I understand that my school work/marks etc. will not be affected if I refuse 
to take part 
  
6.     I agree to take part in this study   
 
Participant’s Name:  
Participant’s signature: 
Date: 
 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR NAME:  
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR SIGNATURE: 
DATE: 
 
One copy to be kept by the participant and one by the researcher  
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 DEBRIEF FORM  
 
Reasoning by Analogy in Nigerian School Children 
 
I would like to take this opportunity to say Thank You for taking the time to respond to 
the questions.   
 
Please be assured, all data collected will be treated in the strictest confidence. You are 
free to withdraw your data from the research at any time by contacting Mark 
Iruayenama Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk or Dr Michael Price at 
michael.price@brunel.ac.uk 
 
The completed research will help to gain an understanding of children’s 
conceptualization of the continuity of personhood generally and conceptualization of 
retrograde immortality specifically.  You were chosen to take part in the study because 
you fall between the ages of five and twelve.  
 
If you were unduly or unexpectedly affected by taking part in the study please feel free 
to feed it back to the researcher. If you feel unable for whatever reason what-so-ever 
to talk with the researcher then please either contact Dr Michael Price at 
michael.price@brunel.ac.uk or the ethics officers Achim.Schuetzwohl@brunel.ac.uk, 
01895 266367 and bridget.dibb@brunel.ac.uk, 018952 66564.  
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SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES ETHICS CHECKLIST 
ETHICAL MATTERS MUST BE CONSIDERED BEFORE ANY RESEARCH TAKES PLACE 
FAILURE TO FOLLOW THE CORRECT ETHICAL PROCEDURESOR CONDUCTING 
RESEARCH WITHOUT ETHICAL APPROVAL WHERE IT IS REQUIRED MAYLEAD TO 
DISCIPLINARY ACTION 
GUIDANCE  
This Ethics Checklist  has been designed to help determine the level of risk or harm to 
participants’ welfare entailed in a proposed study. It also contains a sample consent 
form and information leaflet checklist that you can use/adapt as appropriate.  
NB: If your research requires NHS ethics approval, you should not complete this form. 
Please provide the School with a copy of your letter of NHS approval once you 
receive this.  
Who Completes the Checklist? 
The Principal Investigator (PI) is the main researcher and can be a student. The PI (or 
where the PI is a student, the supervisor) is responsible for exercising appropriate 
professional judgement in this review. 
Underpinning Codes of Ethics 
Before completing this checklist, you must refer to the University Code of Research 
Ethics as well as the relevant code of ethics for your discipline. These are listed in the 
Useful Links section at the end of this guidance. It is your responsibility to follow these 
Codes of Research Ethics in the conduct of your study. This includes providing 
appropriate documentation and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data 
(see section  3.3.2 of the University Code of Research Ethics).  
The Checklist 
This Checklist is in two parts: 
Part 1: This must be completed by all students and staff undertaking research. This 
section aims to confirm that there are no ethical or risk assessment issues related to 
your research.  
Part 2: This is for all Principal Investigators who identify that there are ethical and/or 
risk assessment issues in their proposed research.  
YOU MUST HAVE YOUR APPLICATION, CONSENT FORM AND INFORMATION SHEET 
APPROVED  BY YOUR DEPARTMENTAL ETHICS COORDINATOR (OR IF APPROPRIATE, 
UNIVERSITY ETHICS COMMITTEE) BEFORE YOU START YOUR RESEARCH AND APPROACH 
POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS.  
What do I have to do if I need to complete the University Research Ethics Committee 
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Application Form? 
You will need to complete and submit this via BBL. In most cases, the School will be 
able to review and approve the ethics form. If the research needs University level 
approval, your form will be submitted to the University Research Ethics Committee by 
the Research Office.  
 
Risk Assessment  
All Principal Investigators (and their supervisor where relevant) are required to 
consider matters of risk and conduct a risk assessment as part of the University’s 
Health and Safety Policy. If issues of riskare  identified,  a risk assessment is required 
and must be attached to this form. For further information about Risk Assessments and 
guidance on how to undertake one, see the document ‘RISK ASSESSMENT – FAQs’ 
which can be found in in the School of Social Sciences Ethics Organisation, under my 
Organisations in BBL. 
Disclosure and Barring Service (formerly Criminal Record Bureau)Checks 
If your research involves vulnerable persons, you are required to follow University 
guidelines for Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) checks. If you need a DBS check 
please contact the DBS Administrator in Admissions who will send you the information 
you need to make a DBS application.  
 
How to submit Checklist and appendices on Blackboard Learn  
Stage 1: Log into BBL 
Stage 2: Click on the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics Organisation, under the 
My Organisations list on the right hand side 
Stage 3:  Download the Ethics Checklist from the folder on the homepage titled 
‘Research Ethics Application Form’.  
Stage 3: Click on your appropriate department folder 
Stage 4: Click on the Ethics Checklist Submission Assignment Tool 
Stage 5: Upload your Ethics Checklist and appendices eg consent form, information 
leaflet, using the Browse My Computer link, and ensure you have uploaded 
the correct documents 
Stage 6: Once you have confirmed they are the correct documents, click submit 
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Stage 7: You will receive an email receipt of your submission to your Brunel email 
account 
Stage 8: Click on the My Grades link in the School of Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Organisation to find the outcome and feedback once it has been reviewed by 
your Departmental Ethics Coordinator.  
 
Further information about how to submit is available in the School of Social Sciences 
Ethics Organisation, under My Organisations, in BBL. 
 
What happens after I have received ethical approval? 
Once you have received ethical approval, you can start your research.  
Students are required to retain a copy of the approved Checklist, consent form and 
information leaflet and submit these with their research report/dissertation/thesis.  
All undergraduate and postgraduate work submitted/conducted without ethical 
approval may be subject to academic penalties and disciplinary action.  
If your research is delayed and will extend beyond the dates stated on your form, 
please contact your Departmental Ethics Coordinator to seek approval for an 
extension.  
 
Useful Links and Resources  
University Research Code of Ethics LINK 
UREC website - LINK 
Code of Ethics – Anthropology LINK 
Code of Ethics – Economics and Finance (Use University Research Code of Ethics) 
Code of Ethics – Politics and History (Use University Research Code of Ethics) 
Code of Human Research Ethics – Psychology PDF 
Code of Ethics – Sociology and Communications - LINK 
 
Risk Assessment – FAQs – School of Social Sciences Ethics Organisation, under my 
Organisations in BBL. 
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Contacts 
Anthropology  Ethics Coordinator:   Dr Isak Niehaus 
Economics and Finance Ethics Coordinator:   Professor Frank Skinner 
Politics and History Ethics Coordinator:    Dr John MacMillan 
Psychology Ethics Coordinator:     Dr Achim Schutzwohl/ Dr 
Bridget Dibb 
Sociology and Communications Ethics Coordinator:  Dr Simon Weaver 
RESEARCH ETHICS ADMINISTRATOR:    MS AMREEN MALIK 
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SSS RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST – PART 1 
 
SECTION I: PROJECT DETAILS 
1. Project title:  Reasoning by Analogy: Inference of Retrograde Immortality by Priming Future 
Immortality in Nigerian School Children. 
2. Proposed start date: 12/10/14 3. Proposed end date: 12/10/15 
SECTION II: APPLICANT DETAILS 
4. Name of researcher (applicant) Mark Abiye Iruayenama 
5. Student Number  1137686 
6. Status  PGR Student 
7. Department Psychology 
8. Brunel e-mail address Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk 
9. Telephone number 07949954405 
SECTION III: FOR STUDENTS ONLY 
10. Module name and number: Psychology Research PhD 
11. Supervisor’s name: Dr Michael E. Price  
12. Brunel supervisor’s e-mail address: michael.price@brunel.ac.uk 
 
 Yes No 
13. Does this research involve human participants? 
  
14. Does this research raise any ethical or risk concerns as set out in the University Code 
of Research Ethics or relevant disciplinary code?    
15. Risk Assessment – are there any elements of risk related to the proposed research? 
(See Risk Assessment – FAQs) 
  
If you have answered Yes toany of questions 13-15, you mustcomplete Part 2 of this 
form.  
 
Students: If you have answered No, please email this document to your supervisor who 
will confirm that the research does not involve ethical issues. Once electronically 
signed by your supervisor, please submit Part 1 of this form via BBL within 1 week. 
Please keep a copy for yourselfand bind itinto your dissertation/thesis as an appendix.  
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Staff: If you have answered No, please sign below and submit your form via BBL. Please 
keep a copy for yourself. 
 
If your research methodology changes significantly, you must submit a new form. 
 
For Supervisor’s/Staff e-signature  
 
I confirm that there are no ethical or risk issues relating to this research and the applicant can proceed 
with the proposed research.  
e-signature/ Date: Michael Price, 16/10/14 
 
SSS RESEARCH ETHICS REVIEW CHECKLIST – PART 2  
Section IV: Description of project 
Please provide a short description of your project: 
Children (5 yrs – 12 yrs) will be tested in an unoccupied classroom individually, within their school premises 
uder the supervision of their class teacher. They will be introduced to the study by telling them that they will be 
asked questions about the past and things they could do then. The experimenter will inform the children that the 
questions will not be graded, and are not part of a test.  
 
Children will be presented with three drawings representing three developmental periods in their past (Emmons 
& Kelemen, 2014). The images consist of culturally appropriate renditions of a Nigerian woman and infant (see 
Appendix II). The three images include: a pre-life image (depiction of a young mother), an in utero image 
(depiction of a pregnant mother), and a baby period image (depiction of a baby). The images will be presented to 
the children following the procedure set out by Emmons and Kelemen (2014). Crucially, and novel to the 
present study, two sets of images will be presented to the children; one containing religious symbolism and 
another containing secular symbolism (see Appendix III). 
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According to experimental condition (religious symbolism vs. secular symbolism), all three images will be 
initially laid out on the table linearly (i.e., prelife period, in utero fetal period, and baby period). Children will be 
told to imagine the drawings are of themselves and their mother. The baby period will be discussed first (while 
pointing to the drawing of the baby), followed by the in utero fetal period (explaining that that they were in their 
mother's belly), and lastly the pre-life period (explaining that it was before they were born). After the 
introduction of the drawings, they (the drawings) will be mixed up and the children will be asked to order them 
linearly to ascertain if they understand that the drawings represent three distinct stages of their past. If any child 
fails to order the images correctly the order of the images will be reviewed and the child will be given a second 
chance to answer. 
 
When the three different drawings have been understood by the child, the pre-life image alone (religious 
symbolism‬ vs.‬no‬symbolism)‬ will‬ be‬laid‬down‬on‬the‬table‬and‬the‬child‬will‬ be‬asked‬12‬“yes-no”‬questions‬
about mental and bodily functions they might have had during their pre-life period. (See Appendix IV for the list 
of‬questions).‬All‬12‬questions‬will‬ be‬prefaced‬the‬following‬ way:‬“Think‬ about‬yourself‬during‬ this‬time‬when‬
your mother still was not pregnant with you. During that time (Could you feel happy?)”. 
 
 
SECTION V: RESEARCH CHECKLIST 
Please answer each question by ticking the appropriate box: 
 YES NO 
1. Does the project involve participants who are particularly vulnerable or unable to give 
informed consent (e.g. children/ young people under 18, people with learning 
disabilities, your own students)? 
  
2. Will the research involve people who could be deemed in any way to be vulnerable by 
virtue of their status within particular institutional settings (e.g., students at school, 
residents of nursing home, prison or other institution where individuals cannot come and 
go freely)? 
  
3. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study without their knowledge 
and consent (e.g., covert observation of people in non-public places)?   
4. Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics (e.g., sexual activity, drug use) 
where participants have not given prior consent to this?   
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 YES NO 
5. Will the study involve work with participants engaged in breaking the law? 
  
6. Will the publications/reports resulting from the study identify participants by name or 
in any other way that may identify them, bring them to the attention of the authorities, 
or any other persons, group or faction?  
  
7. Are drugs, placebos or other substances (e.g. food substances, vitamins) to be 
administered to the study participants or will the study involve invasive, intrusive or 
potentially harmful procedures of any kind? 
  
8. Will the study involve the use of human tissue or other human biological material? 
  
9. Will blood or tissue samples be obtained from participants? 
  
10. Is pain or more than mild discomfort likely to result from the study? 
  
11. Could the study induce psychological stress or anxiety or cause harm or negative 
consequences beyond the risks encountered in normal life?   
12. Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing? 
  
13. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and compensation for 
time) be offered to participants?   
 
 YES NO 
14. Will the study require the co-operation of another individual/ organisation for initial 
access to the groups or individuals to be recruited? If yes please attach the letters of 
permission from them. 
  
15. Will you be undertaking this research as part of a work placement or in conjunction 
with an external organisation? If Yes and the organisation has conducted its own research 
ethics review, please attach the ethical approval. 
  
 
If you have answered ‘yes’ to any of questions 1-13, you will need to complete the 
University Application Form for Research Ethics Approval. 
Students: If you have answered ‘No’ to all of questions1-13, pleasesign below and 
submit this completed Checklist, consent form, information leaflet and any other 
documents and attachments for your supervisor’s approval by email .Once you have 
received it back from your supervisor you will be able to submit via BBL. Forms that 
do not have your supervisor’s approval will be rejected.  
Staff: If you have answered ‘No’ to all of questions 1-13, please sign below and submit 
this completed Checklist, consent form, information sheet and any other documen ts 
and attachments via BBL.  
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Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Code of Research 
Ethics and any relevant academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your 
study.  This includes providing appropriate information sheets and consent forms, 
and ensuring confidentiality in the storage and use of data.  Any significant change in 
protocol over the course of the research should be notified to the Departmental Ethics 
Coordinator and may require a new application for ethics  approval. 
 
Applicant (Principal Investigator) Name: Mark Iruayenama  
Applicant’s e-signature: MAI 
Date: 16/10/14 
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Supervisor Section (for students only) 
 
 Please tick the appropriate boxes. The study should not be submitted until all boxes are 
ticked: 
 The student has read the University’s Code of Research Ethics  
 The topic merits further research 
 The student has the skills to carry out the research 
 The consent form is appropriate 
 The participant information leaflet is appropriate 
 The procedures for recruitment and obtaining informed consent are appropriate 
 An initial risk assessment has been completed 
 
If there are issues of risk in the research, a full risk assessment has been undertaken in line with 
the ‘School of Social Sciences Risk Assessment– FAQs’ document and a risk assessment is 
attached.   
 A DBS check has been obtained (where appropriate) 
 The debriefing form is appropriate (NB for psychology only- please refer to BBL) 
 
Any comments from supervisor: 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor or module leader (where appropriate): 
E-signature: Michael Price 
Date: 16/10/14 
 
Supervisors: Please email this form to the student who will then need to submit it and 
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related appendices via BBL.  
Student: Once you have received this form back from your supervisor, submit this 
completed Checklist, consent form, information sheet and any other documents and 
attachments via BBL. 
 
Departmental Ethics Coordinator section:  
This request for expedited review has been:  Approved (No additional ethics form is necessary) 
 Declined (Full University Ethics Form is necessary) 
 
Declined (Please give reason below) 
 
 
 
 
 
       
Departmental  Ethics  Coordinator Name:  
E- signature 
Date: 
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VI 
 
Study Five: Information Sheet 
 
Memory Retention and Other Psychological Constructs 
 
You are invited to participate in a psychology study interested in memory retention and 
other psychological constructs. The Department of Psychology at Brunel University 
requires that all persons who participate in psychology studies give their written 
consent to do so.   
 
The broad goal of this research program is to explore participants‘ ability to recall items 
encoded in memory in a dynamic context. A second and separate study assesses a 
number of general psychological constructs. 
 
You are not obligated to participate in this study and if at any time during the session 
you feel unable or unwilling to continue, you are free to leave without negative 
consequences.  
 
You will be required to perform a counting task and respond to a series of 
questionnaires not related to the counting task. The sequence of presentation (counting 
task first or not) will vary and depends on random allocation. 
 
There are disadvantages to taking part in this research. All your responses will be kept 
strictly confidential. Your name will never be linked with the research materials, as the 
research does not focus on any individual‘s response but the general scores of all the 
responses. 
 
If you have any general questions about this project, or ethical issues relating to the 
project, feel free to contact Mark Iruayenama at Mark.Iruayenama@brunel.ac.uk. If you 
have any concerns or complaints regarding the way in which the research is or has 
been conducted you may contact the Chair of the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee Dr Achim Schuetzwohl at achim.schuetzwohl@brunel.ac.uk. 
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VII 
Study Five: Consent form 
 
 YES NO 
1. I have read the Research Participant Information Sheet. 
  
2. I have had an opportunity to ask questions and discuss this 
study.   
3. I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study: 
- at any time (Please note that you will unable to withdraw once 
your data                                 has been included in any 
reports, publications etc.) 
  
- without having to give a reason for withdrawing   
4. I understand that I will not be referred to by name in any 
report/publications resulting from this study   
5. I agree to take part in this study 
  
 
Research Participant Name:  
Research Participant signature: 
Date: 
 
Principal Investigator name:  
Principal Investigator signature: 
Date: 
 
One copy to be kept by the participant and one by the researcher  
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VIII 
 
Study Five: Debriefing form 
 
 
The study aims to investigate how specific culturally  acquired constructs stored in 
memory and associated with specific cultural visual symbolism (religious and sceptic) 
might influence self-reported measures on need for cognitive closure, agency 
detection, positive schizotypy, and religiosity. Depending on a random selection 
process you would have viewed during the counting task either a category of religious 
symbolism, scepticism symbolism, or no symbolism. 
 
 
The general hypothesis of the study, informed by the attentional sensitization of 
unconscious visual processing theory (Kiefer & Adams, 2012), is that exposure to 
relevant symbolism will amplify task-congruent pathways associated with the particular 
symbol, given that these pathways are already established in memory. (i.e., exposure 
to scepticism symbolism will result in more rumination and doubt when responding to 
the questionnaires).        
 
 
The following studies might be of interest to you: 
 
  
Barrett, J.L. & Johnson, A.H. (2003).The role of control in attributing intentional 
agency to inanimate objects.Journal of Cognition and Culture,  3(3): p. 208-217.  
Kiefer, M., Adams, C,S, & Zovko, M. (2012). Attentional sensitization of 
unconscious visual processing: Top-down influences on masked priming.Adv 
Cogn Psychol. 8(1): 50–61. 
Scholl, B.J. & Tremoulet, P.D. (2000).Perceptual causality and animacy.Trends 
in Cognitive Sciences.4(8): p. 299-309.  
Wyer, R. Jr. (Ed) (1997). The Automaticity of Everyday Life: Advances in Social 
Cognition in Social Cognition, Volume 10. New York: Psychology Press  
 
 
 
 
 Once again, thank you for taking part in this study.   
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IX 
 
Study Five: Ethics Checklist / Approval
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Appendix D 
 
METHODOLOGY IMAGES 
i 
Study Two: Images for distraction task  
1.    2.  
3.    4.   
 
 
1. What can you see in the image? Can you join the dots to form a coherent 
image?  
2. Can you see any circles between the black squares? If you can how 
many can you see? 
3. Are the two straight lines (without the arrows at the end) equal? 
4. How many legs does this elephant have?  
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II 
 
Study Two: Secular primes 
 
 
 
1. First secular prime  
 
 
2. Second secular prime  
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III 
 
Study Two: Benign Religious primes 
 
 
 
 
1. First benign religious prime  
 
 
2. First benign religious prime  
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IV 
 
Study Two: Punitive Religious primes 
 
 
 
1. First punitive religious prime  
 
 
2. Second punitive religious prime 
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V 
 
Study Three Secular primes 
 
 
 
 
1. First secular prime  
 
 
 
2. Second  secular prime  
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VI 
 
Study Three: Benign religious primes 
 
 
 
 
 
1. First benign religious prime  
 
 
 
 
 
2. Second benign religious prime  
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VII 
 
Study Three: Punitive religious primes 
 
 
 
 
1. First punitive religious prime  
 
 
2. Second punitive religious prime  
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VIII 
 
Study Four: Religious and non-religious primes 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Pre-life period 
 
 
 
2. In uteri period 
 
 
 
2. Baby period 
 
Religious prime    Non-religious prime 
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IX 
Study Five: Still frame of secular video prime 
 
 
 
1. Still frame of secular video prime 
 
 
 
2. Still frame of secular video prime 
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X 
 
Study Five: Still frame of secular video prime 
 
 
 
1. Still frame of benign religious video prime 
 
 
 
2. Still frame of benign religious video prime 
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XI 
 
Study Three: Still frame of benign religious video prime 
 
 
 
1. Still frame of punitive religious video prime 
 
 
 
2. Still frame of punitive religious video prime 
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Appendix E 
 
I 
 
Studies Two and Three: Data collection  
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II 
 
Study Four: Data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Religious treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Non-religious treatment 
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III 
 
Study FIVE: Data collection 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
278 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix E 
 
Examples of religious images in Nigeria 
 
i 
 
Sample image taken in Abuja 
 
 
 
 
1. Large Christian billboard promoting the belief in eternity  
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II 
 
Sample images taken in Lagos 
 
 
1. Series of church adverts   2. Face of Jesus on a carrier  
      bag 
 
3. Threat of Hell inside a public bus 4. Christian flyer about Heaven  
      and Hell 
 
5. Christian stickers on a public bus 6. Christian messages inside a  
      public toilet 
 
7. Church building and signpost in a 8. Threat of Hell inside an  
socioeconomic status area academicvery lowinstitution 
(polytechnic)  
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APPENDIX G 
BELIEF AND DISBELIEF IN THE BIBLE 
I 
Table 1  
List of the Rewards for Belief in the Christian God in the Bible. 
Chapter and Verse  Quote 
Acts 16:31 ―… believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be 
saved, and thy house‖. 
Acts 13:39 ―And by him all that believe are justified from all things…‖  
 
Hebrews 11:6 ―But without faith it is impossible to please him: for he that 
cometh to God must believe…‖  
 
James 2:19 ―Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: 
the devils also believe and tremble‖. 
 
John 3:16 ―For God so loved the world, that he gave his only 
begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not 
perish, but have everlasting life‖. 
 
John 5:24 ―Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that heareth my word, 
and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, 
and shall not come into condemnation…‖. 
 
John 6:35 ―… he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that 
believeth on me shall never thirst‖. 
 
John 6:47 ―Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me 
hath everlasting life‖. 
 
John 11:25 ―Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection, and the life: 
he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall 
he live‖. 
 
 
(table continues) 
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Continued table 
 
Chapter and Verse Quote 
 
John 11:40 Jesus saith unto her, Said I not unto thee, that, if thou 
wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of God?‖ 
 
John 20:29 ―Jesus saith unto him, Thomas, because thou hast seen 
me, thou hast believed: blessed are they that have not 
seen, and yet have believed‖. 
 
Luke 1:45 ―And blessed is she that believed…‖ 
 
Luke 8:50 ―But when Jesus heard it, he answered him, saying, Fear 
not: believe only, and she shall be made whole‖. 
 
Mark 9:23 ―Jesus said unto him, if thou canst believe all things are 
possible to him that believeth‖. 
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II 
 
Table 2  
List of Consequences of Disbelief in the Christian God 
 
Chapter and Verse Quote 
 
1 John 5:10 ―… he that believeth not God hath made him a liar; 
because he believeth not the record that God gave of his 
Son‖. 
2 Thessalonians 2:12 ―That they all might be damned who believed not the 
truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness‖. 
2 Timothy 2:12 ―… if we deny [him], he also will deny us:‖ 
John 3:18 ―He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that 
believeth not is condemned already…‖  
John 3:36 ―He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he 
that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath 
of God abideth on him‖. 
John 8:24 ―I said therefore unto you, that ye shall die in your sins: 
for if ye believe not that I am he…” 
Jude 1:5 ―I will therefore put you in remembrance, though ye once 
knew this, how that the Lord, having saved the people out 
of the land of Egypt, afterward destroyed them that 
believed not‖. 
 
 
(table continues) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
283 
 
 
 
Continued table 
 
Chapter and Verse Quote 
 
Luke 1:20 ―And, behold, thou shalt be dumb, and not able to speak, 
until the day that these things shall be performed, 
because thou believest not my words, which shall be 
fulfilled in their season‖. 
Luke 12:46 ―The lord of that servant will come in a day when he 
looketh not for him, and at an hour when he is not aware, 
and will cut him in sunder, and will appoint him his portion 
with the unbelievers‖. 
Hebrews 3:18 – 3:19 ―And to whom sware he that they should not enter into his 
rest, but to them that believed not? 19 So we see that 
they could not enter in because of unbelief‖. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
